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2ac anti-blackness turns

The freedom of the anti-capitalist worker is premised upon a denial of blackness because it remains on the terrain of beings. Their claim to produce freedom for blackness relies on a vicious ruse of analogy that re-elaborates on the conditions of slavery.

Barber (Daniel Colucciello, Department Member ICI Berlin Institute for Cultural Inquiry) 2016 (The Creation of Non-Being, Rhizome, Issue 29, , C.A.)

[28] This is to name the essential limit of Lazzarato's account as the failure to analyze the ways in which the domination of capitalism is constituted by the domination of anti-blackness. In making this claim, I am following Wilderson's argument that "the privileged subject of Marxist discourse is a subaltern who is approached by variable capital—a wage. In other words, Marxism assumes a subaltern structured by capital, not by white supremacy" (Wilderson 2003: 225). The essential limit of Marxism, he argues, is its theorization of capitalism in terms of "exploitation (rather than accumulation and death)" (Wilderson 2003: 234). Marxism thus begins from and stays within the being of whiteness, a being whose coherence is premised on the denial of the fact that capital "was kick-started by approaching a particular body (a Black body) with direct relations of force, not by approaching a White body with variable capital" (Wilderson 2003: 230). [29] The position of the worker, in virtue of its raced difference from the position of the slave, asserts a capacity for analogical relation—even amidst exploitation—with the exploiter. The exploited and the exploiter, despite their asymmetry, share a being that is made through the denial of blackness, which is positioned as the slave; the worker possesses an analogical relation to the owner that the slave does not. To presume that the slave position can be analogized with the worker position is thus to attribute the latter's analogical capacity to the former, which is without analogy. It is to presume an analogy between what is capable of being analogous with what is not: "the ruse of analogy" (Wilderson 2010: 37). [30] This means, as well, that there can be no question of an intersection between separate but equal spheres of class and anti-black racism, much less of an account that takes up anti-blackness as a means of proceeding toward a supposedly essential antagonism of class. Against such accounts, Wilderson remarks that, within them, "racism is read off the base, as it were, as being derivative of political economy" (Wilderson 2003: 225). On the contrary, what is essential is anti-black racism, or the incommensurability between non-being and being: class division concerns relations between analogizable terms (owner and worker) that, however conflictual or exploitative, presume a common being, a being whose making—and being made coherent—is premised on (the denial of) the real non-being of the slave. [31] All this is to say that anti-black racial ontology is the condition of possibility for the Marxist demand—central to Lazzarato's own version of autonomist Marxism—for being free from exploitation. As Christina Sharpe remarks: "The legal captivity of Africans and their descendants was central to the codification of rights and freedoms for those legally constituted as white and their legally white descendants. That is, freedoms for those people constituted as white were and are produced through an other's body legally and otherwise being made to wear unfreedom and to serve as a placeholder for access to the freedoms that are denied the black subject" (Sharpe 2010: 15). The being of freedom, or the articulation of a free being – that is, the very link between being and freedom—is premised upon a denial of blackness, or non-being. This is the case even (or especially) when freedom is expressed as a possibility, for such possibility—pertaining only to that which has already emerged as being—cannot articulate that which this emergence denies. As Saidiya V. Hartman remarks, the "language of freedom no longer becomes that which rescues the slave from his or her former condition, but the site of the re-elaboration of that condition" (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 185). [32] Freedom names the modulative, mutational possibilities of being(s). Marxist discourse, however innovative, addresses free beings, or the being of freedom. It leaves unthought non-being, the reality of which is logically prior to all being, and thus to all possibilities of being. It is for this reason that Lazzarato's account of capitalism in terms of debt, while an extremely innovative form of contemporary Marxism, still fails to articulate the essential antagonism of non-being. When Lazzarato speaks of the indebted man, of the "we" of debt inheritance, he is speaking of the position that Marxism ascribes to the worker—instead of a capital-work relation we have, in Lazzarato, a credit-debt relation. Debt innovatively re-defines the meaning of work, but it does not change the positionality of the worker, which remains as the position of the debtor. His critique proceeds in virtue of a link—foreclosed by debt—between being and freedom, without ever articulating that the very possibility of this link is premised on the denial of non-being, on the making of blackness as that which is without the possibility of being free. Lazzarato thereby fails to address how the being of the worker, now the indebted man, is rendered visible by standing out against the background of (black) flesh.

