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Russian-Turkish relations are inevitable.

Kara 22 [Mehtap Kara, PhD in International Relations from Eastern Mediterranean University, assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bahçeşehir Cyprus University; 6-13-2022; "Turkish-American strategic partnership: is Turkey still a faithful ally?"; Southeast European and Black Sea Studies; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683857.2022.2088081?journalCode=fbss20; KL]

Turkish-Russian rapprochement and future of the transatlantic alliance

Turkish-Russian relations deteriorated after Turkey’s shot down of a Russian jet over Turkish territory in November 2015. However, the failed coup attempt marked a new beginning between the two. Both countries have reached agreements on several issues, including the maintaining territorial integrity of Syria despite their differences of opinion about the future of the Assad regime. Along with individual leaders’ common frustration with the Western countries, both countries also have been driven by pragmatism (Ibryamova and Kara 2017). In Turkey and Russia, the decision-making mechanism is centralized around one person. Both leaders, Erdoğan and Putin, have strong leadership characteristics and have been in power for a long time, which evidences that, further to the strategic interest, Turkish-Russian reconciliation is also the result of the overlapping ideologies of both political leaders on several issues, including being sceptical about the Western countries’ intentions, restricting media freedom, oppressing oppositions, and using nationalist narration and religious values in policy making (Nougayrède 2014). Erdoğan’s growing personal domination has turned into an authoritarian populism, especially after the Gezi Park protests and transition from parliamentary to a new presidential system, which allowed him to further consolidate his executive powers (Özpek and Tanriverdi 2018; Castaldo 2018; Özen 2020; Cilliler 2021). The new presidential system enabled Erdoğan to have a monopoly over the country’s foreign policy and national security matters. His populist rhetoric has been characterized by nationalism and anti-Western discourse where the West, particularly the US, is resituated as the ‘other’ (Kaliber and Kaliber 2019). Erdoğan seized disproportionate power to shape the country’s response to external stimuli and the AKP’s unofficial coalition partner, the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli. Both leaders’ images and threat perceptions have been based on an enemy image of Western countries.

Russia successfully took advantage of the increasing tension between Turkey and the Western countries. During a telephone conversation on a special occasion, both leaders, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Erdoğan, used the term ‘strategic partnership’ to define Turkish-Russian bilateral relations (Mercouris 2017), which is quite significant, considering the term was also used to define the Turkish-American relations. Turkish policymakers have tried to respond to uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to shape regional developments in its favour by establishing new alliances with Russia and Iran. One manifestation of this was the result of the Astana peace talks. On 15 September 2017, Russia, Turkey and Iran signed a deal to establish de-escalation zones across Syria, including Syria’s northwest province of Idlib.1 Turkish authorities believed that this was another opportunity to break the terror corridor, which was the term for YPG’s three cantons in Northern Syria established in 2014, located southern border of Turkey. The YPG aimed to unite these cantons with Afrin canton to have geographical unity. With the support of the US the YPG dominated SDF’s capture of Manbij in 2016 was further extended the corridor on the Turkish border (Milliyet 2022). During the Idlib operation, Erdoğan pointed out Afrin as the next stop. ‘Operation Olive Branch’ in Afrin was launched in January 2018 as a response to the US decision to build new border security with the SDF.

