Not recognizing cyber is more confusing for allies – NATO has already made cyber a core part of its mission.
Veenendaal et al 16 [Matthijs Veenendaal has been working for the Netherlands Ministry of Defence since 2006 in various policy positions. He is currently stationed as a researcher at the Strategy Branch of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. He has been closely involved in the development of cyber defence policy of the ministry of Defence and the principle author of the first Defence Strategy for operating in cyberspace (2012). Kadri Kaska is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. As a legal and policy analyst with over 15 years of experience, her current research focus is on national cyber security strategies and organisational models, in particular cyber aspects of crisis management. She has also consulted on developing cyber security policy and strategy. MAJ Pascal Brangetto is a supply officer in the French Army.; “Is NATO Ready to Cross the Rubicon on Cyber Defence?”; NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence; June 2016; https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NATO-CCD-COE-policy-paper.pdf]//eleanor
NATO has defined two distinct responsibilities concerning cyber defence: (a) collective defence and (b) the protection of NATO networks. In 2011, the NATO Cyber Defence Policy established that “[i]n order to perform the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence and crisis management, the integrity and continuous functioning of its information systems must be guaranteed.”6 The Wales Summit Declaration of 2014 expanded on this when the Alliance affirmed that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence, yet the Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defence of 2014 failed to delineate roles and responsibilities.7 The task of defending the alliance against armed attacks through cyberspace with military means was thereby added on top of a policy for network defence. As long as the NATO Cyber Defence Policy merely recognises that the principle of collective defence is applicable in cyberspace, while limiting possible action to the protection of networks, it will continue to cause confusion among Allies. The principle of collective defence is NATO’s raison d’être and lies at the heart of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. It commits the Alliance to protect and defend the Allies’ territory and populations against an armed attack.8 Consequently, the accepted core responsibility of the Alliance in cyberspace is to defend the Allies against armed attacks through cyberspace, when necessary through military means. However, the only means at its disposal is the protection of its own networks and systems. This means that while the Alliance recognises that cyberspace can be used by adversaries to launch an armed attack against it, it is impossible for the Alliance to counter such an attack in and through cyberspace. For NATO, this is rather a novel approach to its responsibilities. It would, for instance, be unimaginable that in response to an armed air attack, NATO would not allow for the use of air power, but would limit its response to the use of air defence systems. While the core tasks of collective defence and the protection of own networks are clearly connected and overlapping responsibilities, they are executed under different political, legal, and organisational frameworks. The responsibility for the protection of its own networks is, in principle, the same for NATO as it is for any other large public or corporate organisation working with sensitive information. It is essential to the security and continuity of these organisations, but it is a task mostly carried out in a peacetime context and day-to-day business setting. Outside of an armed conflict, cyber attacks against NATO as an organisation will be qualified as cyber espionage, cyber crime or, in some cases, information operations; but not as armed attacks. Thus, the organisation has the obligation to protect its networks, systems and data but there is a big difference between guarding duties and combat actions. Likewise, as the Alliance will not use military means to counter these types of cyber attacks, the guiding policy should not be defined in military terminology or integrated into a larger military framework. However, that does not mean that a guiding policy for the use of cyber operations is unnecessary and it certainly does not mean that a network defence policy can substitute a cyber operations policy.