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SC devastates partner-nation governance. Triggers elite control.

PN = partner nation

Bushley 17 [U.S. Army Capt. Adam Bushley, Rule of Law attorney for Task Force Wolverine, 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team; "Governance: The Missing Ingredient in Security Cooperation"; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Published: 2017; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038564.pdf; KL]

This paper explores whether DOS can more systematically incorporate U.S. good governance strategic objectives into the oversight of DOD’s SC/SA programs. Both elements of the fifth secondary questions (existing trends within the SC/SA context and whether SA/SC programs support the foreign assistance principle of “do no harm.”) are below.

Although the transparency of whether good governance exists has increased due to a proliferation in measurement indices, the presence of good governance around the world is declining. The Freedom of the World report, published in 1973, was one of the first of more than fifty different indices that measure the effectiveness of government institutions. 131 Since 2006, for the ninth consecutive year, the index reported that the world has seen an overall decline in political rights and civil liberties. It states that the good governance is under great threat. 132

Again, good governance occurs when the ROL and human rights are respected, and the state is responsive, transparent, and accountable to the people without corruption or abuse of power. Both Great Britain and the U.S. hold the position that good governance is fundamental to peace and security, and “is the foundation on which a society is built.”133 According to an anticorruption guide commissioned by USAID, good governance is a prerequisite to sustainable international aid. 134 The NSS and others hold the position that authoritarian abuse is often a prime cause of crises (e.g., Syria, South Sudan).135 The country context in which the U.S. operates is of critical importance.

By definition, good governance incorporates human rights; the “support for universal rights is both fundamental to American leadership and a source of our strength in the world.”136 In 2009, DoD co-published an interagency guideline that stated that their “implementation of current foreign assistance approaches to security and development [including] traditional security assistance . . . equipment and training” programs should incorporate the “do no harm” guiding principle.137 In adherence to the basic “do no harm” assistance principle, SC/SA programs should ensure that they protect, or at least do not disproportionately harm the fifth of fourteen DOS strategic SC/SA objectives: 5) Adherence to Norms of Human Rights.138

The establishment of the ROL is a necessary component of good governance. According to USAID’s Guide to Rule of Law Country Analysis, “The underlying malady [of weak ROL institutions] is the power of entrenched political and economic elites who benefit” from the status quo.139 Throughout the guide, it is emphasized that “ROL reform must establish a respected and fair relationship between the state and society through balanced powers, proper oversight, checks and balances, and a cultural norm that supports ROL.”140 USAID has done significant work in reducing corruption in scores of countries around the globe, some of which is outlined in the “Guide for Legal Empowerment of the Poor.” The guide highlights that changing legal text is not enough to establish good governance. In order to change behavior to build the ROL to support good governance, there must also be a change in enforcement and incentives through appeal processes, audits, and limiting discretion, to name a few examples.141

As indicated previously, SC/SA programs are often most successful when they are conducted in permissive environments where there is an established ROL, and the recipient government is legitimate and is trusted by its people and has a relatively effective form of governance.142 Unfortunately, many of the countries the U.S. is assisting have extremely low levels of transparency, oversight, accountability, adherence to the ROL, and checks and balances. In 65 percent of the countries Transparency International (TI) studied in Asia, public trust in the military’s ability and will to address internal corruption was very low.143 Citizens are rightfully concerned. According to TI’s Government Defense Anticorruption Index, all states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are at high risk of corruption in the defense sector. The U.S. supports the UN position that the lack of trust and risk of corruption both pose a grave threat to regional security and stability by giving fodder to extremist groups, who use citizen dissatisfaction as a means to question a government’s legitimacy. 144

A large percentage of the SC/SA recipients score in the bottom tier of the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index.145 For example, using expert surveys, of fifteen countries studied in Asia, only Japan and South Korea have parliamentary defense committees that can influence defense ministry decisions and budgets. According to USAID’s “Methodological and Substantive Analysis of USAID Legislative Strengthening Evaluations, 2003-2015,” parliaments are an “essential” oversight mechanism to help prevent misconduct, abuse, or the exploitation of power by the military. 146 In Myanmar, the military funds a significant part of its operations through the “selling of state resources, the large-scale cultivation and sale of opium poppies, [and] uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources.”147 Yemen’s military participates in organized crime that smuggles oil and drugs, illegally trades arms, and engages in human trafficking.148

