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No China Link

The China threat is real – any notions that suggest otherwise are equally orientalizing – turns the K

Dicicco et. Al 20(Jonathan M. Dicicco, Ja Ian Chong, Tadeusz Kugler, Jack S. Levy, J. Patrick Rhamey Jr., Yuan-Kang Wang, AyŞE Zarakol, Steve Chan, November 9 2020 "Roundtable 12-2 on Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations," H-Diplo | ISSF, https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides)//BRownRice

Indications exist that the Xi leadership may be less satisfied with the status quo than Chan claims given that current PRC actions push up against not only the United States and Taiwan. South Korea reported economic punishment from China as a result of the deployment of a missile defense system to guard against possible North Korean attacks and repeated dangerous behavior by Chinese fishing vessels.[8] Japan expressed concern over increased naval and aerial activity by PRC assets in and over contested areas.[9] Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam indicate growing PRC harassment of their fishing and other civilian vessels in the South China Sea, which is notable given that Indonesia and the PRC do not have overlapping territorial claims.[10] Then there are tensions along the Sino-Indian border that recently resulted in deadly clashes between Indian and Chinese troops.[11] Current PRC behavior is worrisome for regional actors in other ways as well. Australia reports economic pressure for not conforming to Beijing’s preferences on pushing for an open investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and complaining about PRC efforts to influence its internal politics.[12] Along with Canada, Australia saw citizens detained and charged for illegal activities under suspicious circumstances.[13] Singapore too faced Chinese state pressure over its insistence on adherence the rule of law over the arbitration over the South China Sea brought by the Philippines against the PRC.[14] That such issues do not receive more treatment by Chan is curious since they raise questions about PRC’s commitment to self-restraint and can potentially trigger the chain-ganging effects on U.S.-China ties that Chan warns readers about (21-22, 211-215). Such friction can potentially harden positions and raise the stakes over an issue such that prevailing becomes more tied to status and other concerns, driving more aggressive and even revisionist behavior.[15] Chan’s finding that misplaced worries about the PRC and its intentions stem in part from misunderstandings of perspectives on international politics that are informed by theories from “the West” rather than China deserves elaboration and debate. So-called “Western” international relations theories often have parallels in the Chinese tradition, broadly construed. Work analyzing Spring and Autumn, Warring States, Song, and Ming documents indicate that the strategic thought that is prominent in these periods closely resembles statecraft familiar to those in the contemporary “West.”[16] Texts as varied as the Han-era annals Records of the Grand Historian and the Ming-era fiction Romance of the Three Kingdoms will suggest the same.[17] Parallels between “Western” and “Chinese” approaches to politics are unsurprising. Several millennia of collective human experience, thought, and debate over statecraft, conflict, as well as governance are almost certainly bound to produce similarities in responses. Dividing the world into “Western” and “Chinese” views of the world ignores the fact the PRC has disagreements with ostensibly “non-Western” polities such as India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, each with their own distinct philosophical traditions.[18] Also, despite sharing cultural origins, people in the PRC and on Taiwan disagree fundamentally issues of political values and rights, not the relatively simple issues of who should rule China or what a Chinese state should entail geographically.[19] Moreover, the PRC’s ruling Chinese Communist Party draws at least some of its inspiration from European thinkers in the form of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. Successive dynasties from historical China also proved themselves very adept at conquest—that is how regimes and empires get built.[20] Attributing tensions between the United States and PRC to culture suggests an overly monolithic view of the rich and varied philosophical and political traditions both major powers draw from, giving them less credit than is due.[21] To claim that contemporary international scholarship and U.S. policy are unable to adequately understand China because they are “Western” may oversimplify the nature and seriousness of problems dogging U.S.-China relations and their consequences for the world. Relegating difference to culture is not only Orientalizing, it can encourage a misplaced expectation that understanding can bring some sort of happy, mutually acceptable outcome. Perhaps Beijing and Washington understand each other well. They simply disagree fundamentally over values and interests in ways that make finding mutually acceptable accommodation increasingly difficult. This does not have to imply that either side is morally superior or normatively “better” than the other, just that understanding provides little promise for improving relations and avoiding confrontation. Better accounting for such possibilities invites fuller consideration of the roles that agency and contingency play in major power relations, two features that Chan clearly identifies as critical in the volume. Thucydides’s Trap? deserves much credit for grappling with important, pressing, and difficult questions about the drivers behind the downturn in U.S.-China relations and possible ways to address this slide. Yet, Chan’s outlook is more similar to Graham Allison’s than he initially lets on. Allison’s call for creative statecraft is possible only if the United States and China are not locked in a structural situation which neither can escape or beset by contingent circumstances that prevents Washington and Beijing from effectively exercising the agency Chan believes is central. Chan offers some insight when he points to divergences in perspectives between Washington and Beijing but may be overly limiting the ways he conceives of effects of culture and socialization. Likewise, the volume can go further in conceptualizing the various ways third parties such as regional actors and international organizations can affect U.S.-China ties, given that world politics is not just major powers going at each other—a fact both Chan and Allison recognize. Major power interactions simply do not occur in a vacuum. Such dynamics may reinforce competition as much as ameliorate them, but their effects await further clarification and explanation.

