The link is massive and outweighs the link turns – their ev is that development of OCOs is politically popular – that is our argument – the plan’s sharing of those highly coveted mechanisms guarantees the backlash is substantial – a host of other political obstacles magnify the link – interoperability, sovereignty, and attribution requirements mean the link alone turns the case – these fights doom standardization and cohesion
Blessing 2021
Jason Blessing is a Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. During the 2020-2021 academic year, he served as a DAAD Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Program on “The United States, Europe, and World Order” at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Blessing has previously worked as a Consulting Fellow for the Cyber, Space and Future Conflict Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and was a USIP-Minerva Peace and Security Scholar with the United States Institute of Peace. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs at Syracuse University, an MA in Political Science from Virginia Tech, and a BA in Government from The College of William & Mary. “Fail-Deadly, Fail-Safe, and Safe-to-Fail: The Strategic Necessity of Resilience in the Cyber Domain,” NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (172-191) 2021. dmr
Attribution difficulties present further challenges to the ‘who’ of deterrence. Adversaries with rapidly changing tactics, techniques, and procedures—along with the ability to easily conceal an operation’s origin and perpetrator—can pose hurdles to technical attribution.41 Technical difficulties can weaken deterrent postures by delaying the timeliness of retaliatory punishment. Moreover, the effects of an operation that a defender notices may actually be second- or third-order effects. This can add additional time between attribution and punishment.42 The larger attribution issues, however, are political. NATO lacks common standards or guidance for attributing cyber operations in either a technical or political sense. Indeed, attribution remains a member state prerogative. Not only are the targeted member states responsible for attribution, but those members looking to contribute to collective defense must perform independent attribution assessments, and the political decision for a collective defense response must come from the NAC.43 Reaching a consensus decision to trigger collective defense in response to cyberspace operations is likely to be politically contentious, and member states will have few incentives to risk revealing the intelligence sources and methods that underlie attribution decisions. These dynamics are likely to intensify when additional links in the attribution chain are required, such as when a perpetrator is encouraged or sponsored by an adversarial state but lacks direct ties. Attribution is less likely to be politically controversial across the Alliance once a conventional conflict is underway as contextual clues from kinetic attacks can reduce uncertainty. This discussion points to a greater role for deterrence-by-denial. Deterring an adversary by taking measures to deny potential gains does not hinge on attribution and thus possesses a potentially wider scope of application.44 A second and related hurdle for cyber deterrence is determining which actions the Alliance seeks to deter. Much of the activity in cyberspace falls below the physical effects thresholds associated with the disruption, degradation, or destruction of computers and networks. Such considerations complicate decisions to invoke Article 5—specifically, the types of cyberattacks to which Article 5 should apply. Indeed, cyber operations targeting military assets or critical civilian infrastructure can be incredibly costly but may not reach damage levels associated with conventional attacks.45 Moreover, espionage via network exploitation is widespread, varied, and falls well below the threshold of armed conflict.46 Problematically, such exploitation can be nearly indistinguishable from operations that eventually seek to attack computers or networks and produce effects. Network exploitation can even be precursor to conventional military operations.47 Determining how to deter presents a third obstacle to NATO’s cyber deterrence efforts. Threatening conventional military means in response to cyber operations poses dilemmas of proportionality and can risk unintended escalation.48 Retaliation with cyber tools carry their own problems. First, the Alliance faces issues of political reliability, particularly in the context of the SCEPVA framework. Legally, Allies retain different constitutional restraints on offensive cyber operations that can hamper the ability to volunteer sovereign effects. Strategically, states may be hesitant to volunteer their ‘best’ cyber effects for fear of burning an exploit that could have had a greater payoff when used in a national context. Volunteering sovereign effects can also inadvertently give unwanted insight to an adversary regarding an Ally’s techniques, tactics, and procedures. Second, the temporary and transient nature of cyber capabilities makes it incredibly difficult to establish repeatable and predictable effects required of deterrent threats.49 Finally, signaling in cyberspace is generally ambiguous and rarely straightforward.50 For instance, an adversary may not even recognize a signal, believing it instead to be a technical glitch. Even if a costly signal is received, there is no way to ensure that it has interpreted as intended. In addition to deterrence, NATO’s fail-safe cyber defense efforts face political and technical challenges. Because NATO will not undertake any active defense measures, actions to mitigate the effects of a cyberattack are limited to NATO networks or to individual member state networks when requested. This forecloses the possibility of developing an institutional strategy to mitigate the costs of a cyberattack upstream by disrupting the source of an attack, much like US Cyber Command does with its “defend forward” posture.51 More problematically, Allies have and will continue to have different legal, strategic, doctrinal, and threat frameworks for cyberspace that complicate defensive measures for the Alliance. Most immediately this means that Allies will locate resources to different aspects of cyber defense based on individual country circumstances. Different strategic focuses have the potential to intensify disparate threat perceptions, capabilities, and skillsets. This can also exacerbate interoperability problems; for example, during an operation or crisis, some systems will be controlled by NATO while others will be controlled by an ally or a group of allies with different skill and knowledge levels. In the longer term, disparate legal understandings, particularly regarding sovereignty in cyberspace, will become more impactful as a greater number of allied nations develop forward defense strategies and the requisite capabilities for out-of-network operations. An out-of-network operation can in and of itself cause operational friction. However, differing definitions of sovereignty in cyberspace—and what violates it—inevitably create political friction between Allies as some look to operate and produce effects on other Allies’ networks.52 This political friction will contribute to even greater hesitancy over cyber-intelligence sharing and complicate the coordination of defensive mitigation measures across the Alliance.