This also accesses a Ressentiment DA because the reactive definition of blackness to a merely opposable term destroys the possibility of freedom and the active creation of value.
Marriott ‘7 /David, associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at the University of California, Santa Cruz, Haunted Life: Visual culture and Black modernity, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, Pg. 233-237/
Fanon borrows this formulation from Nietzsche, in particular The Genealogy of Morals and The Will to Power. Nietzsche defines "ressentiment" as developing in those "natures who are denied true reactions, those of deeds."!' Ressentiment psychology – and this point is crucial both for Nietzsche and for Fanon's appropriation – is distinguished by a consciousness of loss, by a failure to integrate experiences of powerlessness, leaving this experience to remain in the memory as a traumatic kernel, leading to an obsession with past racial injuries that poison the ability of the self to function in the present or project an active future. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche defines "Slave ethics are what] begins by saying no 110 to an "outsider," an "other," a non-self, and that no is its creative act. This reversal of direction of the evaluating look, this invariable looking outward instead of inward, is a fundamental feature of rancor. Slave ethics requires for its inception a sphere different from and hostile to its own. Physiologically speaking, it requires an outside stimulus in order to act at all; all action is reaction" (Nietzsche, The Birth, 170-171). The slave blames the other, or outsider, for his suffering, makes him or her the symbol of evil and a phobic object. This response remains reactive. The slave does not act on the basis of his or her sovereignty, but in opposition to the other's domination. Nietzsche argues that ressentiment indicates a failure, not so much to accept responsibility for one's existence (Sartrean "bad faith"), but a failure to affirm life as a spirit of becoming. Fanon terms it a slavish, reactive attitude toward the future and the past. In this "pessimism of indignation" one assumes that one can do nothing because one is wretched, and one blames someone else for one's wretchedness. This is why, in Wretched of tlte Earth, Fanon argues that the first stages of spontaneous anticolonial violence are always reactive: "racism, hatred, resentment," "the legitimate desire for vengeance," cannot sustain a war of liberation. 14 Such reactive moments are linked to questions of time but in a negative sense, as examples of a reactive affirmation of history. It is precisely because he recognizes racist historicity in these attitudes that Fanon's work is taken up with the problem of time and death. If the limit set to black life is the significance conferred on presence by racism which voids all black life of value as life, with the result that one cannot live it, racism also robs the black of his or her ability to live and so to die as a free subject. Spurned by history, the attempts by blacks to reimmerse themselves in time have resulted in a turn toward allegory and myth. These attempts are condemned because they restrict the life as lived to one held in abeyance, in suspension, a life ossified either by its slavish reverence for the precolonial past or by its abject sacrificing of itself to the future to come, the freedom always to come in eternity. Both attitudes are positings of finite being that refuse to tarry with death as the true scandal of black historical experience and so become even less capable of resolving it. This is not to say that Fanon has lost faith in a redemptive future, or that he wants to routinize and categorize such temporal ecstasies by representing death as life's categorical commandment. Rather that, as in the letter to Tayeb, what matters is the life earned when it plunges into the inexplicable and emerges from it; what matters is how we, like Orpheus, take up the cunning and creativity of ressentiment as a culture on the edge of nothingness. Only by negotiating power and violence can we engage and reconfigure virtue for the modem polity (the "new humanism" that emerges from the "tabula rasa" opened up by the colonized on the path toward revolution-a possibility which is neither an end nor a beginning but an endless "tension of opening" between the twO).IS That is, death as lawless violence is the predicament and possibility of who we are and might become, here, now, the tenses through which we belong irreducibly to this time. This is also why Fanon rejects Sartrean, Hegelian, and other forms of determinate historicism, the logic according to which everything that happens had to happen. Against dialectical logic – and its view that out of experience, no matter how negative. something emerges – Fanon posits a black existential time in which what happened happens and keeps on happening in ways that remain unforeseeable and unknowable but which nonetheless forces us to be responsible at the level of ethics, politics, and will. Throughout Fanon's oeuvre. antihistoricism turns on the difficulty of naming and