Governance experts, such as TI, Perry Cammack and Yezid Sayigh with the Carnegie Endowment, contend that the security of the MENA region and the world depend upon using the military as an instrument of national power in a way that upholds “accountability to citizens and basic transparency through which effective independent oversight of policy, budgets, and military behavior can be exercised.”149 When a single MOD cannot control its personnel or account for its materiel, the world is less safe. For example, a United Nation Security Council report found that ISIS seized conventional military assets including vehicles, weapons, and ammunition, sufficient to arm and equip three divisions—including new and unused surplus materiel.150 Further, in the MENA region, military materiel acquisition is procured on an ad hoc basis with desires of certain individuals overriding technical security needs.151 Placating the desires of powerful and potentially corrupt generals can leave gaps unfilled in the security apparatus, potentially creating critical vulnerabilities within the Critical Capabilities (CC) (a means that is considered a crucial and essential to the accomplishment of a specified objective) or enablers that are necessary to accomplish long-term U.S. objectives.

Extent of Corruption in Partner Militaries and Its Effect on U.S. Security

Unethical behavior quickly destroys organizational morale and cohesion— it undermines the trust and confidence essential to teamwork and mission accomplishment. 152

U.S. strategic policy identifies the existence of corruption and poor governance in other nations to be destabilizing and a threat to U.S. national security. Case studies in and out of military institutions have found that corruption and a lack of checks and balances will “significantly inhibit” SC/SA effectiveness, and that corruption is a “pervasive threat” to military operations. 153 The need to combat corruption or its corrosive effects on U.S. strategic objectives is mentioned a dozen times in the twenty-eight page 2015 National Security Strategy. Mitigating corruption can support mission operations to reduce violent extremism, as well as increase government legitimacy and citizen confidence.

Corruption damages any DOD mission’s operational effectiveness and “erodes the legitimacy and efficacy of an international mission.”154 Corruption can be a source of conflict; twelve of the fifteen lowest ranked countries on Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) have issues with insurgents or international security.155 For example, in Indonesia, it is estimated that 30 percent of the military procurement costs are pilfered through corruption.156 Generally, if corruption is used to create stability in the short-term (e.g., using bribes to buy loyalty), it can create a system of impunity that lacks respect for the rules of law, which inherently undermines mission command, the mutual trust, understanding, and disciplined initiative that balances authority, control, and flexibility that is necessary in order to gain and maintain decisive action.

Many officers in DOD believe that corruption is simply part of some countries’ cultures, where citizens have attitudes of resignation to corruption, and, therefore, nothing can be done to address it. 157 However, citizens know that corruption undermines service delivery, decreases economic opportunity, and increases inequality. This is why ISIS propaganda in Iraq and Syria refutes the government as illegitimate, due in part to its corruption, in order to gain sympathizers for their cause to overthrow the government.158 The status quo does not have to be the end state. In fact, many anticorruption programs, which focus on changing the rules of the game, incentives, or illegal behaviors that undermine the ROL, have found significant success when effective in-depth assessments help develop programs that are tailored to specific objectives within a sector where political will exists. 159

Secondary Question 5B: Do No Harm

Well-intentioned SC/SA programming can harm partner nations in four ways. First, the U.S. could negatively affect the rights and protections of citizens within a country if there is a lack of transparency and checks and balances in the defense institutions. 160 For example, when DOD has ignored host nation corruption in the past, which has had detrimental results. As written in 2016 by Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, current U.S. National Security Advisor, “Paradoxically, avoiding state building or sidestepping the political causes of state weakness in the hope of avoiding costly or protracted commitments often increases costs and extends efforts in time.”161 In fragile states, the government often does not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Therefore, the default in fragile states is often self-protection forces and other powerbrokers providing security, distributing aid, delivering justice, and supplying jobs in lieu of government intervention. They operate along ethnic, religious, or tribal lines and are frequently under political protection.

