Any NATO security cooperation, no matter how small, is perceived by Russia.
Pezard & Rhoades ’20 — Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Her research focuses on Arctic security; strategic competition; European security and transatlantic relations; measures short of war; security cooperation and security force assistance; deterrence and use of force; and French defense and security policy. Pezard received her Ph.D. in international relations (political science) from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, and her M.A. in contemporary history from the French School of Political Science (Sciences-Po) in Paris. Ashley Rhoades is a defense policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. At RAND, her work focuses on strategic competition, security cooperation, deterrence, terrorism and counterterrorism (with an emphasis on al Qaeda and the Islamic State), and European and Middle Eastern security issues. Ashley received her M.A. in security studies from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. She holds a B.A. with honors in political science and a minor in art history from Stanford University. 2020; “What Provokes Putin’s Russia?”; RAND Corporation; https://doi.org/10.7249/PE338; //CYang
Although the United States and its allies can make every effort to send clear signals and communicate effectively with Russian leadership, there is always a risk that Russia will misinterpret U.S. and NATO actions. A variety of factors beyond the control of the deterring party — including cultural differences, cognitive biases, irrational behavior, and flawed assumptions — can cause the target state to mis-read or misjudge the actions of its adversary.99 Domestic concerns or political constraints can also color how a state perceives and reacts to the actions of its adversary. One potent example of misperception occurred in 1983, when the Russians mistook a NATO nuclear warfare exercise called “Able Archer” as a cover for an actual nuclear strike, and nearly retaliated in kind.100 Only belatedly did then-President Ronald Reagan come to the realization that
[m]any people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans many of us in the administration took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthink-able that the United States would launch a first strike against them. But I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike. . . .101
This incident illustrates the importance of trying to understand how the other side will interpret one’s actions and the dangers of presuming that the adversary will share the same logic and assumptions.
Moreover, Russia tends to view any defense- or security-related actions taken by the United States or NATO in the European theater as being targeted at it, regardless of the actual intent behind these actions. As one RAND report notes,
Any actions in Europe to support American operations elsewhere have been and will be observed by a Russian military more interested in us than we are in it. It is critical that operational planning take this into account and that planners and operators take steps to prevent Russia from mistaking operations and actions as unintended “signals.”102
Of course, Russia may also make such claims about perceived U.S. and NATO “aggression” with the aim of justifying its own defense- or security-related actions. Whether rooted in genuine concern over U.S. actions or political theater, the reality is that Russia frequently does not modulate its responses based on the perceived or stated U.S. intent behind its actions, but rather reacts to transgressions of its redlines irrespective of the reason behind the violation. Nonetheless, if U.S. and NATO planners fail to account for Russian sensitivities and assumptions when deciding on courses of action, seemingly minor or irrelevant actions could inadvertently trigger escalation with Russia.