Assistance deters AND lowers the likelihood the US becomes directly involved in a future conflict
Porter and Mazarr 21, *Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London, ** senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the US National War College, where he was Professor and Associate Dean of Academics; and has been President of the Henry L Stimson Center; Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Defence Aide on Capitol Hill; and a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Patrick and Michael, “COUNTERING CHINA’S ADVENTURISM OVER TAIWAN: A THIRD WAY,” Lowy Institute, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/countering-china-s-adventurism-over-taiwan-third-way)//BB
We argue that the United States should reject the emerging belief that it confronts a binary choice over Taiwan — go all-in on a defence of Taiwan in the event of attack, or see its position in the Indo-Pacific crumble. This Manichean view represents an incoherent mixture of alarmist pessimism about what is at stake with a striking overconfidence in the US ability to deter or win a conflict that would represent an existential challenge to the CCP. Between these two poles, of abandonment and an unqualified US security pledge, there is a prudent middle way. The United States should act as armourer, but not guarantor. It should help prepare Taiwan to defend itself, to raise costs against any aggression, and develop means of punishing China with a range of non-military tools, but not commit in advance to wade in militarily — and consciously equip itself with a menu of options for deterring and punishing Beijing’s aggression without fighting. There are intermediate options that would allow a US administration to reserve the right to directly defend Taiwan — but also to choose not to become directly involved in a war and yet still enhance deterrence before conflict, ensure that any attack was a disaster for Beijing, and make it even more difficult for China to dominate the Indo-Pacific afterwards. We do not advocate ruling out any future policy choice.[13] We cannot forecast what a US president might decide in the event of a crisis, and we do not suggest that the United States should publicly abandon Taiwan. The chance that the United States would join any war over Taiwan will always exist. Increasingly, however, the scope of choice in the event of an attack appears to be narrowing to two extremes — either fighting, or cutting and running.[14] We argue that the United States should widen the scope of options for US presidents over Taiwan to avoid that dilemma.