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Conceiving bodies as cyborgs reifies violence, ignores who created that technology, and doesn’t solve

DeCook 20 (Julia R. DeCook PhD - Assistant Professor of Advocacy and Social Change in the School of Communication at Loyola University, “A [White] Cyborg’s Manifesto: the overwhelmingly Western ideology driving technofeminist theory”, Media Culture and Society, 28 September 2020, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0163443720957891, MG)

I anticipated much about reading A Cyborg Manfiesto before I ever did. I understood it simply as conceptualizing the femme body as cyborg, dismantling the confines within which these categorized bodies have bene controlled and defined. Cyborg, in Haraway’s conception, blurs the lines of all of these boundaries of identities and will no longer think of itself or function in a society of other cyborgs being confined to these categories of difference and distinction. Notably, the rise of technological networks in the 1980s and beyond made some theorists hopeful that this would signify an end to sex differences being defined within the realm of embodiment (Puar, 2012; Wajcman, 2004, 2007), and the transhumanist movement started to formally organize and attempt to disseminate its ideology into the world during the same period (Bostrom, 2005). It was not necessarily the promise of machines, per se, that began peeling away the very definitions of what it meant to be human, but rather the sophistication and intelligence of the machines themselves and their capabilities that started to break down the idea of bodies ‘ending at the skin’ (Wilkerson, 1997). However, instead of shifting away essentialized notions of gender and sex away from the body, the technological revolution of the late 20th and early 21st century may have further reified and cemented these differences rather than usurping them – and, as recent conversations have begun to point out, this extends beyond gender and affects subjectivity and embodied notions of sexuality, race, and ability.

Although Haraway famously made her claim that she would rather be a cyborg than a goddess to mark the departure of the idea of the woman being a natural, biologically driven ‘goddess’ of the Earth and to embrace the potential of science and technology in what it could provide in shifting the idea of woman as a naturalized, essential concept, the issue still remains that technology is shaped by human factors, and that in turn, it shapes us and our humanity. Further adding to this entangled shaping and shifting that occurs is the rejection of the nature driven idea of the woman (the goddess) and replacing it with the cyborg. Is this desire to replace the concept of woman as goddess with the identity of the cyborg an indicator of washing away humankind’s need to tame nature? Or does it merely replace one technology of control with another? Indeed, the idea of the cyborg is a seductive one because it would potentially replace all of the fragile parts of our humanity with artificial and indestructible ones, but the epistemic groundings upon which much of science and technology are built upon and of which the cyborg is built upon are fraught with violence.

I will never forget the first time I read ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ and felt completely and utterly overwhelmed with a certain brand of imposter syndrome reserved for first generation women of color in the academe. Rather than feeling liberated, I felt I was introduced another definition of being through ‘cyborg’ that seemingly served to further privilege a certain kind of body above others (i.e., a white, able-bodied one). As Wajcman notes, ‘the possibility and the fluidity of gender discourse in the virtual world is constrained by the material world’, (Wajcman, 2007: 292), and when technology is predominantly controlled and made by men, this further adds material constraints to what technology is capable of in granting the agency to redefine race, gender, and sexuality for those that seek to reconfigure themselves by their own terms. As Puar notes by citing Currier, ‘the theorization of cyborgs winds up unwittingly ‘reinscribing the cyborg into the binary logic of identity which Haraway hopes to circumvent’ (Currier 2003: 323)’ (Puar, 2012: 56–57). Although Haraway’s intention with A Cyborg Manifesto was to break new ground in conceptualizing about bodies during the transhumanist turn, the cyborg does not necessarily represent a breakaway from essentialized and dichotomized notions of identity, but exists in the liminal space not oppositionally but frictionally against other subjects and identities (Puar, 2012).

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