Active denial strategy of deterrence effectively solves Chinese adventurism by flipping their cost-exchange ratio – prevents US-China war [long]
Heginbotham and Heim ’15 -- (Eric Heginbotham, Jacob L. Heim, 06-03-2015, "Deterring Without Dominance," The Washington Quarterly, v.38, no. 1, Spring 2015, p.185-199, https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP50711.html, accessed 6-25-2022) -- nikki
An active denial strategy seeks to deter Chinese adventurism by maintaining a capability to refuse China the benefits of military aggression. This is different than maintaining all-aspects dominance. Dominance is fast becoming prohibitively expensive and may well be inadvisable when confronting a nuclear-armed great power. Instead, active denial involves both defending the territory of U.S. allies and partners as well as making retaliatory strikes against Chinese combat forces involved in offensive operations. The active denial strategy differs from the offshore control strategy by meeting Chinese aggression directly, thereby making it more difficult for China to achieve a fait accompli. Unlike the alternative approaches outlined earlier, active denial offers a broad strategy that includes many branch options for a U.S. president. There are three mutually-reinforcing components of the active denial strategy. The first is resilient U.S. combat power, capable of surviving a pre-emptive Chinese strike; this will require a portfolio of adjustments to survivability and deployment patterns. The second is capabilities optimized for attacking Chinese forces directly engaged in offensive operations such as amphibious ships, aircraft, and landed forces. And the third is bolstering and leveraging the capabilities of allies and partners. The United States should assist partners in improving their defensive capabilities (create mini-A2/AD bubbles) as well as fully using the geographic advantages offered by partner states. A Resilient Force Surviving a pre-emptive Chinese strike requires that U.S. forces be resilient in the face of Chinese attacks. This includes a portfolio of measures including hardening airbase facilities; dispersing aircraft and other critical assets; prepositioning missile defenses; employing camouflage and concealment, electronic warfare, and rapid repair capabilities; as well as developing procedures and training for fighting under attack. Making aircraft carriers and air bases operationally resilient introduces risk into Chinese military options by denying the PLA confidence in its ability to suppress U.S. air power. Dispersal can take two forms. On-base dispersal spreads aircraft, maintenance equipment, and fuel supplies around a given base and minimizes the amount of damage that a single arriving weapon can do. Theater-level dispersal spreads aircraft across more locations in order to minimize the impact of losing any single location. U.S. Marine Corps concepts for distributed operations using the short takeoff and vertical landing F-35B from improvised bases offer an extreme example of theater-level dispersal. The Marines have also demonstrated their capability to operate conventional fighters from expeditionary airfields, for example during the 2012 Geiger Fury exercise held on the island of Tinian in the Northern Marianas. In a similar vein, the U.S. Air Force has developed a “Rapid Raptor” concept for quickly deploying F-22 fighters to austere locations for short periods. Dispersal will stress combat support capacity, likely requiring Army support for key enablers such as logistics, security forces, and combat engineers. All of these dispersal concepts would complicate Chinese targeting and offer survivability benefits. In addition to dispersal, the operational resilience portfolio will need to include some hardening of key facilities (air bases, command-and-control centers, and ports). Hardening key nodes at those facilities (e.g., communications, fuel storage, and aircraft) can be a cost-effective way to mitigate vulnerabilities. This could involve reinforcing existing buildings with steel or concrete or constructing new bunkers and underground facilities (if local geography permits). However, attempting to make entire facilities invulnerable is prohibitively costly, and probably unrealistic. Therefore, hardening efforts must pursue cost-effective ways of protecting critical capabilities. U.S. forces would come under the most intense attacks at the start of a conflict. Consequently, a resilient force posture would seek to exploit U.S. strategic depth in Asia. At the outset, relatively more U.S. forces might be deployed at a distance from China, rather than being concentrated overwhelmingly in China’s immediate periphery as they are today. Long-range bombers flying from lower threat areas, in conjunction with submarines firing cruise missiles, could provide a great deal of U.S. combat power during the opening phase of a conflict. Resilient air bases and carriers near conflict areas will generate sorties to support these other assets, and will become a primary means of attack as adversary surveillance capabilities are diminished and missiles inventories exhausted. Missile defenses (such as Navy ships armed with SM-3 interceptors and the Army’s Patriot air defense system) can intercept some portion of incoming ballistic missiles. These capabilities are far from perfect but they can reduce the number of missiles that could reach defended aircraft carriers and bases, forcing an adversary to expend more missiles to achieve its goals and drawing down its finite quiver of ballistic missiles more quickly. In the future, directed energy systems might augment these layered defenses.14 Camouflage, concealment, and deception could complicate China’s ability to locate U.S. forces. A final component of the resilience portfolio lies in rapid repair capabilities. The U.S. Air Force recently demonstrated a rapid runway repair capability able to fill dozens of craters in an air base’s runways and taxiways in eight hours.15 In the event of a conflict, this resilience portfolio would multiply targets and confuse PLA planners, thereby minimizing the damage that a Chinese attack could do and enabling U.S. forces to rapidly rebound from what damage did occur. Although U.S. forces would initially be deployed in greater depth than they are today, resilience would not require ceding ground to China from the outset. Some U.S. forces would remain in areas close to China during peacetime and at the outset of a conflict. And as the war progressed, the resilient force posture