There is an internal battle on the future of NATO now --- defense planners want to keep the mandate narrow and focused on Russia --- expanding the mandate to include emerging tech will undermine the effectiveness
Ringsmose and Rynning ‘21
(Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning are both professors of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.“NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy Volume 63, 2021 - Issue 5, pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)
Who’s in charge? Multiple allies felt taken by surprise by the advanced nature of the thinking that went into NATO’s military strategy. When General Dunford remarked in May 2019 that NATO now had, for the first time ‘in decades’, a military strategy that ‘clearly articulates the challenges that confront NATO’ and ‘provides the framework for the various plans that will be in place if deterrence fails’, he highlighted not only the benefits of an enhanced framework for military planning but also, inadvertently, the political shortcomings of the Alliance’s strategic leadership.30 Some allies felt a need to push back. Tellingly, the United States and the United Kingdom were not among them. American and British military authorities had led the charge and considered both the new military strategy and the derivative theatre-wide DDA as having been politically approved and ready to go.31 Other allies, however, continue to have reservations with regard to the Russia-centric nature of the strategy, and attach importance to a subtle distinction whereby they have merely ‘noted’ the military strategy but explicitly ‘approved’ the DDA. In fact, these allies have sought to contain the 2019 military strategy and to control the 2020 DDA-led process. As noted, they have arrested the overarching threat assessment, pushing for an upgrade of the role of the southern flank. A revised Strategic Concept will have to find a way to balance between Russia-related collective defence and southern counter-terrorism and capacity-building. For now, the southern flank has won a stronger foothold in the DDA, which henceforth will contain a Sequenced Response Plan – which is comparable to the Russia-centric Graduated Response Plans – to address southern contingencies. This is merely a warm-up for a grander political debate, however. A wide variety of allies continue to insist that SACEUR must base theatre- wide DDA planning on compartmentalised Graduated Response Plans. Compartmentalised planning stifles military agility, but allies like to have NATO plans for their particular neighbourhoods and, moreover, the ability to leverage these plans to control SACEUR’s otherwise free rein within a 360-degree approach to NATO’s theatre of operations. Put differently, they are not about to hand SACEUR a mandate to steer the type of ‘horizontal escalation’ that is baked into the theatre-wide approach. Allies are also in control of force investment, and hence the development of the kind of ready and robust forces on which NATO plans depend. In short, SACEUR may possess a stellar military strategy, but he is limited to planning for the simultaneous activation of just two response plans at any one time, and has too few ready and capable troops on which to call. The traumatic retreat from Afghanistan in August 2021 could ultimately enhance political–military coherence and empower SACEUR’s work with the DDA, though the full implications of the withdrawal remain unclear at the time of writing. The retreat suffered from a lack of allied coordination and exposed the heralded NATO principle of ‘in together, out together’ as cover for US-driven planning. European allies found that they could regret the lack of political coordination and harbour different plans, but ultimately lacked the capabilities to resist or influence US policy. The Afghanistan retreat has thus ignited a new, probing debate on transatlantic burden- sharing that can be expected to give the Strategic Concept process a kind of unpredictable energy. What is clear is that European allies who worry about a hard-nosed turn in US policy – as exemplified by Trump’s sweeping critique of NATO allies and now the Biden administration’s actions in Afghanistan – must give thought to their own defence efforts at a level that extends far beyond the intricacies of NATO’s requirement that allies spend 2% of GDP on defence (a 2014 measure intended to increase European spending). Rebalancing NATO has become an issue that the Strategic Concept cannot ignore, but rather must define and build on. NATO has advanced military planning (MC 400/4 and the DDA) to help this process along, and no doubt SACEUR and other military authorities are hopeful that it will result in more confident political engagement with the terms of allied defence and deterrence, including the resourcing of a more robust European force contribution. To achieve this type of greater political–military coherence, NATO’s leadership must offer a corrected transatlantic vision of collective defence that explicitly delineates core lessons from Afghanistan and their implications for a rebalanced NATO. Political revival, but how? Allies have until now been catching up, having been taken by surprise firstly by forward-leaning military authorities, and then by the speed with which Stoltenberg moved to put a revised Strategic Concept on the Alliance’s agenda. In late November 2020, in the wake of the US presidential election, Stoltenberg stated that ‘the time has come to update our strategic concept’.32 A few days later, a Reflection Group appointed by the secretary-general likewise concluded that ‘NATO must update the 2010 Strategic Concept’.33 In February 2021, the secretary-general offered his condensed view of the Reflection Group’s conclusions, writing in his ‘Food for Thought Paper’: ‘At the 2021 Summit, Leaders should agree to update the Strategic Concept’ and ‘should adopt a tasking for me to lead the process’ with a view to concluding it in 2022.34 The leaders duly did so in Brussels on 14 June.35 The need for political reform had been signalled by the trauma of the divisive 2018 Brussels Summit; the decision to celebrate NATO’s 70th anniversary in April 2019 at the level of foreign ministers, rather than heads of state and government; the intensifying disagreement on how NATO should respond to crises in its vicinity, not least in Syria; and finally French President Emmanuel Macron’s November 2019 characterisation of NATO as ‘brain dead’.36 When NATO heads of state and government met in London in December 2019 not for a summit but for a quick Leaders Meeting – this being all they could handle – they readily agreed to ‘invite’ the secretary-general to steer a ‘reflection process’ to ‘further strengthen NATO’s political dimension’.37 Still, the speed with which Stoltenberg enlarged this reflection process into a ‘NATO 2030’ agenda, his bold leap in demanding a revised Strategic Concept, and his equally bold decision to push his February 2021 ‘Food for Thought Paper’ into the public arena were all surprisingly out of character. Stoltenberg had been decisive in helping NATO weather the storm unleashed by Trump, but as a consensus builder who worked behind the scenes while keeping up public appearances. Now, and for good reason, he was charging ahead. The distinct risk of this charge is that it will add to NATO’s political– military tensions. Stoltenberg’s London mandate, and therefore the work of the Reflection Group, was entirely political: there was no built-in requirement to seek political–military coherence. Moreover, even if Stoltenberg has so far confined the Strategic Concept debate to the headquarters of the North Atlantic Council, thereby avoiding extensive committee work and negotiations, he will not be able to imitate Rasmussen’s tightly controlled process in 2010. In fact, NATO leaders have stipulated that while the secretary-general should ‘lead’ the Strategic Concept process, the text ‘will be negotiated and agreed by the Council in Permanent Session and endorsed by NATO Leaders at the next Summit’.38 The upside is that allied buy-in will increase compared with 2010 and thereafter. The downside is that the temptation to be expansive in terms of priorities could grow. The 2020 Reflection Group, steered by the secretary- general, notably did not call for the slimming of NATO’s core tasks.39 In a bid to build a consensus, the secretary-general may feel tempted to lengthen the list of core tasks, perhaps by adding resilience, disruptive technology, pandemics and natural disasters. This temptation will be all the stronger given that, in the meantime, NATO has decided to ‘mainstream’ the challenges posed by China into the Alliance’s many policy portfolios.40 In short, NATO is approaching a revised Strategic Concept with, on the one hand, a political temptation to go big and, on the other, a Russia-centric approach to military planning. To steer clear of further political–military tensions and even rupture, NATO allies should 1) prioritise collective defence; 2) develop a values-based narrative; and 3) intensify its internal political–military dialogue.