Global economic interdependence stifles hegemonic war
Michael Mousseau, 19 (Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, PhD from Binghamton University; “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to perpetual World Peace”; International Security 2019; 44 (1): 160–196. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00352) //LVL
Hegemonic realist theories largely predict never-ending cycles of global war and peace, caused principally by varying rates of economic growth among leading powers that trigger relative gains concerns and yield opportunities for rising powers to assert control and change the rules of the global order. This section identifies four core reasons why hegemonic war, defined as a clash over global leadership, is not only unlikely in the future, but probably never happened in the past. First, if internal factors determine national interests, as I argue, then hegemony cannot exist among status major powers. Preferring disorder wherever they lack control, status powers simply are unconcerned with global rules, and thus have no interest in fighting over them. Motivated foremost to make others their subordinates and avoid being the subordinate of others, status major powers have nothing to gain and everything to lose in acquiescing to stronger states, and therefore usually balance against them. Second, status states cannot reach the level of economic productivity per capita of contractualist states, and thus it is unlikely that any status power could overtake the combined might of the contractualist hegemony. Fortune may occasionally bestow wealth on a status or axial economy, as it did on the antebellum South, which sold cotton and tobacco in global markets, and as it does on oil-rich states today. But wealth is not economic productivity, so such states are ultimately dependent on the contractualist hegemony and can never seriously challenge it. This explains why the South lost the Civil War. The third reason why hegemonic war resulting from changes in relative economic power is unlikely follows from the second reason: in all likelihood, only another contractualist state can surpass the market leader in economic size; and as discussed, no rising contractualist power would ever challenge a declining one. Contractualist states are uninterested in relative power (unless a state is behaving in a threatening manner), and among them, there are no substantial changes in global rules to fight about. Fourth, even if one were to suppose that a rising contractualist power wanted to be dominant among all contractual states, such a power shift cannot happen, because these states’ economies cannot substantially rise and fall relative to one another. As a result of their shared economic type and preferences for normal trade, their economies have largely converged.