would permit U.S. forces to shift their center of gravity back towards the Chinese mainland. Countering Attacking Forces A robust ability to counter Chinese power projection will require another portfolio of capabilities. The United States must be prepared to counter power projection in three domains: naval forces, air power, and landed forces. The strategy focuses on defeating PLA assets beyond China’s shores, rather than on striking mainland targets. In countering Chinese naval forces, U.S. submarines will continue to have a significant advantage over Chinese anti-submarine warfare capabilities. But U.S. submarines have capacity limitations both in how many torpedoes each carries and how many submarines can operate in a given area. In addition to submarines, the military will need an expanded inventory of joint long-range anti-ship missiles. Integrating such missiles on U.S. Air Force aircraft will expand anti-surface warfare capacity. Land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, either operated by the Army or by U.S. allies, could also play a role, as could modern anti-ship mines. Expanding the ability to air-deliver mines from stand-off ranges would give the U.S. military additional flexibility and free up other highdemand assets such as submarines. In countering Chinese air power, the first line of defense would be provided by U.S. aircraft from aircraft carriers and resilient ground bases working in conjunction with allied air forces. Air defenses, in the form of U.S. Navy air defense destroyers and cruisers or land-based air defenses such as the Patriot system, could provide a second line of defense. Allies and partners could contribute to this second line of defense with their own assets. These could be bolstered by foreign military sales facilitated by the United States and possibly by Japan, which has recently relaxed its ban on arms exports. To defeat landed forces, a combination of capabilities would again be required. Many of the same weapons needed to attack adversary surface warfare groups could be used to interdict amphibious forces before they reached land. A suite of weapons could be used against beachheads, including air-delivered weapons optimized to attack ground forces (such as cluster munitions and sensor-fused weapons), naval fires (land-attack missiles and, in the future, perhaps rail guns), and ground-based fires (including artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, and anti-tank guided missiles). The ultimate means of reducing Chinese ground forces is through land power, ideally that of a partner or ally but potentially with U.S. support. Leveraging Allied Strengths The third component of a denial strategy is buttressing allied strengths and capitalizing on partner geography. One possibility is to assist allies and partners in creating their own A2/AD zones equipped with air defenses, anti-ship cruise missiles, mines, and sensor networks. By focusing on defensive weapons, the effort would seek to make U.S. partners and allies dangerous porcupines whose capabilities would only be a threat to an aggressor seeking to change the status quo. A second important facet will be improving partners’ ability to operate with U.S. forces. Measures could include combined training exercises, data sharing procedures, military advisors, embedded liaisons, and prepositioned supplies to enable U.S. forces to rapidly deploy into the country. During peacetime, the sales of key defensive systems and combined training exercises will demonstrate the challenges China would face if it attempted to change the status quo through force. Increasing the scope and frequency of exercises would also improve familiarity between the United States and its partners, enabling them to operate together better should deterrence fail. The April 2014 agreement with the Philippines regarding an expanded U.S. rotational presence is an important step in deepening contact between the U.S. military and key allies and partners.16 Shifting the Cost-Exchange Ratio All three elements of the denial strategy are designed to turn the tyranny of distance on its head, or at least to neutralize the most significant disadvantages posed by geography. China can, and likely will, build power projection forces (i.e. longer-range missiles, aerial tankers, longer-range bombers, and improved satellitebased communications and surveillance) to challenge the United States farther from its coast. But these systems will begin to place China on the losing side of cost-exchange ratios. The two-stage missiles required to strike targets beyond roughly 1,000 kilometers are more expensive than singlestage systems, and all other things equal, doubling the range of a bomber roughly doubles its cost. In summary, the resiliency measures described above make U.S. forces less lucrative targets against which China would have to launch more expensive missiles and bombers. If executed correctly, this strategy would proliferate targets more quickly and more cheaply than China could add to its missile inventory. On the U.S. side, although many of the capabilities required for an active denial strategy would be provided by legacy systems (such as Virginia-class attack submarines and long-range cruise missiles carried by B-52 and B-1 bombers) some new or expanded capabilities would be required. Improving the resilience of air bases and the survivability of aircraft carriers would require new spending in areas such as electronic warfare, rapid repair capabilities, and hardening. The most expensive element would likely be missile defenses with, for example, a single SM-3 interceptor costing approximately $10 million.17 Although some new capabilities would be required under an active denial strategy, their total costs would be far less than those associated with a strategy aimed at restoring all-aspects dominance. Moreover, the strategy would probably not require an increase in the overall defense budget. Curtailing investment in conventional prompt global strike and reducing the F-35 buy, which would become less critical under a strategy that does not depend on penetrating Chinese mainland air defenses, are savings that could pay for the active denial strategy. As of 2013, the total acquisition cost of the F-35 program was estimated at over $320 billion (in 2012 dollars).18 The F-35 will still be a key U.S. Air Force capability, and one that is critical for air superiority, but fewer of these aircraft would be required under a strategy predicated on a dynamic defense-in-depth, or active denial strategy.