The idea we need to protect the Chinese people from their own tech is dumb and founded in sinotechnophobia

Mahoney 22 – Professor of Politics and International Relations at East China Normal University (ECNU); Executive Director of the International Center for Advanced Political Studies (ECNU); Founder and Director of the International Graduate Program in Politics (ECNU); Senior Research Fellow, Institute for the Development of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics at Southeast University in Nanjing (Jiangsu's leading think-tank); Associate Editor, US-based Journal of Chinese Political Science (SSCI), Associate Editor, and Co-Editor, ECNU Review. With more than 200 publications and a winner of multiple teaching and research awards, he appears frequently on global broadcasts (350+), including CGTN, CCTV, BBC, Airing, RT International and TRT World, and is a regular contributor to China Radio International’s The Beijing Hour and RTHK’s Backchat (Hong Kong). He was a member of the Chinese team that translated Jiang Zemin’s Selected Works into English and subsequently a Senior Researcher with Beijing’s leading think-tank, the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau. He is a regular contributor to South China Morning Post and Beijing Review, among others. Prior to his doctoral studies he was a public health officer with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC/ATSDR). (Josef, “China's Rise as an Advanced Technological Society and the Rise of Digital Orientalism.”, 6/14/22, Europe PMC, , Accessed 7/19/22)//mackerel

The key point here is not to debate the pros and cons of these changes but to note that since Liberation (1949) and especially 1978, China has rapidly developed as an advanced technological society. This development is vital for independence and security but also a key source of global technological culture. This transformation is not confirmed solely by China’s advances in technologies, for example, e.g., quantum computing, artificial intelligence, green energy and space exploration, or social media. Rather, in tandem with China’s advanced social and political organization, we can note the widespread presence of the modern cogito–consciousness, all of which reflect industrial ratiocination, industrial production, industrial education and so on, and all of which are consistent with technological society [41, 51].

Western theorists have long debated the utopian and dystopian aspects associated with becoming a technological society. In the East, in many instances, modernity emerged at speed when possible to counter Western tech-supported imperialism [81]; but in the West, the development of technological society was always resisted by and in negotiations with traditional values and practices. Even in modern Western philosophy, the critical tradition has regarded technological advances as being mostly negative. Ellul’s critique and Heidegger’s nightmare have already been mentioned, but these were inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche, and before him, Søren Kierkegaard, who saw in ‘modern man’ an abomination of being [3, 18, 79]. In the post-war period, these concerns were expressed by the Frankfurt School, but also in Michel Foucault’s works, which equated modernity with totalizing systems of control, with an unrestrained biopolitics and governmentality manifesting in modern schools, hospitals, prisons and so on, all of which were driven by the psychological and physical discipline imposed by the modern market economy [55]. Like Nietzsche, Foucault romanticized certain aspects of Platonic and Stoic philosophy, while Kierkegaard and Ellul did something similar with Christianity—with Ellul going so far as to describe mankind in modern technological society as the “new demons,” as “mature insects that have nothing left to do but reproduce themselves and die” ([13] vii). In short, these theorists have had a profound influence on Western society, and all the more so because their critiques reflected the deep existential fears associated with Western modernity: these have included an Orientalist pride in the West for creating modernity, and the unease that this creation inescapably has always been a double-movement of the becoming and unbecoming of the West itself.

