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AT: Orientalism- Said’s“Ideal type”

Said’s narrative of Orientalism contains a damaging paradox in which he seeks to reject typification of “the orient” yet himself typifies European civilization as an “Ideal Type”, an agent of Orientalism creating an essentialist simplification

Sara R. Farris 10[Sara R. Farris, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London , "AN ‘IDEAL TYPE’ CALLED ORIENTALISM",7-19-2010, Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/1369801X.2010.489701, 1LEE]

The ‘whole impulse to classify nature and man into types’ (Said 2003: 119), for Said, was one of the elements that prepared the way for modern Orientalist structures. ‘In natural history, in anthropology, in cultural generalization, a type had a particular character which provided the observer with a designation and, as Foucault says, “a controlled derivation”’ (ibid.). Said goes on to list such designations: ‘the wild men’, ‘the Europeans’, ‘the Asiatics’ and so on. The practice of classification, as Said recognized, became crucial to sciences, both natural and social. However, in the field of the social sciences and humanities it resulted in the assembly of human/cultural types, thus producing stereotyped images of cultural collectivities. As we have seen, Said acknowledged that Max Weber's ideal types played a central role both in shaping the ways in which classification was employed by European – but also North American – social sciences and in assembling non-western cultures and individuals into Orientalized types.

Said was thus very insightful when he recognized a certain instrumental and summational function of the notion of the ideal type. Its main problem and dangerousness, for Said, lay in the nature of the ideal type itself, as a way of simplifying and naturalizing the Other (especially the Oriental Other) as an articulation of a geographical, historical and sociopolitical entity with immutable traits. He also recognized the pervasiveness of this notion in contemporary intellectual work. As he writes, ‘still, the notion of a type – Oriental, Islamic, Arab, or whatever – endures and is nourished by similar kinds of abstractions or paradigms or types as they emerge out of the modern social sciences’ (Said 2003: 61, my italics).

The characteristics of ideal types as the modalities and the outcomes of conceptualization and classification proper to social sciences are the result of Weber's epistemological presuppositions. Ideal types express Weber's neo-Kantian conception of the relationship between reality and knowledge in which the former is a meaningless infinity in constant change, to which human beings give their own meanings, and the latter is the rigorous, disciplined capacity of the scientist to put some order in this chaos. The ideal type

is a conceptual construct which is neither historical reality nor even the ‘true’ reality. It is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance. It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components. (Weber 1949: 93)

The ideal type thus appears as a ‘telescope’ or a ‘yardstick’ (Mommsen 1974) used in order to comprehend reality.

Within Max Weber's comparative studies on world religions, the method of the ideal type functions as a tool for the ‘conceptualization’ and ‘classification’ of different social phenomena by means of focusing upon a specific point of view, or ‘perspective angle’. Thus Weber applied it in his historical comparative studies in order to classify religious prescriptions regarding economic activity into ‘types of economic ethics’, and came up with a typification of different societies as those geoculturally and geopolitically unified constellations that Said criticized as essentialist and stereotyped.

Each of Weber's studies on Weltreligionen thus leads to the formulation of types of ‘civilizations’ that in the end seem to be assumed as uniform and static. As a result, as many subsequent critics have emphasized, the variables ‘time’ and ‘history’ are cancelled from these unifying/essentializing ideal types (Fischoff 1944; Robertson 1933). Even Parsons had to admit that Weber ‘tended to treat typical motives … as rigidly unchangeable entities [and] used ideal types to atomize his material into rigid units which could only be combined and recombined in a mechanistic way or absorbed into higher-order patterns’ (Parsons 1963: lxiv).

Said, on the other hand, although he does not offer such an extensive methodological reflection as Weber, refers explicitly to Foucauldian concepts of discursive formations in methodological terms. Nonetheless, several criticisms of the same kind as those addressed to Weber's ideal types have also been made of Said's multifaceted definition of Orientalism (Clifford 1988; Porter 1994). The tendency towards a certain semantic shifting in his definition of Orientalism and the association between very different authors who belonged to very different countries and epochs are aspects of Said's work that have been criticized precisely because of a certain ultimate disregard for the variable ‘history’. As Porter has argued, ‘[Said] fails to historicize adequately the texts he cites and summarizes, finding always the same triumphant discourse where several are frequently in conflict’ (1994: 160).

We could go further by noting many more similarities between Said's discourse and Weber's ideal type. Orientalism shares with Weber's notion of the ideal type the one-sided viewpoint of departure and focus that implies the choice of what aspects or objects can enter into the definition (or class). Thus, Said chose to focus on British, French and American Orientalism, while leaving aside other writings. Like Weber's ideal type, Orientalism tries to view with the same ‘telescope’ centuries of history and the most disparate writings and authors, thus often risking annihilating history and dehistoricizing the object of investigation. Similarly, Weber and Said share an attitude of beginning the classification with the purpose of providing a historical account of the object under investigation (namely, the origin of the spirit of capitalism in Weber, and the origin of Orientalism in Said), thus attempting to find its starting point. In a further moment, however, this point is then lost in the beginning of human history. In Weber it was to be the sixteenth century of the Reformation, but then became the beginning of rationalization in its march from pre-Christian history right up until the disenchantment of the world in Protestant Europe. In Said, Orientalism at one stage is the discourse constructed ‘politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period’ (Said 2003: 3) and then progressively goes back to the Middle Ages with Dante Alighieri and then to that virtual place that Said calls ‘imaginative geography’, which makes us set arbitrary boundaries according to a ‘universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is “ours” and an unfamiliar space beyond “ours” which is “theirs”’ (53–9).