As Turkey’s security interest has been long-ignored by its Western allies, Turkish policymakers felt they were left with no option but to cooperate with non-NATO countries, especially after the Obama administration blocked the sale of the Patriot air missile defence system to Turkey. These developments have intensified anti-Americanism in Turkey. Turkish policy makers’ desire to build an air defence structure pushed them to seek other options, resulting in Turkey’s deal with Russia to purchase two Russian S–400 surface-to-air missile batteries to improve Turkey’s defence capabilities against threats from Kurdish and Islamist militants across its borders in Syria and Iraq (BBC News 2017). Turkey’s strategic cooperation with Russia has become leverage to manage its troubled relationship with the US. The Turkish-Russian rapprochement and deepening defence cooperation were mainly the results of the US failure to acknowledge Turkey’s security concerns, its alliance with the YPG, and the refusal to retrieve Gülen (Hale 2019; Kibaroğlu 2019). In response to Turkey’s S-400 purchase on 13 August 2018, the US Congress approved a bill to limit the transfer of the F-35 aircraft to Turkey (The US Senate 2018). Since 2002, Turkey has been a partner of the F-35 program both as a buyer and a production partner, has invested more than $1.4 billion in the program and planned to buy 100 of the fighter jets. Turkey’s S-400 deal was received negatively for two reasons. Firstly, the system is not tolerable to NATO defence systems and would create a weak spot in the defences, and secondly, it could threaten NATO secrets by collecting information on NATO’s next-generation fighter jet, the F-35 (Asli 2019). Kathryn Wheelbarger, an acting assistant secretary of defence, underlined that ‘the S-400 is a Russian system designed to shoot down an aircraft like the F-35’ (Stewart and Pamuk 2019). Therefore, the Western allies agreed that Turkey could not have both S-400 and F-35. Although Erdoğan called the US officials several times to establish a joint working group to resolve technical issues, his calls remained unanswered.

Turkey’s S-400 deal with Russia was also the main reason behind the US’s economic warfare against Turkey. After two-year detention, Turkey released the high-profile prisoner, pastor Andrew Brunson, expecting Turkey’s decision would decrease tension with the US. In this sense, the US’s initial decision to withdraw from Syria in December 2018 was received positively by Ankara. Next month, the US also offered to sell the Patriot missile systems to Turkey with the condition that Turkey should cancel the purchase of the S-400 systems. Turkish officials openly stated that it is a done deal and there is no return, and Erdoğan questioned the Western attitudes and pointed out that Greece has Russian S-300 as a NATO member, as well as Slovakia and Bulgaria, yet complained about the Western position on S-400s of Turkey.2 American withdrawal decision was later revised, and 1000 troops were left in Syria to avoid providing an opportunity for ISIS to recover. In return for Turkey’s insistence on S-400s Turkish pilots’ training (for F-35 jets) at the US have been suspended, their entrance to the US bases has been restricted, and the US aligned with F-35 partners to initiate Turkey’s removal process from the F-35 stealth fighter program (Ali and Stewart 2019). The US Senate introduced a bill that calls for full implementation of sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and as well as to review the NATO Treaty to consider the continued inclusion of Turkey in NATO.3 Despite the US warnings and threats of sanctions by Congress, the first delivery of the parts of S-400s arrived in Turkey in July 2019. The systemic pressure of security threats is the most crucial reason behind the changing Turkish foreign policy behaviour, but only through the mediating effect of unit-level variables. The elites’ threat perception, the strategic culture of increasing nationalism, and the strong state-society relations increased the state’s extraction capacity, helped build domestic support for military operations in Syria, and strengthened the country’s defence capacity by acquiring the S-400 missile system from Russia.

With the surprise American pull-out decision in October 2019, the US abandoned its primary ally, the SDF and the YPG. This enabled Turkey to target the YPG without confronting the US, and the Turkish armed forces launched the long-anticipated third major operation, ‘Operation Peace Spring’, to target the SDF held territories and establish a safe zone, 145 kilometres in length and 30 kilometres in depth, in northern Syria (Hurriyet Daily News 2019a). With this operation, Turkey eliminated the establishment of a terror corridor in North-eastern Syria, pushed the YPG back from the Turkish border, and had an opportunity to resettle Syrian refugees in this zone. After the American withdrawal, Kurdish militias had no choice but to make a deal with Russia and the Syrian government to deploy the Syrian army along the border to repel the Turkish assault (BBC News 2019a). This development has ended Syrian Kurds’ ambition to have an autonomous region and self-rule in Syria. In Sochi, Erdoğan and Putin signed the 10-point memorandum plan to end the Turkish offensive. Both countries agreed that Turkish forces would be allowed to remain in the 120 km-long strip of territory (Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad) as a buffer zone against the YPG, Russian and Syrian troops control the remaining border area, the retreat of the YPG from Turkey’s border, and establishing Turkish and Russian joint patrols to implement agreed security mechanism along with Turkish-Syrian border (Aljazeera 2019). Turkey, Russia, and the Syrian regime simultaneously benefited from Turkey’s military operation and the Sochi agreement. Turkey achieved to establish a safe zone to dismantle the YPG structure on its border and forced the US to abandon Kurdish-led forces, Russia remained the most pivotal player in Syria to determine the endgame in the Syrian conflict, and the Assad regime regained control of the Kurdish controlled areas in northeastern Syria.

