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Taking on too many tasks dilutes NATO’s warfighting capabilities and deterrence focus

Dr. Tardy ‘20

(Thierry Tardy, PhD in Political Science, Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College (Rome), taught at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEID, Geneva), the War College in Paris, the Sorbonne, the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po) and the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INALCO, Paris). He is also Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges., “The risks of NATO’s maladaptation,” European Security Volume 30, 2021 - Issue 1, pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)

Conclusion – overcoming maladaptation This article has offered an analysis of the risks of maladaptation that NATO has been exposed to while seeking congruence with its environment. As any security organisation, NATO has since the end of the Cold War sought to align with the needs and policies of its member states; yet such adaptation has generated side effects that can undermine the Alliance’s own relevance. We have looked at the context of the new Cold War to explore this maladaptation. As of 2014, the resurgence of Russia as a peer competitor has given NATO a new role as a collective defence organisation; Russia constitutes a threat and NATO offers a response to it; through the shift to collective defence NATO seemed to align with its environment. What we have seen in this article though is that the pure defence-focused response is insufficient to NATO’s alignment with its threat environment. Because the threats are diverse and embrace a large range of possible actions, the policy response needs to be equally broad-ranging and multi-domain. This leads to the dilemma by which NATO must play with two imperfect policy options: either it focuses on the narrow segment of defence but then risks being ill-equipped for the multifaceted threats; or it enlarges its mandate to a broad range of tasks but then it runs the risks of diluting its core military function. The dilemma is here to stay. Member states are unlikely to agree on a strategy that would clearly identify one path at the expense of the other. And security institutions inherently struggle to demonstrate relevance and adjust their own mandate to the evolving environment. In this context, the challenge comes from the exposed dilemma as much as it is about a trade-off between the narrow and the broad paths; in lieu of a binary choice the way forward is probably to calibrate the scope of the broadening (see Shea 2019). Here is the relevance challenge: for NATO to keep the military edge and being able to prevail in future military operations, while sufficiently enlarging the scope of its mandate so that it can respond to the most acute contemporary threats. Such trade-off builds a slightly different notion of congruence that is in the end more equivocal than initially asserted. Further research is needed on this calibrating exercise as a potential response to maladaptation. When doing this, three sets of considerations will have to be taken into account, and one possible path is recommended. First, the NATO of the Cold War is no longer a useful point of comparison; the threat environment is simply too different today and adaptation has, as a consequence, become a very different process. Second, maintaining a comparative advantage in the military domain will most likely remain a priority and therefore the starting point of any adaptation policy. Failing that, NATO’s added value would be at stake. Third, the nature of the threats means that NATO must to a degree embrace a wider security agenda: hybridity calls for it, and resisting task expansion will be difficult. In this context, one possible way out comes from burden-sharing through institutional partnerships (Flockhart 2014). Back in the 2000s, the idea of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) emerged from the acknowledgement that “NATO cannot do it all”, and must, therefore, rely on partners which, because of their own expertise and comparative advantages, would maximise the broad international efforts, be it in Kosovo or in Afghanistan (see Williams 2011, Tardy 2012, Jakobsen 2018). This is no less valid today. Partnerships carry benefits that alliances bring, be it in terms of capability aggregation, strategy coordination, or burden-sharing (Wallander and Keohane 2002). Partnering with others is imperative as there are issues that are simply not for NATO to tackle and that are nonetheless essential to NATO’s mission. How to organise this new type of comprehensive approach goes beyond the remit of this article. The thinking relates to other institutions such as the EU or the UN, but also to sub-state actors such as municipalities, law enforcement entities or regions, as well as the private sector. At least two principles should guide the reflection so as to minimise the risk of maladaptation: first is the fact that any task expansion be based on NATO’s added value as a defence institution. It is this defence added value that must determine the nature of NATO’s role in any broader partnership. Any task expansion that would not make the military nature of the Alliance the starting point of the discussion would potentially lead back to the unintended consequences of adaptation and create incongruence. Second, any burden-sharing implies that NATO may not be in the lead, but rather in support of other actors, and even, theoretically, coordinated by others. This implies a sense of modesty in some areas of multi-domain threat response, where NATO’s added value is not central. Making these points takes us far from the alleged pertinence of the post-Ukraine collective defence agenda. Yet, this is what NATO’s relevance and congruence with the twenty-first-century security environment are about.

O’Neil ‘22

(Paul, “The Risk of Attempting Too Much,” pg online @ //um-ef)

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