In the end, and at a more substantial level, the central similarity between Weber's ideal types of Oriental civilizations and Said's ideal type of Orientalism lies in their very content: in their geopolitical and geocultural ‘nature’ as immutable and determining traits. The mere fact of belonging to them affects ideas, cultural and intellectual practices and identities. We might recall that by ‘Orientalism’ Said means, among other things, ‘European culture’ and ‘Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’ (Said 2003: 3). Thus the Orientalist discourse belongs to ‘Europe’ and the ‘West’ as autonomous entities, and it ends up being the ideal type of the attitude adopted by westerners towards the Orient, in a pure geocultural, crystallized fashion. Said's (and several postcolonials’) tendency to treat Orientalism as a geographical and ‘civilizational’ entity has been brilliantly highlighted by Fernando Coronil (1996) and Neil Lazarus (2002). The former notes how ‘typical markers of collective identities, such as “territory”, “culture”, “history” or “religion” appear as autonomous entities … [and] as with commodities, the material thing-like, tangible form of geographical entities becomes a privileged medium to represent the less tangible historical relations among peoples’ (Coronil 1996: 77). As a consequence, the Orientalist typifying or summational attitude, strongly criticized by Said for the generalizations and essentialization of the non-western territories and cultures it provided, is the expression of a territorial entity itself, a territorial entity which in turn has been unified and generalized by Said in a common type: European culture.

Said was certainly correct to identify in the European social sciences dealing with non-western societies and in particular Weber's ideal types the danger of essentialist simplification that, at its core, was informed by a Eurocentric attitude. Nonetheless, when he accused Eurocentrism of essentializing non-western societies, of neutralizing their internal differences and their history, of addressing artificial entities such as the ‘Orient’ or ‘Islam’ and the like, he himself ran the risk of an essentialist simplication. This is to say that he committed the error of adopting a similar conceptual structure in relation to Europe or the West, conceived as geographical, geopolitical, geocultural abstract categories.

Beyond Orientalism

As Said clearly recognized, the most important task of all would be that of undertaking ‘studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a non-repressive and non-manipulative, perspective’ (Said 2003: 24). This is certainly a difficult task, for which answers on the level of meta-reflection – epistemological and/or methodological – seem to be inadequate and misleading.21 Said was well aware of the importance of such a task; indeed, his critique of the manipulative and repressive depictions produced by European scholars during centuries of uneven relations between the West and the East was designed precisely in order to open the space for such non-repressive perspectives. Nonetheless, while conducting this critique, he employed a methodological and theoretical apparatus much closer to that which he criticized than he thought.

The concept of discursive formation, used by Said in order to describe Orientalism both as the discourse produced by colonial rulers and as the discourse that performatively produced them, recalls Weber's analysis of the active dimension of the relationship between religion and political power. This pattern of thought seems to affect also their reciprocal anti-Marx (and anti-Marxist) critique, as well as a certain epistemic ambiguity according to which representation is never, and can never be, ‘objective’ or ‘true’. At the same time, both affirm that the task of the intellectual is to speak ‘truth’ to power and politics. In this way, the realm of politics becomes the locus in which determining decisions that ‘truly’ act upon reality can be made.

Yet, in the last instance, the decisive affinity between Weber and Said lies in the way in which both conceptualized their object of enquiry: Said, not less than Weber, produced an ‘ideal type’ of the West as the geographical, geocultural and geopolitical agent of Orientalism. However, while the formulation of a ‘civilizational’ and ‘geocultural’ ideal type was precisely Weber's goal, in his search for the origin of Europe's accomplishments in comparison to the East, Said's goal was that of demolishing this ‘civilizational’ attitude that, according to him, helped to immortalize the Orient as the static, geocultural entity thus depicted by European writers. The conceptual coordinates that he employed for his analysis, however, arguably run the risk of unwittingly reinforcing such ‘civilizational’ attitudes.22

This internal paradox strongly weakens Said's critique, not only in intellectual terms, as a source of contradictions or incoherence, but especially on the level of what his critique aimed to be: that is, an instrument for the pursuit of studies not affected by a manipulative and repressive perspective. If the origin of this manipulative perspective is thought to lie in a sort of geographical entity, or immutable ‘cultural’ essence (regardless of whether it is the European or the Oriental), it obviously becomes much more difficult, if not impossible, to produce a counter-non-manipulative perspective from within.23 Said's critique has been important for the humanities and social theory as a stimulus for rethinking some foundational categories and in terms of disciplining a certain politico-theoretical ‘arrogance’. The time has perhaps come, however, to rethink the terms of this critique itself, if we are to find a way to move beyond the ‘ideal type’ – and reality – that lies at the heart of Orientalism.

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