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Their description of debate as devoid of politics reveals their Socratic cowardice towards political speed

Glezos 20 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 10-5-2020, Routledge, "Speed and Micropolitics Bodies, Minds, and Perceptions in an Accelerating World, pp 1-3", )//guyB

This card is eh idk at first I was gonna cut it to be an aff “debate isn’t political” card but then I realized the bottom half of the card critiqued that idea so ig it goes neg

Isolates urgency as a generative point of Socrates hatred, very linked to acceleration

It is a brief reference, almost an aside, in a dialogue mostly devoted to questions of morality. In Gorgias, Socrates engages in a dialogue with three rhetoricians, criticizing the art of rhetoric, and debating the nature of morality. However, in the middle of this discussion, Socrates makes the statement earlier as a way of distinguishing rhetoric (and sophistry) from philosophy, arguing that the latter is about expertise and truth, while the former is about flattery. Though only briefly mentioned, this passage is crucial for Socrates’ argument, since it explains why rhetoric can’t ultimately be about truth. This is because the conditions of these kinds of discussions (public debate in the agora) are such as to make real understanding impossible. Bruno Latour, in his discussion of the Gorgias, notes that these conditions are threefold: number, priority, and urgency. Such discussions happen in the context of large groups of people, about important issues, and, crucially, frequently must happen quickly (either because they are responding to fast-moving events, or because the people involved do not have the time to devote to the kind of in-depth discussion and study that would be necessary to produce genuine expertise). According to Socrates, these conditions make ‘real’ understanding impossible. However, as Latour points out, such an approach means that Socrates has, out of hand, dismissed the very possibility of democratic politics. As Latour says Yes, there are too many of them, the questions are too important [megala pragmata], there is too little time [oligô chrono]. Are these not, however, the normal conditions of the Body Politic? Is it not to deal with these peculiar situations of number, urgency, and priority that the subtle skills of politics were invented? ( Latour 1999: 221) Socrates’ vision of truth as purely the domain of the expert – the philosopher – working slowly and assiduously outside of the agora, ultimately means a rejection of the practice of democratic politics. Of course, Socrates (or rather Plato’s) anti-democratic politics have been extensively discussed. Most of this commentary focuses on Plato’s elitism, his rejection of the demos for its failure to possess the understanding of the true and the good necessary to be able to govern themselves. However, the reason I bring this dialogue up is to note the less frequently remarked upon condition that makes Socrates opposed to democratic politics: the condition of urgency. Rhetoric fails not just because it tries to get ‘so many people’ to understand, but because it attempts to do so in ‘such a short time’. The danger of politics is exactly that it must, at least sometimes, be done quickly. And this problem of urgency is, arguably, a greater problem for Socrates than number or priority. While the conditions of number and priority can be resolved through the abolition of democracy and the imposition of a philosopher king, this does not necessarily solve the problem of urgency. While certainly there are many thinkers that argue that a centralization of political authority is the correct response to the problem of urgency,2 this does not free us from the problem of urgency, but, at best, provides a new set of tools for responding to it. What this means is that it is potentially the condition of urgency that shifts Socrates’ position from antidemocratic politics, to simply anti-politics. Socrates hatred of politics qua politics is, I would argue, at root a hatred of speed. To commit to the practice of politics is ultimately to accept that there will be times in which one cannot avail oneself of leisurely reflection and analysis before making decisions and taking action. As a result, by the end of the Gorgias Socrates has thoroughly rejected the politics and debates of the agora, and shifted his argument to the court of the afterlife, describing how the moral man will be judged righteous in the world to come. But as Latour puts it ‘Politics is not about “freshly dead” people, but about the living; not about ghoulish stories of the afterworld, but about gory stories of this world’ (1999: 246). Socrates escapes the world of becoming to the world of being exactly because he cannot ultimately cope with the conditions of politics he experiences within it. And it is, ultimately, the speed of the world of becoming that Socrates seeks to transcend; its uncertainty, its changeability and accelerations.3 R. B. J. Walker describes Plato as a man who ‘seek[s] to flee Introduction 3 from politics into the world of forms’ and refuses to ‘take seriously the world of fleeting impressions, of flux, becoming, and illusions’ (1993: 109). Crucially, as Latour points out, the problem is not just that Socrates seeks to ‘flee from politics’, but that in fleeing he seeks to also destroy the practices that make politics possible. To see a political project through, with the crowd, for the crowd, in spite of the crowd, is so stunningly difficult that Socrates flees from it. But instead of conceding defeat and acknowledging the specificity of politics, he destroys the means of practicing it, in a sort of scorched earth-policy the blackened wreckage of which is still visible today. ( 1999: 239) Having identified the problems of number, priority, and urgency which constrain the process of democratic decision making, Socrates attacks the practices of rhetoric (as well as several other allied arts) by which the Athenian community had learned to grapple with these constraints because they do not meet the standards of his rigorous, slow-moving, didactic philosophical knowledge. Says Latour of this kind of necessarily speedy democratic, political deliberation: Of course ‘it does not involve expertise,’ of course ‘it lacks rational understanding’; the whole dealing with the whole under the incredibly tough constraints of the agora must decide in the dark and will be led by people as blind as themselves, without the benefit of proof, of hindsight, of foresight, of repetitive experiment, of progressive scaling up. In politics there is never a second chance – only one, this occasion, this Kairos. There is never any knowledge of cause and consequence. Socrates has a good laugh at the ignorant politicians, but there is no other way to do politics, and the invention of an afterworld to solve the whole question is exactly what the Sophists laugh at, and rightly so! Politics imposes this simple and harsh condition of felicity: hic est Rhodus, hic est saltus. ( 1999: 242) In short, what we get is a surprisingly common worldview. Truth and understanding can only be developed slowly. Politics necessarily happens quickly. Therefore, Politics cannot be about truth and understanding. In turn, the tactics and practices which are developed to make a speedy politics possible must be devalued and degraded. Socrates’ fear and anxiety of speed translates into his hatred of politics (especially democratic politics) and vice versa.

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