While U.S. assistance to self-protection forces may secure short-term gains, such as in Afghanistan, these forces over the long run often exploit weaknesses in the political and economic systems, and “have a tendency to evolve into predatory groups, attacking external enemies while extorting or preying upon their own community.”162 Such extortion and corruption actually reinforce ethnic, religious, and other divisions that fuel cycles of violence, thereby making peace more difficult and prolonging the need for international forces. Instead, foreign assistance should be used to support the government in displacing these groups. While this thesis does not address conflict countries, it should be noted that in 2014, DOD concluded that the United States’ initial support of warlords in Afghanistan created an environment that exacerbated criminal patronage networks and fostered corruption, which ultimately had significant unintended consequences for U.S. strategy.163

Second, harm can be done by empowering a military that already has undue influence in a country without also strengthening oversight institutions. Unmatched military assistance to an already militarized society may tip the scales of power and permit the military to act as a tool to “suppress democratic opposition or movements.”164 In fact, “a coup or attempted coup occurred once every four months in Latin America (1945-1972), once every seven months in Asia (1947-1972), [and] once every three months in the Middle East (1949-1972).”165 There have been forty-four coups in West Africa alone over the last fifty years.166 Not all of these coups were antidemocratic, not all were successful, and not all of them were even against democratically elected regimes. Nonetheless, the point remains that if SC/SA programs followed the framework of other U.S. Government foreign assistance initiatives, security sector programs would be part of a multidimensional effort, and would incorporate systematic assessments and simultaneously address weak government policies, inadequate laws, or poorly functioning legislatures to counterbalance any assistance given to a military with a misbalance of power. It is USAID’s position that when legislative committee and bill drafter capacity is increased, additional checks and balances on overly powerful executives or corrupt ministries of defense can be established as an additional oversight body to safeguard against power-grabs.167

The importance of establishing oversight mechanisms is repeated forty-nine times in USAID’s Practitioner’s Guide for Anticorruption Programming, yet many of the United States’ partners often do not have these mechanisms in place. In the MENA region, for example, only two of seventeen countries studied, conduct external audits on the ministries of defense.168 The USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) Strategy identifies Public Financial Management (PFM) strengthening interventions as a proven method of promoting a culture of lawfulness. PFM programs increase auditing and transparency in accounting, recording, and reporting processes. This USAID position is partly based on the recent meta-analysis evidence-based study of impact evaluations by the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, one of the preeminent research institutions on corruption that receives substantial funding from multiple G7 countries, that also found that existing studies of PFM programs show that the program had a strong impact on reducing corruption and fraud by changing incentives and the rules of the game.169

Yemen is a good example of the failure to counterbalances to an overly powerful executive in relation to the other branches of government. According to a recent article in Foreign Affairs, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh used the military to consolidate power through a patronage-based system for his allies. Specifically, the article states, “eight years of Western training not only failed to build a military that could defend the state, but led to a myopic focus on counterterrorism that accelerated its implosion. The mistakes made in Yemen—where military trainers were deployed without consideration for local political dynamics—provide a clear demonstration of the unintended consequences of a military-centric approach” instead of one that is systems-based and multidimensional.170 According to International IDEA, although capable, for the last two years, the Yemen military has been unable to control the civil war, mostly because the loyalty of the elite military units is to their politically entrenched commanders, many of whom are supporting coup efforts. 171 That same year, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Sentinel published that “Saudi airstrikes, which are supported by U.S. intelligence, have destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure and decimated Yemen’s military and security services, including millions of dollars in equipment provided by the United States itself[,] . . . As a result, the constant warfare has opened up significant space for al-Qa`ida” and ISIS. 172

[FIGURE 4 EXCLUDED]

This myopic focus was evident in the budget. As seen in figure 4, military assistance made up more than 75 percent of the U.S. assistance to Yemen ($150 million in Section 1206 funding and $13 million in FMF). 173 Yet, according to CRS, such disproportionate funding was given to the military even though the “Yemeni government, economy, and tribal and military elites are intertwined in a patronage system that makes reform efforts difficult.”174 According to a CNN report in 2010, “Officials at the White House and State Department [were] concerned that increasing the size of military assistance might be counterproductive and not absolutely necessary [and] that Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh [would] use U.S. weapons against his political enemies and further destabilize the country.” However, the military assistance was approved anyway because the Yemeni government “reaffirmed its commitment to fighting militants.”175

Effective foreign assistance uses a systems-based approach that balances both governance and security because long term stability requires both. The counterterrorism assistance dwarfed humanitarian assistance, in a country that was: a) ranked 167 of 177 countries in Transparency International’s 2013 corruption perception index; and b) ranked 154 out of 187 countries in the United Nations 2014 Human Development Index, in this case partly due to the extreme water shortages in the country, and the fact that the country is dependent on food imports for up to 90 percent of basic staples.176 Had some of the U.S. military assistance been realigned to address issues of good governance and ROL starting in FY 2010, it is conceivable that the Houthi rebellion, which was provoked due to issues of perceived unfairness, may not have occurred or at least could have been withstood.177 The security assistance may have failed due to the lack of counterbalancing governance assistance.

