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Even if they win we affect technology - it complicates security dilemmas and makes extinction inevitable - three scenarios.

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko, 19 [Nick Dyer-Witheford is an author, and associate professor at the University of Western Ontario in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies. His area of study primarily focuses on the rise of technology and the internet, as well as their continuous impact on modern society and Svitlana Matviyenko is an Assistant Professor of Critical Media Analysis in the School of Communication, “Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism,” 2019, University of Minnesota Press]//Townes language [modified]

As we have argued, from 1945 on, the hegemonic status of the United States, as the world’s chief capitalist power, was intrinsically related to the development of computers and networks. The role of digital systems in its military–industrial complex, initially tightly coupled with nuclear weapons, spread through other aspects of its war-making system as well as through the general economy. In both aspects, it contributed to the United States’s eventual Cold War victory. In the aftermath of that victory, the United States continued to develop its digital military capacities into the ever more direct weaponization of network, creating the technological– human assemblages of what is today referred to as cyberwar. The scope of NSA global surveillance and sabotage programs and the sophistication of the Stuxnet nuclear centrifuge-destroying malware are only the most manifest instances of this process, which is today an integral part of a wider upgrade of U.S. military capacities that ties together a nuclear primacy with the militarization of space and drone warfare. Accompanying and spurring on this process is the additional dynamic of cyberwar adoption by the forces antagonistic to the global dominance of the United States and its allies. These antagonists include the defeated socialist powers, Russia and China, now paradoxically resurrected as capitalist competitors in the world market, or, in the case of North Korea, surviving in a macabre afterlife of state socialism. They also include the forces of militant Islamic jihadism, beckoned into existence by the West as an anticommunist ally, only to become its opponent in the long war on terror. All these actors converge on the militarization of digital networks. Many observers today see a moment that recapitulates the decline of previous imperial hegemons within the global capitalist system—Spain, Holland, Britain—and parallels the moments of extreme instability as old powers and new contenders confront each other.7 The rise of cyberwar is part of this tumult and quite possibly a precursor and preparation for widening and intensifying conflict. Schematically, we can envisage three potentially intertwining trajectories such a process might take:

Network degradation. Alexander Klimburg (2017) outlines the possibility of a “darkening web” characterized by persistent and gradually intensifying cyberwar between states and between states and terrorist movements conducted in a variety of registers. Security breaches, aggressive malware, and botnet attacks proliferate. Digital industrial sabotage and critical infrastructure attacks begin to multiply, as do the accidental runaway effects of cyberweapons. Networks are deeply and chronically infected with computational propaganda, fake news, and viral mis- and disinformation. In response to adversarial incursions, states intensify algorithmic surveillance, censorship, and preemptive virtual policing. Cybersecurity provisions become increasingly mandatory and elaborate. Attribution problems, falsification of evidence, and the overlap between military and intelligence forces and criminal networks create a chaotic digital twilight of hacking and trolling, botnets and viruses, malware, surveillance, and bugs, shutdowns, blocking, and filtering, in which uncertainties exacerbate suspicions and hostilities, altogether making the internet increasingly impossible to use. In short, the “darkening web” is what already exists now, only more so. One of the cofounders of Twitter, Evan Williams, offered his diagnosis, suggesting that “the Internet is broken” (Streitfeld 2017). But maybe it’s not. Maybe the internet is finally what it was always meant to be. Maybe it is perfect, but not for us, the excommunicated user-subjects. For cyberwar.

Hybrid escalations. Similarly rooted in the present is the likelihood that the simultaneous virtual and kinetic conflicts, such as the Syrian civil war, the fighting in Donbas, and the many branches of the war on terror, continue and break out in new regions, bringing ever higher levels and varieties of cyberweapons, deployed for purposes ranging from intelligence gathering, battlefield surveillance, and munitions delivery to sabotage of enemies’ domestic and military resources. The use of drones and other semi- or fully automated weapons systems expands and takes new directions, such as the development of swarms of small autonomous vehicles—“slaughterbots” (Economist 2017a)—for house-to-house fighting in ruined cities. The biometric and networked tracking of refugees created by such conflicts, and the control and interdiction of their entry to affluent fortressed homelands, becomes a major activity of the nation-state security apparatus. Because present hybrid wars are also in large part proxy wars, where local battlefield actors are directly or indirectly supported by major powers, they are charged with the possibility of abrupt collisions between the most powerful militaries on the planet.

“Thermonuclear cyberwar.” We borrow this phrase from Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay (2017), who are among several authors currently pointing to a renewed and dangerous rendezvous between cyber- and nuclear weaponry. The last decade of debates between defense intellectuals about cyberwar has split those who see digital attacks a new equivalent of nuclear weapons, capable of disabling whole societies through critical infrastructure attacks, and skeptics who deride such anxieties as hyperbolic and implausible. But “cyber” and “nuke” are not separate. As we have seen, they were twinned at the moment of conception, with the development of each dependent on the other. And the connection is not just historical; it is current. Now cyberwar weaponry is part of a new approach to nuclear war fighting, the left-of-launch approach. Early ventures in antiballistic missile defense, such as Reagan’s “Star Wars” strategic defense initiative, depended on shooting down swarms of missiles as they plunged through the atmosphere toward their target. Left of launch, in contrast, aims to “strike an enemy missile before liftoff or during the first seconds of flight,” using “cyber strikes, electronic warfare and other exotic forms of sabotage” (Broad and Sanger 2017). This doctrine was incubated during the Obama administration and inherited by the Trump presidency. Advocates of the left-of-launch nuclear strategy present it as a defensive measure. However, the doctrine destabilizes basic premises of deterrence that have, since 1945, restrained nuclear weapon use (Cimbala 2017). Deterrence depends on a dread faith by all parties that both their own and their enemies’ nuclear weapons will work. The possibility that nuclear weapons systems might be secretly [stopped] disabled raises prospects both of overconfidence (trusting one can sabotage an opponent’s system) or panicked preemption (fearing left-of-launch attacks on one’s own nukes and falling into a “use ’em or lose ’em” mind-set). More generally, control and command of nuclear weapons depend on communication systems whose collapse in a crisis situation could have catastrophic results.8 The origin of the internet lay in the U.S. attempt to ensure continuance of such systems in the event of nuclear war; now the weaponization of the internet itself constitutes a possible cause of nuclear war.

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