Ressentiment has become a prevailing social attitude---racial scapegoating, authoritarianism, and clinging to illusory forms of control are the ultimate manifestation of ressentiment toward an ateleological future---only a political and affective strategy that loosens our attachments to idealized stability can generate alternative registers
Glezos 14 [Simon Glezos, Lecturer of Political Science at the University of Victoria, British Columbia, “Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics,” Journal of International Political Theory, Vol 10, Issue 2, 2014, published May 22, 2014] **edited for gendered language
Ressentiment against speed In a previous work, The Politics of Speed, I argued that this willingness to hand over authority to a centralized executive and reject democratic consultation is not due to the technical challenge of speed (any more than the panic over the MV Sun Sea had anything to do with the actual scope of immigration in Canada, the 500 Tamil refugees constituting a drop in the bucket of Canada’s 250,000 annual new permanent residents), but rather its existential challenge (Glezos, 2012: 31).11 This is to say that, in times of acceleration, people fear democratic consultation, and crave authoritative renderings because of the way in which stable identities and narratives come under threat. This reactionary mindset is rooted in a phenomenon I called “ressentiment against speed.” Ressentiment against speed is a kind of crystallized cultural dynamic which craves a stability and a certainty which the world is incapable of providing. This disappointment becomes activated as a drive for revenge against the world which is viewed as the source of instability; against scapegoats who are identified with this instability; and ultimately against ourselves, through calls for authoritarian governance to control us. In this article, I wish to make a more thorough study of this concept of a ressentiment against speed, uncovering its specifically Nietzschean roots. This investigation is important, because I think that a ressentiment against speed is, in fact, one of the central components of Brown’s Paradox. To understand this, we must understand Nietzsche’s philosophy of ressentiment in greater detail. Ressentiment should not be confused with resentment. Resentment, a sense of anger over pain or injury we may have suffered (of whatever sort), is a natural response, as is the attempt to challenge or overturn the sources of these pains or injuries.12Nietzsche (1976) does not council a kind of ascetic rejection of judgment, simply accepting everything as it comes—in which case, we would become, in his words, the ass which can only bray “Yeah-yuh” (p. 424)—nor is he arguing for a Christian “turning of the other cheek.” Being angry, resentful, unhappy, and so on are all perfectly acceptable to Nietzsche so long as—and this is crucial—they serve as a spur to action. So long as your resentment or anger becomes a vector for productive intervention in the world, then they have the potential to be good or noble. The trouble with ressentiment is that, counter to resentment, it does not act as a spur to productive action (although it does still frequently spur reactive behavior, a distinction I will shortly explain). Quite the contrary, ressentiment is resentment crystallized and spiritualized, and thus focuses not on any particular agent or actor, but rather simply on the world as a whole. Ressentiment expresses itself as a generalized resentment against a world that allows pain and suffering to occur. It frequently manifests as a rejection of the world, and the imagining of a world of perfection in opposition to this “imperfect” world. Nietzsche (1968a) makes clear how this drive to idealization is linked to ressentiment and the spirit of revenge. “To talk about ‘another’ world than this is quite pointless … we revenge ourselves on life by means of the phantasmagoria of ‘another,’ a ‘better’ life” (p. 49). This link between idealization and revenge is displayed quite strongly, Nietzsche (1968b) says, in many of the major works of metaphysics in the Western canon: Psychology of Metaphysics—This world is apparent: consequently there is a true world;—this world is conditional; consequently there is an unconditioned world;—this world is full of contradiction: consequently there is a world free of contradiction;—this world is a world of becoming: consequently there is a world of being:—all false conclusions … It is suffering that inspires these conclusions: fundamentally they are desires that such a world should exist; in the same way, to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative. (pp. 310–311) “It is suffering that inspires these conclusions” and ressentiment is “expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer.” This is the danger of ressentiment and how it differs from resentment. Resentment is a part of living in the world for Nietzsche, a world which produces suffering and which therefore must be responded to. But ressentiment takes one out of the world. It orients one’s actions to other worlds, worlds which do not exist. In the context of a discussion of an accelerating world, ressentiment against speed manifests as an existential resentment over the refusal of the world to provide one with the stability—either in time or in space—that one craves. In response, we construct idealized spaces and times, located either in the nostalgia of the past, or in an eschatological future. Nietzsche discusses idealist