AT: retooling rhetoric alt
The alt recreates the epistemological failures they try to critique
Eun 18(Yong-Soo Eunm Yong-Soo Eun, PhD, is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Hanyang University, South Korea, and the Editor-in-Chief of the Routledge series, IR Theory and Practice in Asia. Yong-Soo is broadly interested in IR theory, pluralism in social and international studies, emotion, and the international politics of the Asia-Pacific region. His work has been published in scholarly journals including Review of International Studies, PS: Political Science and Politics, Perspectives on Politics, and The Pacific Review., 10-17-2018, "Opening up the debate over ‘non-western’ international relations," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0263395718805401)//BRownRice
Criticisms At the same time, a number of empirical, epistemological, and normative criticisms have been raised against attempts to develop a Chinese IR theory and (by extension) ‘non-Western’ IR. Empirically, Asian IR are not fundamentally different from those of Europe, in the sense that anarchy, survival, and the balance of power have been the key operating principles of state-to-state interactions since the pre-modern period. For example, based on a detailed archive analysis of China’s foreign relations under the Song and Ming dynasties, Yuan-kang Wang concludes that in the ‘anarchical’ international environment at that time ‘Confucian culture did not constrain … [Chinese] leaders’ decisions to use force; in making such decisions, leaders have been mainly motivated by their assessment of the balance of power between China and its adversary’ (Wang, 2011: 181). This finding leads Wang to defend the theoretical utility of structural realism based on the Westphalian system. Epistemologically, too, critics point out that it is ‘unscientific’ to emphasise and/or incorporate a particular culture or the worldview of a particular nation or region into IR theory, for a legitimately ‘scientific’ theory should seek ‘universality, generality’ (Choi, 2008; Song, 2001). Mainstream (positivist) IR theorists and methodologists argue that IR studies ought to seek observable general patterns of states’ external behaviour, develop empirically verifiable ‘covering law’ explanations, and test their hypotheses through cross-case comparisons. For example, Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba make it clear that generality is the single most important measure of progress in IR, stressing that ‘the question is less whether … a theory is false or not … than how much of the world the theory can help us explain’ (King et al., 1994: 101, emphasis in original). From this perspective, any attempt to develop an indigenous IR theory, be it non-Western or Western, is suspect because it delimits the general applicability of theory. In the case of a Chinese IR theory, criticism of this kind can increasingly be found in studies by younger Chinese IR scholars. According to Xinning Song (2001: 68), Chinese scholars, especially younger ones who have studied in the West, think that it is ‘unscientific or unnecessary to emphasize the so-called Chinese characteristics’. A similar criticism can be found among Korean IR scholars in regard to attempts to build a ‘Korean-style’ IR theory (Cho, 2015). Critics of the ‘Korean School’ of IR frequently ask how can we make a distinctively Korean IR theory while trying to be as generalisable as possible? In Jongkun Choi’s (2008: 215) words, ‘any theorising based on Korea’s unique historical experiences must be tested under the principle of generality’. Normative criticisms of attempts to build a ‘non-Western’ IR theory highlight the relationship between power and knowledge. Critics point out that although theory-building enterprises from the perspective of the ‘non-West’ commonly begin by problematising Western-dominated IR, the ongoing scholarly practices and discourses associated with ‘non-Western’ IR can also entail (or reproduce) the same hierarchic and exclusionary structure of knowledge production, which can fall prey to particular national or regional interests. For example, in his discussion of Chinese visions of world order, William Callahan doubts the applicability of ‘Tianxia’. He claims that what the notion of Tianxia does is ‘blur’ the conceptual and practical ‘boundaries between empire and globalism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism’. Rather than help us move towards a ‘post-hegemonic’ world, Tianxia serves to be a philosophical foundation upon which ‘China’s hierarchical governance is updated for the twenty-first century’ (Callahan, 2008: 749). Supporting this view, Ching-Chang Chen (2011: 1) argues that: re-envisioning IR in Asia is not about discovering or producing as many “indigenous” national schools of IR as possible. Scholars … must also recognise and resist the pitfalls of equating the mere increase of non-Western voices with the genuine democratisation of the field, if they are to live up to their responsibility to jointly construct a non-hegemonic discipline. In a similar vein, Josuke Ikeda (2011: 12–13) argues that ‘there needs to be a “post-Western” turn rather [than a] “non-Western” [one] … in order to address another kind of “Westfailure” in IR theory’. In short, critics argue that although it is our ‘responsibility’ to make IR more pluralistic and democratic, ‘most intellectual endeavors to construct non-Western IRT in Asia run the risk of inviting nativism’ (Chen, 2011: 16). Most recently, Andrew Hurrell (2016: 149–150) has added that although developing culturally specific ways of understanding the world ‘undoubtedly encourages greater pluralism’, attempts to do so can also lead to a national and regional ‘inwardness’ that works to reproduce the very ‘ethnocentricities’ that are being challenged.