2ac left melancholy turn
The negative’s nostalgia for an anti-capitalism before post structuralism is left melancholy -- causes more political inaction
Dean 14 [Contemporary Political Theory, 4 November 2014, “Radicalism restored? Communism and the end of left melancholia,” Jonathan, School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds]
- The left likes to blame capitalism on everything and then we don’t know how to come up with effective resistances outside of cap (fem, queer, etc.) leads to clogging because we can only think in terms of capitalism
The use of melancholia as an analytical category has its roots in Freudian psychoanalysis, and is to be distinguished from the related concept of mourning. For Freud, the latter refers to the (non-pathological) process of working through an acknowledged ‘loss of a loved person, or of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s country, liberty, an ideal, and so on’ (Freud, 2001, p. 243). Crucially, after a period of mourning is completed ‘the ego becomes free and uninhibited again’ (2001, p. 243) but melancholia, by contrast, is ‘related to an object loss that is withdrawn from consciousness’ (2001, p. 245), and as such it remains unacknowledged, enduring and intransigent. A number of authors have argued that Freud’s distinction between mourning and melancholia can help capture something specific about the affects and dispositions of the academic left. Wendy Brown’s 1999 essay ‘Resisting Left Melancholy’ remains the standard-bearer. Drawing on Freud, Walter Benjamin and Stuart Hall, Brown argues that the left-wing melancholic is ‘attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal – even to the failure of that ideal – than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present’ (Brown, 1999, p. 20). Left-wing melancholy, says Brown, ‘signifies a certain narcissism with regard to one’s past political attachments and identity that exceeds any contemporary investment in political mobilization, alliance or transformation’ (1999, p. 20). But what precisely is it that has brought about this pervasive left-wing melancholy? Brown’s answer is twofold. First, she argues that the discourse of the left-wing melancholic frequently cites the turn to so-called ‘cultural politics’ or ‘identity politics’ – in which struggles around gender, race and sexuality are seen to have displaced the traditional focus on class – as having caused a crisis and loss of focus (1999, p. 23). The second alleged culprit – in the eyes of the left-wing melancholic – is the turn to ‘poststructuralism, discourse analysis, postmodernism, trendy literary theory got up as political analysis’ (1999, p. 23). Brown argues that this pervasive structure of left-wing melancholy, despite being based on an ostensible commitment to radical transformation, in fact engenders a conservative refusal to engage critically and constructively with the world. Instead, the left-wing melancholic takes refuge in his or her attachments to a lost ideal of traditional left theory and politics. The crucial point for Brown is that the problems affecting the academic left do not – as the left-wing melancholic would have it – arise from the left’s abandonment of its radical principles. Rather, this melancholia arises from many leftists’ continued (often unacknowledged) attachments to a historically specific model of anti-capitalist revolutionary social change, whose privileged status is now called into question. Left-wing melancholia, for Brown, is therefore bound up with a generalised refusal or inability to respond to the challenges engendered by the changing nature of capitalism, and the emergence of various forms of radical politics – feminism, queer politics, anti-racism and so on – irreducible to historical materialist models of political transformation.3 Brown’s text is notable for its lack of proper names, and as such melancholia is implicitly understood to refer to a collective, widely shared set of investments and orientations. This aspect of left melancholia is tackled in some detail in J.K. Gibson-Graham’s (2006) analysis of the affects and emotions of the academic left. One of Gibson-Graham’s central aims is to contest an entrenched mindset in which ‘the accepted or correct ‘political’ stance is one in which the emotional and affective dispositions of paranoia, melancholia, and moralism intermingle and self-reinforce’ (2006, p. 4). Crucially, these negative affects are not located in particular individuals, but are a ‘structure of feeling’ (2006, p. 1) ‘widely present if not fully manifest in any person or pronouncement’ (2006, p. 6). Gibson-Graham suggests that these structures of feeling reduce the academic left to political [clogging] paralysis, and also curtail our analytical capacities: left melancholia, they argue, reflects and reinforces rather crude, totalising renditions of capitalism as a pervasive and largely uncontestable socio-economic formation. Consequently, complexities within capitalism, and socio-economic practices that diverge from – or indeed actively resist – capitalism, are downplayed, overlooked and cast to the margins, precluding the production of more nuanced framings of contemporary economic practices and social formations. The thrust of Brown and Gibson-Graham’s critical analyses of various aspects of left melancholia is not to suggest that those on the academic left should simply cheer up, or foster more positive affective orientations for the sake of it. Rather, their point is that melancholia – conceived as a specific kind of psychic formation different to, say, disappointment or sadness – hampers the academic left’s ability to intervene politically, or to engage in fruitful socio-political analysis. Consequently, Gibson-Graham and others make a persuasive argument that an urgent task for the left is to explore how we might weaken the hold of melancholia.
This articulates itself in ways that are racist, sexist, and destroy alt solvency
Ross 2k [Marlon B., Professor, Department of English and Carter G. Woodson Institute for African-American and African Studies, “Commentary: Pleasuring Identity, or the Delicious Politics of Belonging,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 4, pages 840-841]
Although in his contribution Eric Lott targets Professor Michaels's comments and his own recent feud with Timothy Brennan (who unfortunately is not included in this volume) rather than Ken's argument, what Eric says about “left and liberal fundamentalists” who “simply and somewhat penitently” urge us to “‘go back to class’” could also be directed at Ken's conclusion. Ken writes, “Crafting a political left that does not merely reflect existing racial divisions starts with the relatively mundane proposition that it is possible to make a persuasive appeal to the given interests of working and unemployed women and men, regardless of race, in support of a program for economic justice.” On this one, I side with Eric, rather than Tim and Ken. Standing on the left depends on whose left side we're talking about. My left might be your right and vice versa, because it depends on what direction we're facing, and what direction depends on which identities we're assuming and affirming. Eric adds, "Even in less dismissive [than Tim's] accounts of new social movements based not on class but on identities formed by histories of injustice, there is a striking a priori sense of voluntarism about the investment in this cause or that movement or the other issue—as though determining the most fundamental issue were a matter of the writer's strength of feeling rather than a studied or analytical sense of the ever-unstable balance of forces in a hegemonic bloc at a given moment." I agree, but I'll risk mangling what Eric says by putting it more crassly.Touting class or "economic justice"as the fundamental stance for left identity is just another way of telling everybody else to shut up so I can be heard above the fray. Because of the force of "identity politics," a leftist white person would be leery of claiming to lead Blacks toward the promised land, a leftist straight man leery of claiming to lead women or queers, but, for a number of complex rationalizations, we in the middle class (where all of us writing here currently reside) still have few qualms about volunteering to lead, at least theoretically, the working class toward "economic justice." What Eric calls here "left fundamentalism," I'd call, at the risk of sounding harsh, left paternalism. Of the big identity groups articulated through "identity politics," economic class remains the only identity where a straight white middle-class man can still feel comfortable claiming himself a leading political voice, and thus hemay sometimes overcompensate by screaming that this is the only identity that really matters—which is the same as claiming that class is beyond identity. Partly this is becauseMarxist theoryand Marx himself (a bourgeois intellectual creating the theoretical practice for the workers' revolution) stage the model for working-class identity as a sort of trans-identification, a magical identity that is transferable to those outside the group who commit themselves to it wholeheartedly enough. If we look back, we realize even this magical quality is not special to a history of class struggle, as whites during the New Negro movements of the early twentieth century felt that they were vanguard race leaders because they had putatively imbibed some essential qualities of Negroness by cross-identifying with the folk and their culture.