In China, however, a different critical tradition was established as a solution to the even bigger existential crisis of foreign domination. On the one hand, the proliferation of Marxism and especially Marxism-Leninism substantially normalized technological development as a historically necessary step for human progress, one that viewed technology and consciousness as advancing and converging as and through the state itself. On the other hand, this was not deeply at odds with Chinese tradition, particularly the Confucian tradition, one in which technique in the form of ritual (li) was to be perfected by the individual, whether the emperor, the gentleman, the father, as exemplars of the ritual that constituted an advanced state of being (e.g., see [50]). Thus, while some Chinese traditions certainly resisted development, China’s rapid advancement as a technological society finds accordance with its traditional and modern philosophical perspectives on human progress, and not just the existential necessity of closing the technology gap to establish and sustain sovereignty.

It’s in this context that we can view broad popular support for Chinese development as a technological society in China itself in terms of high rates of new technology adoption [39], popular support for scientific solutions to problems, and mass positive engagement in public policies that aim for social advances consistent with both individual and national transformations that are forward-reaching, tech-based and tech-oriented [70]—exemplified most recently by broad popular support for China’s “dynamic zero-covid policies” (dongtai qingling).

While the West worries over the pervasiveness of technology and the relatively unrestrained power and influence of big technology firms, while it worries over the erosion of traditional values, privacy, and so on, while such resistances have been most recently on display with broad pushbacks over attempts to formulate effective responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, we see the opposite in China. Broad popular support has greeted, effectively demanded and made possible dynamic zero-covid policies, along with the rapid development and deployment of zero-covid technologies [29]. This does not mean that Chinese people have liked the costs associated with the policies [78], but they have preferred the benefits over the absence of effective controls [35]. And before this, surveys indicate approximately 80% of respondents have supported the development and implementation of China’s “social credit system” (shehui xinyong tixi), although the system is still incomplete and some doubt it will achieve its stated objectives, or do so with reasonable risks to personal privacy [33].

To be fair, not all innovations are popular. For example, although it’s still early days in the development and roll-out of China’s new digital yuan (shuzi renminbi), anecdotal reports suggest less than enthusiastic receptions among the general public. Nevertheless, tech-oriented innovations are popularly understood as essential for improved governance, including anti-corruption efforts, poverty alleviation, and market management, and they are reinforced with popular regulations designed to limit the power of tech firms and harmful social effects associated with technology, like unhealthy screen times among school age children. Furthermore, big tech advances, like 5G, are celebrated, and names like Huawei are embraced as a matter of national pride, with domestic sales soaring in response to international rejections of the same. The key point here is that China’s actualization as a technological society that advances with technology is broadly popular, that it’s even valorized by Chinese theorists as consistent with the rise of an “intelligent civilization” (zhineng wenming), one in which both governance and daily life are substantially supported by big data, artificial intelligence and other forms of digitalization [20, 84], and consistent with Marxist theories of social progress [76].