The focus on exploitation of the worker cannot grapple with black non-being because exploitation occurs through the inheritance of debt which presumes a being which has the capacity to inherit. It is precisely through this capacity that the worker can still identify with the “we” of humanity.

Barber (Daniel Colucciello, Department Member ICI Berlin Institute for Cultural Inquiry) 2016 (The Creation of Non-Being, Rhizome, Issue 29, , C.A.)

[17] A central feature of control is debt. As Deleuze remarks, "A man is no longer a man confined but a man in debt" (Deleuze 1997: 179). The experience of the indebted man is one of endless postponement, for the creditor-debtor relation sets the terms, in the present, for the future of this relation. Otherwise put, the relation between present and future is circumscribed within the relation between creditor and debtor: to have credit is to have the future as a present creditor; to have debt is to have the future as a present debtor. The future is given credit by the present, or the future is what one is given to pay off the debt of the present. In such a relation, the future is endlessly postponed while the present remains, endures, as credit and debt. Any negativity toward the present is foreclosed, and so the future is never created. [18] Yet Deleuze's analysis of control, and thereby of debt, is inchoate. For this reason, it will be useful to turn to the arguments set forth in Lazzarato's recent text, The Making of the Indebted Man, which offers a thoroughgoing development of the insights of Deleuze's analysis. The usefulness of this text arises, additionally, from the fact that Lazzarato—unlike many who work in a Deleuzian vein—tends to avoid dependence on an ineliminable excess of being that is presumed to overcome the limits of the present. Rather than treat Deleuze's thought as the index of an indefatigable, constitutive power of being that guarantees political possibility, Lazzarato attends to the ways in which control has foreclosed such possibility. As such, Lazzarato is perhaps the best available candidate for exemplifying Deleuzian thought without the presumption of affirmation. [19] Lazzarato presents the indebted man as the subjective terrain of communicative capitalism's apparatus of control, and in doing so develops some of Deleuze's central claims. For instance, he observes how debt "preempts non-chronological time, each person's future as well as the future of society as a whole," and contends that debt is the "principal explanation for the strange sensation of living in a society without time, without possibility, without foreseeable rupture" (Lazzarato 2012: 46-47). Furthermore, he confirms that debt marks the appearance of capitalism's capacity to make being as such, and thus to make the future: "The power of capitalism, like the world it aims to appropriate and control, is always in the process of being made" (Lazzarato 2012: 107). [20] Lazzarato offers a key advance on Deleuze with his emphasis on the aforementioned being-making capacity of capitalism. Specifically, he insists that debt is not a scientific necessity—something that stems from autonomous economic laws—but rather a product of power. Debt belongs to the exercise of power, and as such it is a making of beings that are logically prior to—and thus do not gain their coherence through—any science of economy. "Measure, evaluation, and appraisal"—the means by which debt expresses and constructs itself—"all arise from the question of power, before there is any question of economics" (Lazzarato 2012: 80). It is in virtue of the centrality of power within his analysis that Lazzarato offers an additional advance: the claim that attention to the debt-relation is inseparable from attention to the Christian relation. The power at issue, Lazzarato argues, is one in which the "origin of valuation and measure is both religious and political" (Lazzarato 2012: 81). [21] Lazzarato's theorization of capitalism as a power to make the debt-relation—and not as a secular science regulating this relation—leads him to introduce and emphasize the Christian valence of "debt obligations" (Lazzarato 2012: 40-41). He argues that what makes the debt-relation hold (as its necessary, if not sufficient, condition) is obligation, and that the theorization of this obligation requires attending to the Christian character of debt. Being is made through the establishment of a creditor-debtor relation, yet essential to this relation is the establishment of obligation, and obligation, Lazzarato argues, is established by Christianity (from which capitalism inherits it). Simply put, the making of beings through debt is made through obligation, which is made through Christianity. It is along these lines that he claims we are now "indebted to the 'god' Capital" (Lazzarato 2012: 32). Lazzarato's analysis of the debt-relation thereby demonstrates that the power by which capitalism makes being is bound up with a power named by Christianity. Capitalist power must then be analyzed in its undividedness from Christian power, and in a way that attends to the negativity of non-being