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The plan causes in-fighting and disrupts cohesion --- some members don’t want changes to the status quo priorities

Kunz ‘21

(Barbara, PhD from Stockholm University/Sweden and a Master's degree from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris. She is a Member of the steering committee OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions., “NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond.,” Ch. 7 pg Muse //um-ef)

Analyses of transatlantic relations, and security relations in particular, often focus on differences between the United States and its European allies. This clearly is an important factor. Given Europe’s dependence on US security guarantees, the United States’ continued willingness to engage in the continent’s security is the condition sine qua non for NATO’s survival. US dissatisfaction with European engagement and defense spending has consequently been a key item on intra-Alliance agendas since 1949. US concerns about NATO and its European allies’ engagement were indeed voiced openly long before Donald Trump.1 Debates about burden sharing also trickle down to domestic politics in member states and thus contribute to shaping the general climate within the Alliance, as for instance the 2 percent objective that has featured in several German electoral campaigns. It is, however, equally important not to overlook structural differences among European Allies. When the Reflection Group appointed by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg published its report on “NATO 2030” in late 2020, it was no coincidence that Alliance cohesion was among the key points.2 Indeed, disagreements among Allies have increased in recent years—to the point of famously prompting French president Emmanuel Macron to declare NATO “brain dead” because it is no longer able to adopt common views on key strategic matters.3 This notably pertains to the role Turkey has been playing in recent years and intra-Alliance rivalries. Other examples include Allies’ difficulties to develop a common stance on Libya and different views on NATO’s potential role in the Arctic. The latter example is linked to what is certainly the single most important aspect for Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century: the Alliance and its members’ relationship 157158 nato 2030: towards a new strategic concept and beyond with Russia. Yet, regarding Russia in particular, ideas on the way ahead vary widely across NATO capitals. What is ultimately at stake are diverging approaches to European and Euro-Atlantic security at large, based on different interpretations of the future direction of the global security environment. The three most relevant issues most likely to trouble NATO in the coming decade may thus be summarized as, first, disagreements among member states on concrete policy issues, most prominently illustrated by Turkey’s current foreign policies and its consequences for Alliance cohesion. Second, Allies continue and will continue to hold divergent threat perceptions and consequently place different emphases on security challenges and defense priorities. Third, there is no consensus among European Allies on whether US security guarantees can be considered a viable option in the years and decades to come. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims at showing that ‘Europe’ is by no means a monolithic bloc or actor in its own right, but rather a group of states sometimes pursuing different and even incompatible perspectives. In particular, on the Western side of the Atlantic, references to ‘Europe’ as an actor in transatlantic security relations are a frequent phenomenon. Any analysis or future policy based on the assumption that Europeans are unified in security will, however, be erroneous and impracticable. As the ongoing debate on European strategic autonomy has notably revealed, the primary reason is that Europeans lack a joint vision on how to ensure their continent’s security in the future. As this chapter argues, insights gained from this debate pertain to the very fundamentals of European security, beyond petty debates on semantics. Allies’ increased difficulties to come to shared views in fact stem from very different takes on the foundational features of European security and divergent readings of structural evolutions in the international system. However, the problem is not only that diverging visions confront each other. Rather, some European governments simply do not have such a vision, cling to the status quo, and sometimes even refuse to think about the possibility that things may have to evolve. These differences come on top of other divergences on issues such as democracy and the rule of law, including within the European Union, involving Hungary and Poland.

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