This isn’t to say that there are no pushbacks, no traditional values opposing, or again, that we don’t see periodic attempts to regulate and dismantle some technologies and tech firms. This has happened quite publicly with new laws policies directed at digital monopolies and anti-trust practices undercutting fair competition and governance, as well as other developments considered harmful to social and individual well-being. This was observed in enforcements against Alibaba in 2021, with implications for other firms (in 2022, new policies were announced to ease some big tech restrictions to help bolster an economy battered by lockdowns, but this does not signal a significant reversal of capacity or direction). Broadly, these regulations coincided with new laws related to digital finance and cryptocurrencies, but also video gaming, including limiting inappropriate content and imposing strict limits on children’s playing times (2021). Those policies were paired that same year with strict limits directed at buke—after-school study programs—which along with video games were assessed as having reached a tipping point of negative health effects and declining standardized test scores. In fact, these were new attempts at earlier policies with similar goals, e.g., efforts to limit teachers from assigning students unregulated, “off-the-books” homework through social media (initiated in 2018, and reinforced in 2021).

Overall, these policies were responses to pressures building over many years in different sectors. It bears noting that in the case of policies affecting children, there had long been efforts, often quixotic, to reign in China’s intensely industrial model of education [15, 86]; but these were more fully addressed at the height of China’s response to the pandemic. There is no evidence to suggest these policies were advanced because of the pandemic, i.e., when it was clear that online schooling in lockdown locations along with pandemic related social restrictions had made children even more vulnerable to digital exploitation and alienation, although such fears were acknowledged by some (see, for example, Wang et al. [77], Teng et al. [73], and Jiang, Tong, and Chen [31]). And they stand in stark contrast with excessive gaming and increased digital-associated alienation affecting American children in the same period and others around the world [17, 58], and for which there were little to no public policy responses.

But from a holistic perspective, these actions were not contrary to China’s emergence as a technological society but consistent with efforts to manage the well-being of that society as a whole, one in which governmentality is not understood as a conflict between the externality of a state and party vs. the internality of a more authentic or liberated individual existence, but as the convergence of both as the same, and broadly consistent with shared thinking, goals and objectives. Ideally, this is what a technological society would do, or else risk being less of a society and less capable technologically. So while we can point to Heidegger and Foucault and others as being horrified by such developments or less dramatically, the semi-luddite tendencies sometimes observed in European societies today, in fact, China’s emergence as a technological society is not horrific to most Chinese—quite the opposite. This development connected, however, to the emergence in the West of a new Sinophobia and Sino(techno)phobia.

Realism is the true root cause of Wests response to China, not orientalism-doesn’t explain other “oriental” companies like Samsung not being pushed away

Gregory Moore 22[Gregory Moore, Professor of Global Studies and Politics at Colorado Christian University, "Huawei, Cyber-Sovereignty and Liberal Norms: China’s Challenge to the West/Democracies",6-3-2022, SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09814-2, 1LEE]

There are several potential problems with this argument. First, establishing that fear is an independent variable is not easy. Despite the quality of their work generally speaking, the editors have not done the thick description necessary to establish this. Simply showing tough rhetoric, hawkish views on the US/Western/democratic side (which are indeed there), does not really do the job effectively. Second, we haven’t considered counterfactuals or ruled out other methods that might test our hypothesis or do a better job explaining the outcome we observe (the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei) than the proposed independent variable, digital orientalism. Following on from this point, I would propose a consideration of the hypothesized independent variable, “China and Huawei pose credible threats to national security of the US and other democracies” as a way to understand the approach the US, Australia, the UK and others have taken toward Huawei.

Securitization provides a way of looking at this issue that is helpful in this case. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde [3: 25] put it,

Securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects…The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?

There can be no doubt that in the United States, Australia, India and other countries, Huawei’s 5G offerings have been securitized, and this is evident by the “discourse and political constellations” in those and other countries, as I’ve illustrated above. Yet why hasn’t this been the case in all countries? As Buzan et al. note, referencing the work of Arnold Wolfers [3: 30], security threats may be objective/real, or subjective/perceived, and where the twain meet or diverge is not always easy to ascertain. It is possible that A. China’s Huawei is acting as a threat in some countries and not in others. It’s also possible that B. China’s Huawei and its 5G are a threat wherever they operate but some countries don’t yet understand that or don’t believe it. It’s also possible that C. Huawei and its 5G are not a threat and have simply been socially constructed as a threat, needlessly securitized. The notion that digital orientalism is the reason for the securitization of Huawei and its 5G would line up with the last tack, or C.

