Concept too narrow --- focused on solidarity undermines deterrence and long-term planning --- including EDT is key
Ringsmose and Rynning ‘21
(Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning are both professors of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.“NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy Volume 63, 2021 - Issue 5 pg Taylor and Francis //um-ef)
As NATO prepares to update its Strategic Concept, some might be tempted to regard this moment as an opportunity to push NATO beyond Trump – that is, beyond political division and towards a new era of trans-atlantic solidarity. Such a push is certainly needed, and dovetails with the heightened awareness that in a new geopolitical age, and following the debacle in Afghanistan, democratic values may lack the power to bring allies together and to offer the kind of unified vision required for renewed geopolitical competition. The danger highlighted in this article is that political enthusiasm for renewal might well produce a myopic, inadequate Strategic Concept. NATO has been here before: in 2009–10, eager to move beyond the political divisions built into the war on terror, NATO embraced a Strategic Concept that was perfectly crafted to speak to the Alliance’s broad range of political interests and sensibilities. In an age of contingent crisis management, NATO could muddle through without a clear statement of political–military priorities and defence guidance. In an era of great-power competition, this kind of muddling through would be a calamity. NATO’s post-Crimea adaptation tells the story. NATO responded with political vigour, condemning Russia and placing the burden of change on Moscow while bolstering its own defence and deterrence posture. However, internal political limitations meant that NATO did not develop its thinking on the nature of the threat and the effects that would serve to deter it. By 2016, when Trump burst onto the scene, NATO’s capacity for such in-depth political thinking seemed non-existent. The military authorities seized the initiative, crafting a new military strategy centred on desired effects and deterrence. This first real strategy since the adoption in 1967 of NATO’s Flexible Response strategy was then met with political ambivalence. NATO needs to get its strategic house in order. The political–military divide outlined in this article is real but not yet alarming; a failure to tend to it in the new Strategic Concept would sound the alarm. Confronting Russia while competing with China, digesting the lessons of Afghanistan and developing a range of policy competences in cyber, resilience, outer space, capacity-building and more is indeed a tall political order. Strategy is about priorities, however, and NATO’s priorities must bridge the political– military divide. Thus, the new Strategic Concept could do worse than establish collective defence as an overriding priority; wrap it in a narrative of democratic values necessitating both a rebalanced NATO and collective defence; and invite continuous political–military dialogue on military technology and its strategic implications.