Resources for Europe directly tradeoff with resources dedicated to Asian power projection
Simon, Desmaele and Becker 21, *head of international security at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, **doctoral fellow at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, ***currently the US liaison to the French Joint Staff. He was previously a senior transatlantic fellow at the Institute for European Studies (Luise, Linde and Jordan, “Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition with China and the Future of America’s European Strategy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-1/Simon.pdf)//BB
Because outcompeting China has become its most pressing strategic challenge, Washington is adjusting its policies and relationships elsewhere in the world to ensure that they support competition with Beijing. While the shift has been gradual, it is now apparent; it represents a significant change from the twentieth century when the US went to war twice in Europe and conflicts elsewhere were often driven by the logic of European security. Whereas during the Cold War the US enlisted European allies in a global struggle against a European power, today the US seeks to enlist European allies in a global competition with a non-European power. To be sure, neither competition with China nor the preservation of a favorable regional balance in the Indo-Pacific fully monopolizes US global strategy. Both the 2017 NSS and the declassified synopsis of the 2018 NDS emphasize America’s ongoing commitment to the preservation of “favorable balances of power in Europe and the Middle East.”31 The NSS even refers to Europe as the United States’ most “significant trading partner” and notes that America is “safer when Europe is prosperous and stable.”32 Yet there is growing concern in Washington about how China’s rise might affect European security. In this regard, the NSS warns about Beijing’s supposed efforts to “gain a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies and infrastructure.”33 A 2019 task force report published by the bipartisan Asia Society similarly identifies “China’s pursuit of a mercantilist high-tech import-substitution industrial policy” and its “economic and diplomatic statecraft to gain a military foothold beyond Asia,” including in Europe, as key grand strategic challenges.34 In other words, because US strategic objectives in Asia and Europe are increasingly interdependent, China and Asia are also becoming increasingly relevant in Washington’s dealings with and in Europe. This interdependence complicates America’s European strategy in two ways: by underscoring the problem resource trade-offs and by pushing the US to reconcile competing interests across the two regions.