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Revenge DA: their framework standards scapegoat critical debate and leave the door open for authoritative figures to assert themselves- our attempts at engagement will never be enough which culminates in hateful exclusion within debate

Glezos 14 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 5-22-2014, Sagepub Journals, "Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics",)//guyB ** edited for gendered language

Explains ressentiment as a “reactive power” which “separate[s] active force from what it can do”

This probably internal link turns their political engagement offense

Positive change will never be enough because those plagued with ressentiment feel a generalized hatred of the world instead of particular scenarios

Maybe characterize the invocation of fairness as an a priori issue an example of shifting goalposts

“But these moralizing expressions… at least for a while longer” is a good part for this

This is the greatest danger of ressentiment from a Nietzschean perspective. Unlike that active power which a sense of resentment can potentially inculcate, ressentiment functions as a reactive power. Deleuze (2002), in his analysis of Nietzsche, develops an important insight when he says that reactive powers are those which “decompose, they separate active force from what it can do; they take away a part or almost all of its power” (p. 57). By orienting us toward idealized spaces/times, and rejecting intervention in “this world,” ressentiment thus separates us from our power, from what we can do. This is the crucial point which brings us back to Brown’s Paradox, with its description of a state of affairs where we seem to have so much power at our fingertips, and yet seem able to do so little with it. Note the fact that ressentiment separating us from what we can do does not mean that we stop doing things. Indeed, quite the opposite. When under the sway of ressentiment we are just as prone to take action in the world. This is because in ressentiment we have judged the world and found it wanting. We find this world of becoming and speed to be a world of evil and suffering. This is why ressentiment also manifests as a spirit of revenge. We feel that the world has punished us and we wish to punish it back, and this frequently means seeking to punish those who are viewed as agents or avatars of that evil. Once again, this is different than the active behavior that might be undertaken in response to resentment. There the idea is to stop those who injure us, or overcome those things or people who block our way. It is never just the reactive desire for revenge, but always the active desire to achieve some goal, to further our plans, to assert our values. The reactive movement of ressentiment manifests as revenge. It is thus premised upon a moral judgment, and is itself a moralizing move (i.e. one acts primarily to punish an evil rather than achieve an end). Indeed, it is this ability to moralize suffering, to assign blame that is so useful to the agent of ressentiment. Nietzsche (1997) explains the difference between resentment and ressentiment quite well in the passage below: In my judgement, we find here the actual physiological causation of ressentiment, revenge and their ilk, in a yearning, then, to anaesthetize pain through emotion:—people generally look for the same thing, wrongly in my view, in the defensive return of a blow, a purely protective reaction, a “reflex movement” in the case of any sudden injury or peril, such as that performed even by a headless frog to ward off corrosive acid. But the difference is fundamental: in the one case the attempt is made to prevent harm being done, in the other case, the attempt is made to anaethetize a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unbearable with a more violent emotion of any sort, and at least rid the consciousness of it for a moment—for this, one needs an emotion, the wildest possible emotion and, in order to arouse it, the first available pretext. “Someone or other must be to blame that I feel ill.” (p. 93) This desire to seek out somebody to blame is the pattern we see time and again in the reactionary politics of ressentiment. It is what we saw above in the case of the MV Sun Sea, and in other anti-immigration movements like it: the attempt to identify and blame particular actors as representative of what are broader movements and social forces, to take the individual migrant as a synecdoche of global acceleration as a whole. To return to Wendy Brown’s (2001) analysis: If, as Nietzsche recognized, impotent rage inevitably yields a moralizing (re)action, how might we succeed in rereading contemporary political life through this recognition? Might it help us understand, for example, the contemporary tendency to personify oppression in the figure individuals and to reify it in particular acts and utterances, the tendency to render individuals and acts intensely culpable—indeed prosecutable—for history and for social relations? (pp. 21–22) And what is more, we tend to personify that