philosophy and religious cosmologies, but we can just as easily see these drives expressed in political narratives of “golden ages,” “the good old days,” “cities on the hill,” “the end of history,” or simply the security of “strong borders.” These spaces/times become refuges, defences, and weapons against an uncertain world of flow and becoming. Just as to live in the world is to suffer, to live in time is to be subject to contingency, and to live in space is to see that space is always invaded, reshaped, and de/reterritorialized. To wish otherwise is to close one’s eyes and stop up one’s ears, to refuse to intervene in the world as it is. This is exactly what ressentiment against speed produces. Nietzsche’s (1968a) discussion of the philosopher’s disdain for the “world of becoming” shows how ressentiment is always already a ressentiment against speed: All that philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies; nothing actual has escaped from their hands alive. They kill, they stuff, when they worship, these conceptual idolaters—they become a mortal danger to everything when they worship. Death, change, age, as well as procreation and growth, are for them objections—refutations even. What is, does not become; what becomes, is not. (p. 45) This quote brings out another important element of Nietzsche’s thinking. Looking at Nietzsche’s critique of idealism, we might begin to take him for a kind of vulgar realist, criticizing flights of philosophical fancy. This is to misunderstand the complexity of Nietzsche’s conception of the world of becoming. Nietzsche never takes what the “world” is for granted and, with his focus on creativity, even were “one” to know what the “world” is, the world—and “one”—would almost certainly change immediately. But that is exactly the point. Nietzsche affirms that the world is a world of change, of becoming, of uncertainty, of contingency (and therefore necessarily of suffering and disappointment). This is the world that we live in, and the world in which we must act. Ressentiment and political action This is the greatest danger of ressentiment from a Nietzschean perspective. Unlike that active power which a sense of resentment can potentially inculcate, ressentiment functions as a reactive power. Deleuze (2002), in his analysis of Nietzsche, develops an important insight when he says that reactive powers are those which “decompose, they separate active force from what it can do; they take away a part or almost all of its power” (p. 57). By orienting us toward idealized spaces/times, and rejecting intervention in “this world,” ressentiment thus separates us from our power, from what we can do. This is the crucial point which brings us back to Brown’s Paradox, with its description of a state of affairs where we seem to have so much power at our fingertips, and yet seem able to do so little with it. Note the fact that ressentiment separating us from what we can do does not mean that we stop doing things. Indeed, quite the opposite. When under the sway of ressentiment we are just as prone to take action in the world. This is because in ressentiment we have judged the world and found it wanting. We find this world of becoming and speed to be a world of evil and suffering. This is why ressentiment also manifests as a spirit of revenge. We feel that the world has punished us and we wish to punish it back, and this frequently means seeking to punish those who are viewed as agents or avatars of that evil. Once again, this is different than the active behavior that might be undertaken in response to resentment. There the idea is to stop those who injure us, or overcome those things or people who block our way. It is never just the reactive desire for revenge, but always the active desire to achieve some goal, to further our plans, to assert our values. The reactive movement of ressentiment manifests as revenge. It is thus premised upon a moral judgment, and is itself a moralizing move (i.e. one acts primarily to punish an evil rather than achieve an end). Indeed, it is this ability to moralize suffering, to assign blame that is so useful to the agent of ressentiment. Nietzsche (1997) explains the difference between resentment and ressentiment quite well in the passage below: In my judgement, we find here the actual physiological causation of ressentiment, revenge and their ilk, in a yearning, then, to anaesthetize pain through emotion:—people generally look for the same thing, wrongly in my view, in the defensive return of a blow, a purely protective reaction, a “reflex movement” in the case of any sudden injury or peril, such as that performed even by a headless frog to ward off corrosive acid. But the difference is fundamental: in the one case the attempt is made to prevent harm being done, in the other case, the attempt is made to anaethetize a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unbearable with a more violent emotion of any sort, and at least rid the consciousness of it for a moment—for this, one needs an emotion, the wildest possible emotion and, in order to arouse it, the first available pretext. “Someone or other must be to blame that I feel ill.” (p. 93) This desire to seek out somebody to blame is the pattern we see time and again in the reactionary politics of ressentiment. It is what we saw above in the case of the MV Sun Sea, and in other anti-immigration movements like it: the attempt to identify and blame particular actors as representative of what are broader movements