situating a black orphism beyond identity and alterity, beyond loss and the annihilation of being. True anticolonial violence, if it is to go beyond such Manichacism, must arrive at a teleological suspension of the ethical and so go beyond the spurious opposition between murder and illegitimate right, or murder dressed up as political vengeance. Manichean violence is ressentiment, for liberation is not a higher ethical law than murder and can only be justified in the pursuit of freedom, which is incommensurable with domination but nevertheless implicated in its violence. Hence Fanon is not trying to ethically justify the violence of anticolonial war (as he is often accused of doing). but trying to account for the use of violence in the revolutionary pursuit of freedom." Liberatory violence. in brief. as one possible memory of the future; as one possible pathway through the unjust violences of the political world. Both the conclusions to Black Skill, While Masks and Wretched of t/-ie Earlh define that memory as thc horizon of revolutionary hope and politics. as a rupture of time without end but within time's workings. POl' this reason, I cannot accept Patrick Taylor's dircrnpuvc opposition between Black Skill, While Masks as a work that ends with ethics over history. and Wretched of the Earth as a work that moves from ethics to revolutionary history (Taylor. Narratives, 74-76). Such opposition misreads the conclusion to Black Skill, White Mllsks. where Fanon writes, "I am not the slave of the Slavery that dehumanized my ancestors" (230). Antillean culture is a slave culture for Fanon, following Nietzsche, because its ressentiment represents a cultural-historico paralysis which has not yet become creative and so achieve that active forgetfulness of the past that accompanies successful repression and defines a noble memory of the will. This peculiar anamnesis, which is the result of historically distinct configurations of power, dominarion. and race war, reveals how, for Fanon, the traumas of cultural assimilation for the colonial subject is already marked by historical forces and decisive events whose trauma cannot simply be dispelled by the time of analysis or the methods of genealogy. 17 Slave ethics, insofar as it is reactive and denies responsibility and its ability to act, cannot achieve this cultural-historico transmutation. Through decolonization and violence the colonized can break through the impasse of ressentiment and enter into history. The task for the colonized, Fanon implies, is to risk the orphic "leap" into the "black hole" while also moving Out to the universal (199). One must move beyond the "absurd drama" of colonialism dialectically. One must move to ethics from history because ethics is the affirmation of the radical transformation of time, a decision to change both the meaning of the deathliness of black life and its sign of ressentiment. In the essay "West Indians and Africans," Fanon writes, 'The task consists of removing the problem, puuing the contingent in its place, and leaving the Martinican the choice of supreme values. One sees everything that could be said by envisaging this situation in accordance with the Kierkegaardian stages. "18 These stages arc the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious, Fanon's turn to Kierkegaard is not, as Patrick Taylor presents it, a move from ethics to history or, more accurately, inner morality to objective or ethical freedom. but a recognition of how violence and law pervade each other, and of how ethics is an encounter with the violence of power and its legitimation. The task is to move, not from values based on race to human values understood as transcending the old humanisms of Europe, which formed the foundations of colonial racism, but to address the phantasmatic and racist underpinnings of value as such. Fanon explicitly mentions Kierkegaard when discussing how law and violence remain implicated in the movement from ethics to freedom in history. The slave's struggle for freedom cannot only be defined in ethical terms. On the other hand, it is naive to assume that the decolonial world will exist beyond law and coercion. In Black Skin, W!tiLe Masks Fanon writes, "The former slave, who can find in his memory no trace of the struggle for liberty or of that anguish of liberty of which Kierkegaard speaks, sits unmoved before the young white man singing and dancing on the tightrope of existence" (22t). Because the slave has no memory of that "anguish of liberty," the ethical and the historical condition of freedom remains unavowable. The slave remains a dumb wimess to his own violated singularity which he can neither comprehend, renounce nor test. Fanon says that "the real leap consists in introducing invention into existence" (229). One shows how the ethical is mediated by the promise and actuality of such "invention" by becoming actively creative at the level of history. Acceptance of this coexistence does not "eliminate ... the ethical in oneself," but forces one to return to the ethical as the always potential encounter with the violence of the world as a test of one's faith (Taylor, Narmtives, 76).