against being. Asymmetry as Analogy [22] One way of addressing this task is to think debt as inheritance—that is, to think the inheritance of Christian debt by capitalism, and in doing so to think how a capacity of being is inherited by capitalism from Christianity. We inherit debt, and debt requires that our future be inherited—ahead of time—as the debt enacted in the present. But it is not just that debt is inherited, it is also that debt constitutes its inheritors as something, as beings analogically belonging to a "we." Note, for instance, the collective first-person of Lazzarato's claim: "We are no longer the inheritors of original sin but rather of the debt of preceding generations" (Lazzarato 2012: 32). Who is "we"? [23] It is by way of this question that one begins to encounter a limit of Lazzarato's analysis, which I will address in a logical register before returning to the explicitly historical marks of the inheritance that he tracks. This limit, logically speaking, is Lazzarato's focus on asymmetry. He clearly observes the injustice of the debt-relation by articulating the deep asymmetry between creditor and debtor.While this observation is not incorrect, the approach to which it belongs ignores the ways in which asymmetry remains within being. In order for one thing to be communicated as asymmetrical with or disproportionate to another thing, these things must be analogical to one another, possessing a minimal degree of likeness or commonality. Therefore creditor and debtor, despite the extremity of their asymmetry, remain analogous to each other as beings. [24] This is to say that the debt-relation operates as a domain of analogous being, and that Lazzarato—by presupposing and leaving in place this domain—fails to encounter the negativity of non-being.Whereas asymmetry presupposes the commonality and analogical relation of beings, non-being names that which is without being, and thus without analogical relation to being(s): something and nothing are not asymmetrical but incommensurable. Lazzarato's critique of debt, by focusing on asymmetry, ignores this absence of analogy between being (whether positive or negative, creditor or debtor) and non-being, and so it can only amount to a modulation of being—that is, a modulation ofwe. [25] Returning to Lazzarato's history of Christian-capitalist inheritance, I contend that this modulation is evident as an apparent transmutation within the "we": we were once the inheritors of original sin, whereas we are now the inheritors of debt. Yet a deeper continuity remains, for while we are different, it is we who have undergone—and survived—discontinuity: we are still we. Previously we inherited original sin, whereas now we inherit debt, but we are still those who inherit—and, in virtue of this being-inherited or inheriting-being, we are something. We are we, and we remain we, across any apparent discontinuity of Christianity and capitalism, because what remains, what is constant, is the capacity to inherit. Such inheritance is not so happy, of course, for to inherit sin, or to inherit debt, is to be exploited by God or capital. Yet this structure of exploitation maintains an analogy between exploiter and exploited: we are exploited, but precisely through this exploitation, this inheritance of debt, we still know ourselves as we. [26] In this sense, "we" names the inherited capacity to be-something, or the capacity to inherit being. What is ultimately inherited is not debt so much as this capacity: the debt that exploits is the debt that gives being, that gives the capacity to be in analogy with other beings, and thus to participate in or communicate as we. To frame the inheritance of debt primarily in terms of its asymmetry or exploitation is thus to obscure the fact that inheritability, or the ability to inherit, is the common or communicable being underlying all asymmetry. This is to say that Lazzarato focuses his analysis on the conflictual relation between beings of the anti-black world and thereby fails to address the more essential antagonism between blackness and the world. Lazzarato remains within the being of inheritance, or within the we that underlies and guarantees the "coherence" (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 187) of asymmetrical relation, whereas any break with the present must be articulated according to blackness, which is without relation. [27] The break, then, must be articulated according to the uninheritability of blackness. For Lazzarato, however, blackness remains in "the position of the unthought" (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 185), and this is precisely because he adheres to the universalizable horizon of the we. "Everyone is a 'debtor,' accountable to and guilty before. Capital has become the Great Creditor, the Universal Creditor" (Lazzarato 2012: 11). Yet it is clear that there are those who do not participate in the we of the indebted man. Logically prior to the domination articulated via asymmetrical relations of we (inheritance of debt), there is domination articulated as non-being: "the damned of the earth" do not inherit.