and social forces, to take the individual migrant as a synecdoche of global acceleration as a whole. To return to Wendy Brown’s (2001) analysis: If, as Nietzsche recognized, impotent rage inevitably yields a moralizing (re)action, how might we succeed in rereading contemporary political life through this recognition? Might it help us understand, for example, the contemporary tendency to personify oppression in the figure of individuals and to reify it in particular acts and utterances, the tendency to render individuals and acts intensely culpable—indeed prosecutable—for history and for social relations? (pp. 21–22) And what is more, we tend to personify that oppression in the weakest, most vulnerable constituencies, themselves caught up in the same history and social relations as their attackers. This is because, having separated active force from what it can do, the politics of ressentiment naturally takes as its enemies those who are weakest, those who are most easily targeted and punished. In relation to these nationalist and xenophobic movements, it is instructive that, for Nietzsche (1997), one of the most important contemporaneous examples of the politics of ressentiment was the anti-Semite (p. 48). But these moralizing expressions of revenge and punishment, and the feeling of power which comes along with them, does not actually lead to the empowerment of the bearer of ressentiment. This is because the standards that it sets can never be achieved. A mindset overcome by ressentiment says that only a world free of suffering, of uncertainty, of insecurity, is of any value. One does not want less pain, but no pain. Not less insecurity, but no insecurity. Thus, no matter what is done, it will always fall short of this goalpost. Actual positive change which might improve their lot, or increase their power, is eschewed because it will never provide them with ideal world they crave. Better to engage in moralizing punishment which does nothing to solve their pain, but, as Nietzsche says, hem somewhat, gives them a feeling of moral superiority which will keep them going, at least for a while longer.13 What is more, this craving—for certainty, for stability, and most importantly, for moral superiority—makes these sufferers of ressentiment easy prey for those who wish to exploit them and gain their support. Nietzsche discussed this in terms of “the Priests,” but in our days, in democratic countries (and not just democratic countries), it is more useful to speak of the politician of ressentiment, the politician who does not just respond to the anxiety and fear of [their] public, but actively cultivates it. As Nietzsche (1997) describes it, He brings ointments and balms with him, of course; but first he has to wound so that he can be the doctor’ and whilst he soothes the pain caused by the wound, he poisons the wound at the same time—for that is what he is best trained to do, this magician and tamer of beasts of prey, whose mere presence necessarily makes everything healthy, sick, and everything sick, tame. (p. 93) The politician of ressentiment provides ever more targets and scapegoats for moralizing punishment, knowing that it will never actually solve the problems of his or her constituency (my god, if it did, what then?). Indeed, it is not at all coincidental that reactionary politicians of ressentiment frequently institute neoliberal policies, making the conditions of insecurity and acceleration which give rise to the ressentiment against speed even more prevalent. The politician of ressentiment relies on, and exploits, his or her constituency’s craving for certainty and stability, by presenting himself or herself as the potential source of the authority that will usher in this other world. The politicians of ressentiment present themselves to their constituency as “their support, defence, prop, compulsion, disciplinarian, tyrant, God” (Nietzsche, 1997: 92). People feel themselves incapable of bringing into being the world of security they desire, and therefore become willing to submit to anyone who claims that ability. How else to explain The Globe and Mail endorsement which simultaneously decries the “antidemocratic” behavior of the Conservative party, while craving the “discipline, leadership and bullheadedness” that they bring to government? In this regard, we see the final stage of ressentiment, and the final ascendancy of “The Priests,” of the politician of ressentiment: “I suffer: someone or other must be guilty”—and every sick sheep thinks the same. But his shepherd the ascetic priest, says to him, “Quite right, my sheep! Somebody must be to blame: but you yourself are this somebody, you yourself alone are to blame for it, you yourself alone are to blame for yourself.” (Nietzsche, 1997: 94) When we authorize increasingly centralized and authoritarian governments, when we do not jealously guard our civil liberties and democratic rights, what are we saying, other than that we accept that we are the problem with politics, that we ourselves are to blame? Give us, then, a “leader” who will provide us with the security we crave.14 Once again, ressentiment as that which separates an active force from what it can do, as that which separates people and communities from their power. And this is the irony of the ressentiment against speed. As people feel impotent in the face of acceleration, they become more willing to give up what power they do have to increasingly authoritarian structures or, when they do express their power, do so