The argument presented here, however, is that digital orientalism does not explain the US/Western/democratic response to China’s growing illiberal impact on global internet governance or its worrisome presence, via Huawei, in more and more national 5G internet infrastructure schemes. On the contrary, the hypothesis posed here is something like B. above, that real security concerns do, that the securitization of Huawei is not an irrational response to Huawei 5G because of 1. some of Huawei’s actions/track record, 2. the nature of its relations with the Chinese state, and 3. the track record or broader actions (now and in the past) of that Chinese state at home and abroad as it regards media freedoms, intellectual property theft, human rights problems, and more. Having said this, digital (or conventional) orientalism may be lurking in the background and exacerbating technological and political dynamics. I suspect it is. The editors are likely not incorrect in that sense, for certainly there is a sense that China represents a “digital other,” a “political other” and a “cultural other” for Westerners and Liberals in general, and the notion of digital orientalism may explain certain aspects of that. At the same time, the argument presented here is that a careful study of China’s practices in the cyber-realm, whether at home or abroad,Footnote9 make it clear that there are very clear security-centric reasons for concern about China’s and Huawei’s presence in 5G internet infrastructure construction, mobile phone handset production, and even Chinese apps like TikTok and WeChat, which India has banned, and both of which the Trump Administration tried but failed to ban in the US.

US, Australian, British, Swedish and other countries’ increasingly robust pushback against Huawei and other Chinese players in the construction of global 5G infrastructure can be easily understood by studying A. China’s cyber practices at home and abroad, and B. the impact they have on the security (and perceptions of security) of nations they work with. Very simply, those pushing back see what China is doing, they don’t like it, and they don’t want Chinese companies to have any major role in constructing telecommunications infrastructure inside their countries. This is because they believe they know what that will lead to, and they don’t believe that is good from their perspectives. If China/Huawei was a player like Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the US and these others would not be raising alarms. In fact, the US, Australia and UK have not been raising alarms about Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the other major players in 5G. Why? Is it digital orientalism? In fact, given that Samsung is Korean, one might expect the US to push back against Samsung, for it too is “oriental,” non-Western, following the logic of Said. We don’t really see that, however. South Korea is a democratic polity and a US ally, so there is no angst on Washington’s part, no concerns about security. Moreover, the South Korean government does not have a history of stealing US IPR, of spying on the US as China has been, or doing anything that could be considered a national security threat toward the US, so there has been no pushback from Washington in the face of Samsung’s growing presence in the US or in US 5G operations.

Some argue that the US simply refuses to yield the number one spot to anyone, whether in technology or in economic dominance. Yet if the US was pushing back against Huawei because the US wanted to be number one, because the US wanted to dominate, why wouldn’t the US fund AT&T, Apple, Google or someone else in the US to be number one? Why wouldn’t the US hinder the advances of Nokia, Ericsson and/or Samsung in the US and elsewhere? We don’t really see any of that, however.

Digital orientalism doesn’t really explain this, in this case. I will argue here that it’s because first, American thinkers do not think in such hierarchical terms as their Chinese counterparts do (they aren’t unified in an obsession with being number 1 as is the case with the Chinese state and its companies; see [18]. Second, the US is not pushing back against Huawei primarily because of market imperatives/motivations, but rather because of concerns about security and lack of trust in the Chinese state and Chinese companies that are subject thereto. The US trusts the leadership of Nokia, Ericsson and Samsung, and they don’t see their home governments (Finland, Sweden and South Korea, respectively) as bent on spying, stealing IPR and undermining free expression at home and increasingly around the world. It’s about the Chinese state’s very bad track record of stealing intellectual property, of suppressing free expression, of cyber-surveillance and hacking, of suppressing truth and suppressing dissidents – increasingly not only inside China but abroad as well.Footnote10 Pushing back against Huawei and China’s cyber-sovereignty model has become an existential fight for those who see things in the way I have depicted here. In a telling statement by former Obama National Security Advisor Susan Rice to Canada’s CBC about the security threat Huawei posed to Canada and others, Rice said,

It’s hard for me to emphasize adequately without getting into classified terrain how serious it is…It gives the Chinese the ability, if they choose to use it, to access all kinds of information. Civilian intelligence, military, that could be very, very compromising. So as much as I disagree with the Trump administration on a number of things, on this I believe they are right [15].