Their move to call us individualistic masks the whites as the collective and demonize people who challenge racial and sexual violence – that allows that violence to continue and reifies neoliberalism

Ahmed in 14 <Sara. Professor of Race and Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths College, University of London. “Selfcare as welfare” August 25, 2014. http://feministkilljoys.com/2014/08/25/selfcare-as-warfare/>

Audre Lorde writes persuasively about how self-care can become an obscurant, how caring for oneself can lead you away from engaging in certain kinds of political struggle. And yet, in A Burst of Light, she defends self-care as not about self-indulgence, but self-preservation. Self-care becomes warfare. This kind of self-care is not about one’s own happiness. It is about finding ways to exist in a world that is diminishing. Already: we have been given some tools to sharpen our understanding of how neo-liberalism can be used as a tool. There are differences that matter, differences that matter relating to differences of power. Neoliberalism sweeps up too much when all forms of self-care become symptoms of neo-liberalism. When feminist, queer and anti-racist work that involves sharing our feelings, our hurt and grief, recognising that power gets right to the bone, is called neo-liberalism, we have to hear what is not being heard. When feminism involves recognising the suffering of say, an individual woman of colour at the hands of a sexist, heterosexist, and racist system that is indifferent to the suffering it causes and that is called neoliberalism, you would be repeating rather than challenging this structural indifference. And you also negate other “other histories” that are at stake in her struggle for her suffering to matter. Those who do not have to struggle for their own survival can very easily and rather quickly dismiss those who have to struggle for survival as “indulging themselves.” As feminism teaches us: talking about personal feelings is not necessarily about deflecting attention from structures. If anything, I would argue the opposite: not addressing certain histories that hurt, histories that get to the bone, how we are affected by what we come up against, is one way of deflecting attention from structures (as if our concern with our own pain or suffering is what stops certain things from just “going away”). Not the only way, but one way. If you have got a model that says an individual woman who is trying to survive an experience of rape by focusing on her own wellbeing and safety, by trying to work out ways she can keep on going or ways she can participate in something without having to experience more trauma (by asking for trigger warnings in a classroom, for instance) is participating in the same politics as a woman who is concerned with getting up “the ladder” in a company then I think there is something wrong with your model. Sometimes, “coping with” or “getting by” or “making do” might appear as a way of not attending to structural inequalities, as benefiting from a system by adapting to it, even if you are not privileged by that system, even if you are damaged by that system. Perhaps we need to ask: who has enough resources not to have to become resourceful? When you have less resources you might have to become more resourceful. Of course: the requirement to become more resourceful is part of the the injustice of a system that distributes resources unequally. Of course: becoming resourceful is not system changing even if it can be life changing (although maybe, just maybe, a collective refusal not to not exist can be system changing). But to assume people’s ordinary ways of coping with injustices implies some sort of failure on their part – or even an identification with the system – is another injustice they have to cope with. The more resources you have the easier it is to make such a critique of those whose response to injustice is to become more resourceful. You might not be trying to move up, to project yourself forward; you might simply be trying not to be brought down. Heavy, heavy histories. Wearing, worn down. Even if it’s system change we need, that we fight for, when the system does not change, when the walls come up, those hardenings of history into physical barriers in the present, you have to manage; to cope. Your choices are compromised when a world is compromised. It is not surprising: some recent anti-feminist, anti-queer and anti-intersectionality (intersectionality as code for people of colour) statements from the “white male left” rest on charging us with being individualistic, as indulging ourselves, as being concerned with ourselves and our own damaged “identities.” I wonder if Audre Lorde might have had to insist that self-care was not self-indulgence because she had heard this charge. I wonder. I have read recently some critiques of feminists for calling out individuals for sexism and racism because those critiques neglect (we neglect) structures. Really? Or is that when we talk about sexism and racism you hear us as talking about individuals? Are you suddenly concerned with structures because you do not want to hear how you as an individual might be implicated in the power relations we critique? I noted in my book, On Being Included (2012) how there can be a certain safety in terms like “institutional racism” in a context where individuals have disidentified from institutions they can see themselves as not “in it” at all. And how interesting: the individual disappears at the very moment he is called to account. He will probably reappear as the saviour of the left. You can hear, no