by attacking the weakest elements of the systems they oppose, usually in ways which actually shore up the systems they are supposed to be opposing.15 Living with/in Brown’s Paradox The result of this analysis is that both attempts to “solve” Brown’s Paradox prove unsatisfying. The neoliberal approach of embracing the uncertainty and instability of this accelerating world as progress requires us to ignore the violence and exploitation which goes along with it, and pretend that this “progress” is evenly distributed. Furthermore, it dismisses the very real desires for stability and security in our lives—and livelihoods—as somehow quaint, or even childish. We see how the frequent neoliberal complaint that “government cannot provide for everything” borrows the tropes of parenting, making the dissatisfied citizen into nothing more than a peevish toddler, rather than a stakeholder in a social contract with a legitimate grievance. Any response to Brown’s Paradox will require that we acknowledge the very real inequality and violence that are currently part of our accelerating world, and the impotence that most people feel in the face of it. It must also, therefore, have some sort of program for empowering people, for challenging these inequalities and violences, for providing people with genuine opportunities, rather than the neoliberal offer of “owning” one’s own subjugation. As Chantal Mouffe (2005) puts it in her attempt to understand a different, though related, paradox “One of the crucial stakes for left democratic politics is to begin providing an alternative to neo-liberalism. It is the current unchallenged hegemony of the neo-liberal discourse which explains why the left is without any credible project” (pp. 118–119). The fact that this is still the state of affairs even after the global meltdown of the neoliberal order in 2008 speaks to the urgency of this project, and the power of the neoliberal narrative. Genuine efforts must be made both to constrain the violent flows of global capital, and to insulate individuals and communities from these flows, efforts which must be pursued at the local, state, and global levels. One trajectory of future research on the question of speed therefore must be to look at effective policy responses to the exploitation of global acceleration. And yet, at the same time as we try to empower people, we must be sure that our desire for stability and security, our desire to oppose the uncertainty of an accelerating world, does not manifest itself as a ressentiment against speed. Some measure of uncertainty and instability in the world is ineradicable. This is true for both historico-empirical reasons (we are undergoing a period of social acceleration, and we are unlikely to uninvent the wheel of technological speed any time soon) but also for essentially ontological reasons. As discussed above, we must recognize that we live in a world of becoming, and that this necessarily introduces a note of flux, uncertainty, and acceleration into our lives. Our teleological projections will always be disturbed by irruptions of radical futurity, and the borders we try to police will always be criss-crossed by deterritorialized lines of flight. What is more, these contingencies are not necessarily bad things. First, they open us up to new experiences, new possibilities, new worlds. Brown was not lying when she said that we now live in “a global order more saturated by human power than ever before.” We must be careful how we think about, and use that power, but we cannot just ignore it or give it up lightly. Indeed, in terms of achieving our first goal, a willingness to interact constructively with the powers and opportunities our accelerating world provides us with will be crucial. Second, and more importantly, genuinely slow worlds, worlds with firm borders and thoroughly policed lines of time, usually require deep authoritarian power to maintain those borders and narratives. Certainly, it is exactly in the ressentiment of speed that the reactionary call for control is invoked; in the attempt to extinguish the novel, the unexpected, the different, the other. As William Connolly (2002) puts it “A slow, homogeneous world often supports undemocratic hierarchy because it irons out discrepancies of experience through which constituencies can become reflective about self-serving assumptions they habitually use to appraise themselves in relation to others” (p. 144). Our response to Brown’s Paradox must, therefore, be careful not to turn stability and control into a fetish, but to acknowledge the intractability—and also the benefits and pleasures—of a world of contingency, a world of becoming, a world of acceleration. We must therefore begin to cultivate a third way, a response which does not so much try to resolve Brown’s Paradox, as re-inflect. Such an approach would seek to embrace the power and opportunities which an accelerating world provides, using them to resist the exploitation and violence inherent in the contemporary world. However, at the same time as it sought some amount of security for individuals, it would be willing to accept that a certain amount of contingency and instability in the world is ineradicable. It would ensure that this desire for stability did not manifest as a reactionary drive for the exclusion and erasure of difference, nor through a totalitarian drive for complete mastery over contingency. It would thus be a politics that attempted to express itself as, in Nietzsche’s words, an “active