Concept has competing priorities --- they trade-off
Got ‘21
(Antoine Got is a Young Leader in Foreign and Security Policy within the Global Fellowship Initiative at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), “Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?,” pg online @ //um-ef)
NATO has embarked on the process of producing a revised Strategic Concept, which will be presented at the forthcoming 2022 summit in Madrid. As part of this process a vigorous debate is taking place over its role as a security provider. As China grows in prominence on the organisation’s strategic agenda, an underlying question is that of the type of presence or power projection the alliance is willing to commit to in the Indo-Pacific area. A shift towards greater involvement in this area would likely meet with US approval. On NATO’s southern border, many remain preoccupied with risks stemming from the Middle East and North Africa region – terrorism, instability and migration – while new conventional and hybrid challenges are arising from geopolitical rivals that include Russia, Iran and, increasingly, China. Russia, with its enduring assertiveness in terms of both rhetoric and action, remains a considerable threat to Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and others, as the latest troop manoeuvres on its border with Ukraine and growing hold over Belarus illustrate. The problem, of course, is that such challenges are hard to reconcile, given competing risk perceptions, and even more so to synthesise into a single strategic narrative. Historically, this is perhaps unsurprising. For most of its existence NATO’s essential raison d’être was firmly anchored in its core Article 5 task of ensuring collective defence.5 It was only after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 that the organisation began a historic process of strategic reorientation away from the territorial defence of European states toward a broader range of security concerns and responsibilities. In the latter end of the 1990s this paved the way for a series of decisive NATO-led military interventions in the civil wars of the former Yugoslavia which, together with the advent of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), produced a great deal of optimism regarding the ability and perceived duty of foreign powers to defend populations against state-perpetrated atrocities in other parts of the world. But as the early optimism of the 1990s turned into the excesses of the so-called “War on Terror” and 2003 invasion of Iraq, this enthusiasm began to falter. With the alliance’s difficult experiences in Libya and Afghanistan came an enduring perception of mission fatigue and a sense of NATO’s own limitations as a military organisation supporting crisis management. While Afghanistan helped to erode allied willingness to engage in future comparably ambitious stabilisation efforts abroad, events in Libya accelerated underlying trends by elevating questions over whether NATO was suited to act as a primary enforcer of R2P. This produced enduring scepticism regarding the general desirability and efficacy of NATO’s engagements abroad, which culminated in 2014 with the end of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the transition to a “train-and-advise” mission that withdrew in September 2021.