doubt, my tiredness and cynicism. I do not apologise for it. I am tired of it. Some of the glib dismissals of “call out culture” make my blood boil. I say glib because they imply it is easy to call people out, or even that it has become a new social norm. I know, for instance, how hard it is to get sexual harassment taken seriously. Individuals get away with it all the time. They get away with it because of the system. It is normalised and understood as the way things are. Individual women have to speak out, and testify over and over again; and still there is a system in place, a system that is working, that stops women from being heard. In a case when a woman is harassed by an individual man, she has to work hard to call him out. She often has to keep saying it because he keeps doing it. Calling out an individual matters, even when the system is also what is bruising: the violence directed against you by somebody is a violence that leaves a trace upon you whether that trace is visible or not. And: there is a system which creates him, supports him, and gives him a sense that he has a right to do what he does. To challenge him is to challenge a system. I read one anti-feminist article that implied feminists are being individualistic, when they call out individual men, because that calling out is what stops us working more collectively for radical transformation. Collectivity: can work for some individuals as a means for disguising their own interest as collective interest. When collectivity requires you to bracket your experience of oppression it is not a collectivity worth fighting for. And I have watched this happen with feminist despair: when women speak out about sexual harassment and sexual violence they are heard as compromising the whole thing: a project, a centre, a revolution. And the individuals they speak of are then presented as the ones who have to suffer the consequences of feminist complaint, the one’s whose damage is generalised (if “he” is damaged “we” are damaged). When her testimony is heard as damaging the possibility of revolting against a system, a system is reproduced. I will say it again: the individual seems to disappear at the moment he is called to account. We are the ones who then appear as individuals, who are assumed to be acting as individuals or even as being individualistic, while he disappears into a collective. From my study of will and willfulness, I learnt how those who challenge power are often judged as promoting themselves, as putting themselves first, as self-promotional. And maybe: the judgment does find us somewhere. We might have to promote ourselves when we are not promoted by virtue of our membership of a group. We might have to become assertive just to appear. For others, you appear and you are attended to right away. A world is waiting for you to appear. The one who can quickly disappear when called to account can then quickly re-appear when on the receiving end of an action that is welcomed or desired. I think of these differences as how we become assembled over and by tables. Two women seated together at a table, let’s say. Sometimes you might have to wave your arm, your willful arm, just to be noticed. Without a man at the table you tend not to appear. For others, to be seated is not only to be seen, but to be seen to. You can take up a place at the table when you have already been given a place. You do not have to become self-willed if your will is accomplished by the general will. This is why the general dismissal of feminism as identity politics (and there is a history to how identity politics becomes a dismissal) needs to be treated as a form of conservatism: it is an attempt to conserve power by assuming those who challenge power are just concerned with or about themselves. An individual is one who is not dividable into parts. In Willful Subjects (2014), I tied the history of the individual as the one who does not have to divide himself to a patriarchal, colonial and capitalist history. He can be an individual, not divided into parts, because others become his parts: they become his arms, his feet, his hands, limbs that are intended to give support to his body. When a secretary becomes his right hand, his right hand is freed. Your labour as support for his freedom. This is how the question of support returns us to bodies, to how bodies are supported. Willful parts are those who are unwilling to provide this support. So how quickly those who resist their subordination are judged as being individualistic as well as willful. In refusing to support him, by becoming his parts, we have become self-willed; in refusing to care for him, we are judged as caring for ourselves, where this “for” is assumed as only and lonely. Self-care: that can be an act of political warfare. In directing our care towards ourselves we are redirecting care away from its proper objects, we are not caring for those we are supposed to care for; we are not caring for the bodies deemed worth caring about. And that is why in queer, feminist and anti-racist work self-care is about the creation of community, fragile communities, assembled out of the experiences of being shattered. We reassemble ourselves through the ordinary, everyday and often painstaking work of looking after ourselves; looking after each other. This is why when we have to insist, I matter, we matter, we are transforming what matters. Women’s lives matter; black lives matter; queer lives matter; disabled lives matter; trans lives matter; the poor; the elderly; the incarcerated, matter. For those who have to insist they matter to matter: selfcare is warfare.