By agreeing with the YPG, the Russian and Syrian regimes seized an opportunity to implement the 1998 Adana Agreement on border security between Turkey and Syria to re-establish the status quo. Therefore, Turkey eventually will have no option but return to the Adana Accord.4 There are possible risks and adverse outcomes for Turkey’s military operations in Syria. Cook (2018) believes that with these operations, Turkey could find itself in an irregular war in a foreign country with Kurdish militias, who gained combat experience during their alliance with the US. Based on Turkey’s history of forty years of war with PKK, it is likely that Turkey will be withdrawn to long term struggle against guerrilla-like forces in Syria. Through military involvement, Turkey has already signed up to govern the region, including managing various issues ranging from security and education to health and delivering water, which might be a problem to manage in the long run (Daragahi 2018).

Sterling and Folker (2002, 103) underline that states simultaneously might see each other as valuable economic partners and security threats. Therefore, ‘cooperation and competition cannot be separated’ (Doran 2010, 41). Turkey and Russia managed to separate economic cooperation from geopolitical rivalries. This new flexible strategic alliance has led to increased cooperation in various sectors while competing or pursuing different interests in several regions/conflicts. According to Faber, states’ actions work compensatively, and ‘a conflictual action in one policy area is followed by cooperative action vis-à-vis the same government in the same or another policy area’ (1990, 309). The nature of the current Turkish-Russian relationship has been characterized as competitive cooperation. The two countries prefer different outcomes and support opposing sides in the Syrian civil war while also having divergent interests in other regions, including the Balkans, Caucasus, MENA, and Central Asia. Yet, they were able to avoid direct confrontation and accommodated each other’s interests and expanded their sphere of influence in these regions. However, Turkey remains on thin ice in terms of regional competition with Russia, where things can escalate quickly and unexpectedly in any of those regions. For instance, in February 2020, dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed by the Russian backed air strikes in Idlib. After the American withdrawal, Russia controls the outcome of the Syrian conflict. So despite the risks, Turkey continues to strengthen its economic and defence ties with Russia. There is also a growing personal close relationship between Erdoğan and Putin as Erdoğan is growing more authoritarian. This is an opportunity for Russia to include a NATO member in the anti-Western camp as much as possible.

Turkish-Russian cooperation in Syria (facilitating Turkish incursions in Syria) has expanded cooperation in other fields, including economy, tourism, defence, and energy sectors. Besides the purchase of S-400s, a Russian company is building Turkey’s first nuclear plant (Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant) and two pipelines were constructed, the Blue Stream and TurkStream, across the Black Sea to supply natural gas to Turkey. While Turkey is decreasing its reliance on the Western alliance due to its distrust against the West relatively increasing its dependence on Russia in terms of natural gas, trade, and technical expertise in areas from defence to energy. Öniş and Yılmaz (2016) identify Turkish-Russian relations and cooperation in Syria as asymmetric interdependence in a turbulent region. Turkey desires to keep its ties with Russia as leverage against the US. The AKP-MHP alliance plays a vital role in Turkey’s military activism and willingness to pursue more independent policies as well as to take initiatives in the country’s security and national interest in the region. According to Military expenditures data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Turkey’s budget for military expenditure rose 65% between 2009 to 2018, reaching $19.0 billion and putting Turkey among the world’s top 15 military spenders (Tian et al. 2019). Turkey’s security-driven policies are not likely to change as long as the AKP needs MHP’s support in the parliament (after failing to gain half of the seats in the parliament in the June 2018 general election, the AKP became dependent on MHP’s support).

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