Given how much Rice was opposed to Donald Trump and almost all he stood for, her agreement with him on this issue is striking. It seems clear that this was no election-year posturing on the Trump Administration’s part, though that is how the Chinese government tends to frame it.Footnote11 Huawei’s building and operation of 5G networks in other countries poses serious challenges to the security of potentially any host-country, and what is being argued here is that this is the reason for the increasing push-back, the securitization moves, China and Huawei are facing as Huawei tries to expand its 5G operations abroad.

Toward the ends of explaining how and why Huawei 5G gets securitized in some places and not others, I think it is possible to take Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s securitization a bit further. I don’t see regional security complexes (a key factor in their work) at play in a prominent way here, because the array of countries that have aligned in opposition to Huawei are more diverse than any regional framework could accommodate, with Sweden, Australia, India, the UK and the US all saying no to Huawei, whereas Germany, South Korea, and Canada are keeping the doors open. The US, for example, has close allies on both sides of this digital divide, and there are members of China’s region/neighborhood who are on both sides of this divide as well, all of which is to say that neither alliance patterns or regional patterns clearly explain the digital divide over Huawei.

I think another concept found in Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s work [3] better explains it, with the help of an expansion of another of their concepts. The first concept referenced here is that of security constellations (p. 201). Buzan et al. define them as “a much wider concept than security complexes, reflecting as it does the totality of possible security interrelationships at all levels” (p. 201). They add, “security constellations will almost certainly generate a much fuller set of nonregional subglobal patterns (such as those created by the sets of countries that export copper or those countries vulnerable to seal-level rises” (p. 201–2). Considering the range of Buzan et al.’s “sectors” (ie, military, environmental, economic, societal and political sectors), it is not clear where one would locate cyber, however. Given that the work being referenced was published in 1998, it seems logical that two new sectors should be added to Buzan et al.’s sectoral framework, and this is the conceptual expansion referenced above: that of cyber and space sectors. While space as sector is yet relatively underdeveloped, cyber is a sector that has grown apace in recent years and should now be considered a sector in its own right, as might be evidenced by the addition of “Cyber Commands” and like agencies to the arsenals of many nations today, whereas none existed only a few short years ago. With the addition of a cyber sector and the interrelation of this sector with extant sectors like military, economic and political sectors, for example, it is clearer to see how a security constellation encompassing all of these might interplay so as to bring about the digital divide we’ve seen over Huawei’s participation in 5G network construction. For example, whereas Sweden does not have to worry about a direct military threat from China as it does from neighbor Russia, it does operate in a security constellation wherein China’s economic interests (and actions) and the nature of its political sector/system are such that Sweden perceives a threat. In the same way, whereas South Korea has a more immediate potential threat from China militarily (after all, S. Korea’s mortal enemy North Korea is China’s ally, and S. Korea’s ally the US is China’s chief adversary), it does not apparently view China (or at least Huawei) with as much trepidation as the US does. It may be that it doesn’t see its own interests as being as divergent from China’s as the US does. It may also be that its cool relationship with Japan for reasons of unresolved history puts it in closer ideational orientation to China (with which it shares some anti-Japanese historical angst) than, again, would be the case with the US. Cyber is just one part of a constellation of security interests between these many players and so a simple digital orientalist, geopolitical, economic or alliance-driven explanation alone does not really do justice to the broader complexity of interests and issues that drive issues or sectors like cyber.

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