It also means the alt fails because reading racist and sexist violence as extrinsic effects of capital alienates people from the proletariat movement against capitalism

Belkhir in 1 <Jean Ait. “Marxism Without Apologies: Integrating Race, Gender, Class; A Working Class Approach” Race, Gender & Class8.2 (Apr 30, 2001): 142.>

More than ever there is a need for the continued struggle against historical social inequalities based on race, class and gender. We need to integrate racism, sexism and classism into the Marxist analysis of capitalism in which race or gender or class serves as a point of entry through which the varied forms of social inequality can and must be understood. Thus, in recognizing the centrality of race, gender and class issues in the struggle against economic inequality and exploitation and cultural subordination and domination, we will be able to avoid the dramatic mistakes of the past that considered racism, sexism and classism as divisive issues. Marxism and the "Woman Question" In their article Marxist Theory and the Oppression of Women, Morrissey & Stoecker (1994) argue "those who follow Marx and Engels are left with a Marxist theory that is ambiguous on whether the source of women's oppression might be independent of the source of capitalism and whether this oppression could be ended by ending capitalism alone." Feminism often suggests that Marxism produced virtually nothing of real usefulness about gender inequality and the liberation of women. For Vogel (1983): "Marx and his collaborator Engels had little to say about the emancipation of women.... For them it was a marginal problem." As a result, the sexist bias in Marxism contributed to the growth of distortions in their analysis of capitalism. In her famous article entitled: The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, Hartman (1981) argued that: "The marriage of Marxism and feminism has been like the marriage of husband and wife depicted in English common law: Marxism and feminism are one, and that one is Marxism." As such feminists argued (e.g., Hartman, 1981), since capital and private property do not cause the inequality of women, their abolition alone will not result in the end of gender inequality. Only specifically feminist analysis revealed the systemic character of the patriarchal relations between men and women necessary to understand gender inequality. Most women writing on feminism began with the central notion that there was a distinction between sex and gender and argued that "women" were not born, but made: the problem was culture, not nature that were at the center of women's so-called inferiority. Other feminist writers also argued that the end of capitalism or patriarchy would not necessarily end the objectification and "subordination" of women because the control was within culture and the unconscious. Some feminist theorists believe that the gender hierarchical system is more deeply embedded in the male ego and thus, the various changes in the social order have remained male dominated, whether capitalist, socialist, fascist, communist, authoritarian, or liberal. Central to the reproduction of the "inferiorisation of women" is the socialization process of children outside and inside the home where "the patriarchal ideology, that men are superior to women," are taught and, where the inferior position of women is reinforced by the churches, unions, armies, factories, offices, media, publicity, schools, etc. The extensive list of practices, such as clitoridectomy, infibulation, prostitution, pornography, rape, foot-banding, body-veiling, involuntary sterilization, and sex-object advertising, illustrate the unequal power relationship of women to men, and finally, modern Asia's anomaly; the girls who do not get born. MARXISM AND THE "RACE PROBLEM." Although much contemporary sociological writing concerns itself with analyses of race, theories of racial ethnic inequality have never been a priority in Marxist social science. As Geschwender & Levine (1994) reminds us: "Classical social theorists, such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, were not concerned with the race problem...The authors conclude their reviews of Classical and Recent Theoretical Developments in the Marxist Analysis of Race and Ethnicity in regretting that certain Marxist theorists make the error of denying the race problem in the U.S. For instance, Bonacich (1980) reduced racism to an ideological adjunct to class exploitation. Wallerstein (1972) came very close to eliminating the concept together by stripping it of any meaning independent of the exploitation process. As consequence, Manning Marable (1996) argues that racism has blunted the critical faculties of white progressives from the colonial period to the present Blacks have seen an endless series of prominent white liberal and progressive allies betray their trust and embrace the politics of white supremacy. Marxists have always insisted that the flow of social history is determined by the relationship between subjective and objective factors -- the superstructure or ideological, cultural, and political apparatuses and the base, or forces of production. But what most American progressives and Marxists adhered to was a philosophy not of Marxism -- which also suggests that the relations between superstructure and base are reciprocal, each affecting the other -- but of economic determinism. Racism was, therefore, only part of the larger class question. Small wonder, then, that until today, no progressive or Marxist white organizations, Old Left or New, had won over any significant number of black and people of color activists, intellectuals, or workers.

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