force,” which is to say a force which expresses itself, which builds a world to its specifications, but does so with an understanding, and even affirmation, of the limitations of life in “this world.” Such a politics therefore would rigorously have to root out the sense of ressentiment against speed, and become comfortable with living, organizing, and taking action, in an accelerating world of becoming. Learning to live within a paradox (without resorting to tactics of violence or transcendence to overcome or resolve the paradox) is no easy thing. In recent years, many thinkers have tried to develop strategies for how to live within the confines of paradoxes which they considered to be constitutive of political life. William Connolly (1991), for example, repeatedly engages with the question of what he terms “the paradox of identity,” the tension between the fact that we must simultaneously “accept the indispensability of identity and live within the medium of identity while refusing (while struggling vigorously to refuse) to live [our] own identity as intrinsic truth” (p. 46). Chantal Mouffe (2005) struggles with what she terms “the democratic paradox,” the tension between democracy as that which expresses the will of the people and that which protects and expresses the rights and agencies of the individual (pp. 2–3). Although each of these paradoxes relate to specific topics, they are fundamentally linked to the issues I raise, insofar as all are about the tension between the human desire for stability and certainty (stable identities, stable communities, stable borders), and the recognition that individual flows will always disrupt those certainties (and the further recognition that suppressing those flows entirely would require escalating, and ultimately infinite, violence). All are thus about the tension between being and becoming. We can therefore look to the way these other thinkers seek to deal with paradox. In both cases, these two thinkers advocate the importance of recognizing the ineradicability of paradox. Mouffe (2005) says that “it is vital for a pluralist democratic politics to expose and acknowledge paradoxes” (p. 16), and Connolly (1991) argues that we must learn to think “within the code of paradox” (p. 60). Note that this recognition of paradox, this attempt to live within paradox, does not involve a complete letting go or rejection of our desires of stability. To do so would be to succumb to the temptation to will away the paradox (as in the neoliberal approach). Connolly recognizes the inescapable dimension of identity, Mouffe accepts (and lauds) the importance of a sense of community, and I understand the importance of some sense of stability to the lives of individuals and communities. However, living within the paradox also means acknowledging that these certainties will always be marked by an inescapable de gree of contingency. This does not mean letting go of our desire for stability, but it does mean loosening our attachment to it, recognizing the necessity (and indeed desirability) of some amount of difference, individuality, and flux in the world. This loosening of attachment is not easy, and cannot simply be the result of policy prescription. It will also mean challenging dominant narratives of identity, and working on the affective sensibilities of individuals and communities to make them more capable of coping with a certain amount of uncertainty and instability in the world. A second trajectory of future research on speed will therefore have to focus on how to draw on narrative and affective resources to inculcate a sense of comfort with uncertainty, and fight against the pull of ressentiment.16 In an ideal world, this project of loosening people’s attachments to stability would begin to integrate with the project of making them less subject to the violence of global acceleration, creating a self-reinforcing cycle.17 As people become more secure, they become less subject to ressentiment-laden tendencies. At the same time, as they affectively fight off the ressentiment-driven desire for stability, they potentially become more willing to engage in active political tactics which might actually provide for greater security and stability. Lessened ressentiment against speed might provide the conditions of possibility for greater solidarity and alliance building across borders and differences, a greater willingness to take advantage of some of the powers which global acceleration provides. Here we might look to increasing examples of global solidarity networks (Castells, 2012; Glezos, 2012: ch. 5) and to transnational labor activism (Stillerman, 2003). Let us be clear; this possibility of a feedback loop associated with living within paradox should not be taken as a resolution of that paradox. We must remember that this paradox is fundamentally irresolvable, and thus that it will be the source of an ongoing political struggle over crucial questions (“How much stability is enough?”; “How much velocity is desirable?”). This struggle will always run the risk of falling into either ressentiment against speed or indifference to the pain that it causes. This is as it should be. As Mouffe (2005) puts it, when it comes to paradox “[N]o final resolution or equilibrium between those two conflicting logics is ever possible, and there can be only temporary, pragmatic, unstable and precarious negotiations of the tension between them” (p. 45). The best that we can do is try to ensure that we live that paradox deliberately.