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Russia hates the institution of NATO---withdrawal is key

Evan Kerrane 9/23/20. PhD candidate, Swansea University, UK; Major, U.S. Army. "Russian Insecurities: How Fear Drives Perception in the Near Abroad". Sciendo. 9-23-2020. https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/jobs/ahead-of-print/article-10.2478-jobs-2020-0004/article-10.2478-jobs-2020-0004.xml?language=en

Moscow has remained sceptical of the security alliance, once aimed at defending Western Europe from the Soviet Union remaining in existence following its collapse. Richard Sakwa (2016) argued that NATO’s very being is ‘justified by the need to manage the security threats provoked by its enlargement’ (4). While this commentary ignores why the former Warsaw Pact and Baltic states would perceive Moscow as a threat, it still serves to represent the alternative viewpoint, not of a benevolent NATO seeking peace and justice, but of a menacing military alliance taking over strategic territory through membership.

Furthermore, NATO is viewed as a lingering tool of U.S. dominance in Europe. For many realists, the survival of NATO following the Cold War says more about American power and influence over Europe than multilateral institutions (Waltz 2000, 20). Waltz argued, ‘that international institutions serve primarily national rather than international interests’ (21). In other words, NATO survived because it was in the national interest of the United States and its expansion continues to be a policy pursued for American interests. Moscow, therefore, perceives NATO as an imperial weapon of an expansionist, unchecked U.S. power.

To this end, Russia sees NATO as a weapon against its interests and a potential threat to its survival. Russian academic Sergei Karaganov (2014) argued, ‘the West has continually sought to expand its zone of military, economic, and political influence through NATO and the EU. Russian interests and objections were flatly ignored. Russia was treated like a defeated power, though we did not see ourselves as defeated’. This perception is not isolated within Moscow. Prominent Cold War figures warned of the policy of expansion towards Russian borders. George Kennan (1997), the American diplomat and author of the original containment policy, warned that expansion of NATO would be disastrous for U.S.–Russia relations, as perception in Moscow questions the need for a military alliance following the end of hostile tensions.

Debate centred on whether the West ‘promised’ not expand into the Near Abroad continues among academics (for discussion, see Kramer 2009; Kramer and Shifrinson 2017). However, these issues are secondary to the security issues of strategic depth between Moscow and the West. Since realists argue that states pay close attention to relative gains from rivals, and since perceptions play a key role in this analysis, any perception of an advantage equates to an advantage. For Moscow, there is a perception that the admissions of former World Trade Organization (WTO) states represent these broken promises by NATO (Waltz 2000, 22). The 2008 discussion of membership to both Georgia and Ukraine signalled further ‘violations’ of this agreement, but the power gains remain the primary concern. During a March 2014 press conference, Putin expressed his frustration at the West. He said, ‘We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. And all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West’. Putin went on to say that the West repeatedly lies to Moscow, ‘This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: “Well, this does not concern you”. That’s easy to say’ (Ibid.).

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