Executive action magnifies the link
Christenson 15, Associate Professor of Political Science and the Director of Advanced Programs @ Boston U (Dino, “Political Constraints on Unilateral Executive Action,” Case Western Law Review, 65.4)//BB
Moreover, other institutions, particularly Congress, may play an∂ important role—even when presidents know that efforts to overturn an∂ executive action will fail—by engaging in the political debate and∂ mobilizing public pressure against the president should he act unilaterally∂ contra congressional preferences. Decades of political science scholarship∂ have demonstrated that the public lacks systematic knowledge∂ of politics and therefore relies heavily on heuristics when forming their∂ political judgments.48 Political elites thus become key cue-givers who∂ help inform and shape public opinion.49 Finally, citizens acquire most∂ of their knowledge about politics from the mass media. Scholars have∂ long noted that the media depend on official Washington sources for∂ information. However, a robust literature in political communications∂ goes further and argues that the media tend “to ‘index’ the range of∂ voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the∂ range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a∂ given topic.”50 When other political actors, particularly members of∂ Congress, object and criticize presidential actions in the public sphere,∂ they are all but assured of receiving considerable media coverage, and∂ they are well-positioned to influence public opinion against the∂ executive branch.51∂ In essence, we argue that while the statutory and legal constraints∂ on presidential unilateral power are weak, the political constraints are∂ quite robust.52 Unilateral actions that could provoke public ire and∂ erode the president’s political capital, thereby undermining later efforts∂ to pursue other aspects of the president’s programmatic agenda, may∂ fail a simple cost-benefit calculation. The informal political costs of∂ acting—even when Congress and the courts are almost certainly∂ unwilling or unable to strike down the action—may outweigh the policy∂ benefits of acting unilaterally. These political costs, which are not∂ accounted for in most extant models of unilateral politics, are tangible∂ and substantial; indeed, they may explain why presidents fail to act∂ unilaterally as aggressively and on as many issues across the gamut of∂ policy as formal models suggest they should.