Our argument isn’t that nothing is contingently knowable – it’s that we will never know everything about the world works
Glezos 20 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 10-5-2020, Routledge, "Speed and Micropolitics Bodies, Minds, and Perceptions in an Accelerating World, pp 80", )//guyB
Turning to Spinoza as a way of helping to understand and combat the rise of ressentiment against speed might appear to be a curious decision as, at first blush, it seems as if Spinoza’s metaphysics are themselves an instance of ressentiment against speed. This is because explicit in Spinoza’s monistic ontology is a complete rejection of contingency. Spinoza views all things as unfolding according to a strict conception of necessity. As he says, ‘[n]othing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way’ (I P29). Everything that happens is fully determined according to the requirements of being. Our perception of contingency is merely the result of our inability to grasp the complete web of causality that determines any action, outcome, or decision. Indeed, in Spinoza’s metaphysics, even God is not capable of contingency saying, ‘God does not act from freedom of will’ (I P32C1) but rather from the necessity of his nature. Despite this rejection of ontological contingency, Spinoza’s work is actually surprisingly useful in helping us understand how people react to contingency in an accelerating world. This is because of the way in which his epistemology works alongside his ontology. For Spinoza, humans are always constrained by our finiteness, and hence our understanding will always be premised upon inadequate knowledge. As such, the perception of contingency in life is ineradicable. It is true that, through rational thought we are able, in a certain way, to perceive things sub specie aeternitatis. But this only relates to understanding the formal logical rules which govern existence. It does not lead us to be able to actively grasp (or predict) all of the web of causal factors which lead any individual ‘thing’ to occur (II P16–17). (And all of this before Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism, with its determinations and limitations of thought, is brought into the mix.) From this perspective, our perception of infinite being will always be incomplete, and we will always see the world as full of contingency. It does not matter if metaphysically there is no freedom or indeterminacy in deus cive natura. Our lives as modal beings will always be replete with uncertainty, no matter how much we might learn about the universe.