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Anti-eurocentrism fails

Anti-eurocentrism is flawed and unneeded – western-centrism’s role in IR has decreased exponentially

Kuru 15(Historicising Eurocentrism and antiEurocentrism in IR: A revisionist account of disciplinary self-reflexivity, DENIZ KURU*, sep 21 2015, page 352-353)//BRownRice

‘All scholars are Eurocentrics’: The limits of anti-Eurocentrism What can be seen as a major problem with critics of Eurocentric IR is their tendency to overstate the impact of Eurocentrism as an ideology by confusing it with a more geo-historically situated form of Eurocentric world order. Stated differently, anti-Eurocentrics do not differentiate in general between Eurocentrism as an ideology (one that sees Europe, or a more global West as the only active subject of world politics) and Eurocentrism as a picture of the world that derives from the significance of European powers at a certain point in time, basically from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. This perception leads the critics to exaggerate the extent of Eurocentrism in IR. Virtually all forms of analysis that give a prominent role to the European (and Western) actors in the global political order come to be seen as Eurocentric. Whenever a scholar chooses to focus on the significance of the European powers (or the impact of the West), [they are] targeted as Eurocentric.3 The extent of this problem becomes more visible when considering the work of anti-Eurocentric scholarship, which demonstrates an unending circle of intra-IR disciplinary blaming and bashing. For instance, feminist IR scholarship points to the prevalence of Eurocentric biases among their more mainstream colleagues.4 In turn, they are accused by Hobson of Eurocentrism. He sees in feminist IRʼs focus on women in the Third World ʻthe risk of returning us back into the Eurocentric cul-de-sac of rendering Eastern women as but passive victims of Western power, thereby stripping them of agencyʼ. 5 Postcolonialists criticise in turn the approach most closely associated with Hobsonʼs approach, that is, historical sociology for carrying Eurocentric features.6 Finally, postcolonialists are attacked by advocates of decolonising approaches who find the presence of Eurocentric positions in the work of the former.7 This inherent race to the bottom in the form of accusing others as Eurocentrics demonstrates that a mere proliferation of anti-Eurocentric analyses will not suffice to de-Eurocentricise IR. Otherwise, disciplinary self-reflexivity will be reduced to blaming others for Eurocentrism without turning to a broader contextualisation of and variation between Eurocentrisms. It should be evident that this would help us neither in reducing the actual impact of ideologically motivated Eurocentric analyses in the discipline nor in gaining a better understanding of our own positions and scholarly motives. A major aspect in this context concerns the differences between the continuing impact of European/Western influences in todayʼs world and the way in which Western-dominated power-knowledge connections of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are to a certain extent overcome. Although many scholars criticise IRʼs Eurocentrism for the close relations they find between knowledge (production) practices and the supposed power impact of the West, they overlook the extent to which the gradual decline in the Westʼs power has also changed these interactions. This means that one has to approach Eurocentrism in a more nuanced fashion so that the residual impact of the Western powersʼ relatively decreasing global significance can be recognised as the instantiation of a gradual process of de-Eurocentricisation that goes in line with a less Western, more post-Western world. Immanuel Wallerstein speaks of ʻanti-Eurocentric Eurocentrismʼ. According to him, this form of Eurocentric scholarship asserts either that Europe just interrupted others from doing what they were doing and did it herself, or that Europe did something which was just ʻa continuation of what others had already been doing for a long time, with the Europeans temporarily coming to the foregroundʼ. To overcome such anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism, scholars must ʻcease trying to deprive Europe of its specificity on the deluded premise that we are thereby depriving it of an illegitimate creditʼ. Wallerstein suggests that ʻ[w]e must fully acknowledge the particularity of Europeʼs reconstruction of the world because only then will it be possible to transcend it.’ 8 Following this assumption, even Hobsonʼs anti-Eurocentrism emerges as an instance of Eurocentrism, for he tends to look for non-Western origins in virtually all historical developments of the modern era, overlooking thus the extent to which the Western dominance in the nineteenth century made its previous interactions with the non-Western actors less relevant when thinking of Eurocentrism in that era.9 I turn to a detailed examination of Hobsonʼs approach after providing a more differentiated typology between various forms of Eurocentrism. As another example in which Wallerstein would have seen anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism, one can refer to Kerem Nişancıoğluʼs recent study on the peripheral role given to the Ottoman Empire in studies of capitalist development. He argues that IR ʻhas been built on largely Eurocentric assumptionsʼ with the Ottomans being ʻabsent, passive, or merely a comparative foil against which the specificity and superiority of Europe has been definedʼ. 10 His counterpoint is that the Ottoman Empire ʻwas arguably the most powerful actor in the Early Modern periodʼ. Based on his employment of Trotskyʼs theory of uneven and combined development, the combined impact of Ottoman strength and Europeʼs privilege of backwardness would lead the latter (especially its northwestern parts, that is, England) to gain ʻthe geopolitical space required to conduct modern state-buildingʼ. Thus, Nişancıoğlu presents a revision of the historical sociology of international relations, which he accuses of being too concentrated on European history. The point of contention is about conditions affecting the birth of modern capitalism. However, it is possible to see this as another issue, one that is researchable in a historical framework without accusations of Eurocentrism. Nişancıoğlu himself is careful to add that his goal is not ʻto argue that capitalismʼs origins were entirely extra-Europeanʼ nor to ʻseek to substantially diminish the centrality or uniqueness of Europe in this processʼ. 11 These are big caveats that show that even self-declared non-Eurocentric accounts recognise Europeʼs specific role in the emergence of the modern world order. Hence, it becomes possible to reject Nişancıoğluʼs general critique of IRʼs Eurocentrism, for his own work illustrates that the broader assumptions of IR still hold with regard to Europeʼs dominant role in the emergence of modern capitalism and the international order associated with it.

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