Washington has internalized a zero-sum relationship between Europe and Asia. They will trade-off resources, even if it’s not legally required.
Simon, Desmaele and Becker 21, *head of international security at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, **doctoral fellow at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, ***currently the US liaison to the French Joint Staff. He was previously a senior transatlantic fellow at the Institute for European Studies (Luise, Linde and Jordan, “Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition with China and the Future of America’s European Strategy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-1/Simon.pdf)//BB
First, to influence and maintain a favorable balance of power in Europe, Washington has traditionally relied on a strategy of forward military presence coupled with economic and diplomatic engagement. But US resources are limited, and increasing demand for them in Asia raises new questions about whether Washington can preserve a favorable European regional balance at a lower cost than in the past. In this context, Washington must consider how much influence it is willing to cede to European actors, including Germany, Russia, Britain, France and the European Union (EU). Second, as Europe becomes a secondary theater in US grand strategy, Washington is compelled to ensure that Europe’s key powers and institutions support US interests when it comes to competition with Beijing, or at least that they do not undermine US efforts in this regard. In reframing its relationship with Europe, the US is paying increasing attention to Europe’s positions toward China and Asia. Washington recently warned Europeans, for example, about China’s efforts to leverage investments and trade to gain technological and related strategic advantages relative to the United States.9 China-related considerations are also likely to gain relevance in the context of America’s calculations vis-à-vis Russia, a country that can play a direct—if limited—strategic role in China’s immediate periphery: Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Western Pacific. For now, the US continues to look at Russia (primarily) through a European lens and worries about Moscow’s potential to threaten US regional interests and upset the European balance. However, as competition with China becomes the focus of US grand strategy, Washington may increasingly consider how Russia can affect that competition—whether through its relationship with China, its ability to strain the European balance of power, or its propensity to create challenges elsewhere in the world. While it is certainly conceivable that the United States could retain such overwhelming advantages vis-à-vis all its peer competitors, or that China’s rise could organically slow or reverse, the US does not seem to be betting on either scenario.10 The centrality of China in US grand strategy appears to be structural, driven by the broader eastward shift in the distribution of global economic power. It is therefore unsurprising that as the United States becomes increasingly preoccupied with China’s rise, it adjusts strategy in other regions accordingly. The fact that Washington has labelled China as a “global” competitor makes it difficult to isolate SinoAmerican competition in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific area from what happens in other theaters, particularly Europe.