oppression in the weakest, most vulnerable constituencies, themselves caught up in the same history and social relations as their attackers. This is because, having separated active force from what it can do, the politics of ressentiment naturally takes as its enemies those who are weakest, those who are most easily targeted and punished. In relation to these nationalist and xenophobic movements, it is instructive that, for Nietzsche (1997), one of the most important contemporaneous examples of the politics of ressentiment was the anti-Semite (p. 48). But these moralizing expressions of revenge and punishment, and the feeling of power which comes along with them, does not actually lead to the empowerment of the bearer of ressentiment. This is because the standards that it sets can never be achieved. A mindset overcome by ressentiment says that only a world free of suffering, of uncertainty, of insecurity, is of any value. One does not want less pain, but no pain. Not less insecurity, but no insecurity. Thus, no matter what is done, it will always fall short of this goalpost. Actual positive change which might improve their lot, or increase their power, is eschewed because it will never provide them with ideal world they crave. Better to engage in moralizing punishment which does nothing to solve their pain, but, as Nietzsche says, at least anesthetizes them somewhat, gives them a feeling of moral superiority which will keep them going, at least for a while longer.13 What is more, this craving—for certainty, for stability, and most importantly, for moral superiority—makes these sufferers of ressentiment easy prey for those who wish to exploit them and gain their support. Nietzsche discussed this in terms of “the Priests,” but in our days, in democratic countries (and not just democratic countries), it is more useful to speak of the politician of ressentiment, the politician who does not just respond to the anxiety and fear of his or her [their] public, but actively cultivates it. As Nietzsche (1997) describes it, He brings ointments and balms with him, of course; but first he has to wound so that he can be the doctor’ and whilst he soothes the pain caused by the wound, he poisons the wound at the same time—for that is what he is best trained to do, this magician and tamer of beasts of prey, whose mere presence necessarily makes everything healthy, sick, and everything sick, tame. (p. 93) The politician of ressentiment provides ever more targets and scapegoats for moralizing punishment, knowing that it will never actually solve the problems of his or her [their] constituency (my god, if it did, what then?). Indeed, it is not at all coincidental that reactionary politicians of ressentiment frequently institute neoliberal policies, making the conditions of insecurity and acceleration which give rise to the ressentiment against speed even more prevalent. The politician of ressentiment relies on, and exploits, his or her [their] constituency’s craving for certainty and stability, by presenting himself or herself as the potential source of the authority that will usher in this other world. The politicians of ressentiment present themselves to their constituency as “their support, defence, prop, compulsion, disciplinarian, tyrant, God” (Nietzsche, 1997: 92). People feel themselves incapable of bringing into being the world of security they desire, and therefore become willing to submit to anyone who claims that ability. How else to explain The Globe and Mail endorsement which simultaneously decries the “antidemocratic” behavior of the Conservative party, while craving the “discipline, leadership and bullheadedness” that they bring to government? In this regard, we see the final stage of ressentiment, and the final ascendancy of “The Priests,” of the politician of ressentiment: “I suffer: someone or other must be guilty”—and every sick sheep thinks the same. But his shepherd the ascetic priest, says to him, “Quite right, my sheep! Somebody must be to blame: but you yourself are this somebody, you yourself alone are to blame for it, you yourself alone are to blame for yourself.” (Nietzsche, 1997: 94) When we authorize increasingly centralized and authoritarian governments, when we do not jealously guard our civil liberties and democratic rights, what are we saying, other than that we accept that we are the problem with politics, that we ourselves are to blame? Give us, then, a “leader” who will provide us with the security we crave.14 Once again, ressentiment as that which separates an active force from what it can do, as that which separates people and communities from their power. And this is the irony of the ressentiment against speed. As people feel impotent in the face of acceleration, they become more willing to give up what power they do have to increasingly authoritarian structures or, when they do express their power, do so by attacking the weakest elements of the systems they oppose, usually in ways which actually shore up the systems they are supposed to be opposing.

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