Third, if arms sales are made without good strategic planning or a wellfunctioning force management system, haphazard arms deals can undermine the recipients’ security. This could occur by procuring equipment that is unsuitable to their needs that they cannot properly utilize, or by acquiring platforms that are too advanced for their needs or too similar to systems they already possess.178 This lack of sustainability occurs when SCO’s focus on getting the partner nation what they request instead of what they need.179 Inevitably, many countries have acquired overly technical and complex systems for their needs, or purchased “unaffordable fighter jets and buil[t a] pool of pilots when that is not appropriate for the security environment the partner nation faces or its budget.” These are questionable results for the U.S. to permit to occur to a partnered ally through a U.S. government controlled foreign military sales system. 180

For the last sixty-five years, claims have been made that U.S. military assistance has, at times, given modern weapons merely to placate the political feelings of the recipient, not because such weapons are deemed essential to the success of a regional security plan. Saudi Arabia’s arsenal includes the Typhoon jet and the F-15 fighter jet, which are duplicative systems, as well as duplicative tactical troop-carrying vehicles from Canada, Serbia, and Germany.181 If SC/SA programs were conducted similarly to other foreign assistance programs, they would be required to adhere to a rigorous sustainable aid model. For example, sustainable assistance mandates in USAID’s agriculture programs require the integration of environmental health, economic viability, and social equity to ensure long-term productivity and not cause subsequent problems, such as water scarcity. 182

Fourth, poorly synchronized SC/SA programs could harm a PN by wasting funds that could have been more responsibly allocated in a way that benefited the PN’s citizenry. Quoting DOD SC/SA professionals, RAND made the point that many of the existing train-and-equip SC/SA programs are often “episodic and generally not sustainable.”183 If SC/SA practitioners conducted SC/SA programs similar to other foreign assistance programs, they would familiarize themselves with the breadth of funds spent on military and non-military purposes to ensure that U.S. SC/SA programs are not weakening other U.S. strategic goals for the country. 184 While budget tradeoffs are inevitable, it is better to have these discussions and make informed decisions rather than to unknowingly be making decisions because an option was never discussed. Over the last ten years, India has increased its military spending by 147 percent, Bangladesh by 202 percent, Thailand by 207 percent, and Cambodia by 311 percent. 185 Over the same time period, military spending as a percentage of GDP in dropped by almost 25% in Turkey (from 2.8 to 2.1) Singapore (4.4 to 3.2), and Chile (2.5 to 1.9). 186

No U.S. government data could be found regarding the government’s position on whether this was too high, too low, or just right. However, if SC/SA practitioners conducted SC/SA programs similar to other foreign assistance programs, part of the SCO’s responsibility would be to understand the international and regional spending average for the security sector, as well as an objective assessment of the PN’s security needs, in order to help shape national budgetary decisions to align the nation’s spending to the citizen’s need for each of the different types of government services if the PN’s spending was severely misaligned with its own needs. While each PN rightfully has sovereignty to dictate its own budget, it is common practice in the foreign assistance community to influence what percentage of a PN’s national budget is allocated to other sectors (e.g. health and education) and the same could be done with the security sector. From a foreign assistance perspective, the issue is not necessarily how much military spending went up or down, but whether foreign assistance practitioners are having the discussion about budget priorities with their PN counterparts.

Putting It All Together

This paper explores whether DOS can more systematically incorporate U.S. good governance strategic objectives into the oversight of DOD’s SC/SA programs. To thoroughly discuss this question, five secondary questions were individually analyzed above. This section attempts to take those individual analyses and tie them together under sub-components of good governance: (1) accountability, ROL, and reforming military justice disciplinary rules; and (2) human rights protections.

In 2010, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates unabashedly expressed that “[b]uilding the governance and security capacity of other countries was a critical element of our strategy in the Cold War. But it is even more urgent in a global security environment where, unlike the Cold War, the most likely and lethal threats . . . will likely emanate from fractured or failing states, rather than aggressor states.”187 However, building institutional capacity and supporting governance is a long, arduous process that takes time. DOD’s current SC/SA system of personnel assignment creates rapid turnover that lacks continuity and supports tactical level targets in lieu of creating a unified effort through a longer-term operational or strategic approach.188 Guidance is needed.

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