Financial reasons for unsustainability are wrong.
Carla Norrlof 16, Ph.D. in IR, Discipline Representative of Political Science at the University of Toronto; and William Wohlforth, Ph.D. in Political Science, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, 2016, “Is US grand strategy self-defeating? Deep engagement, military spending and sovereign debt;” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 36, No. 3, https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894216674953
Retrenchment proponents see American military spending as contributing to the growth of public debt3 and the country’s relative economic decline, and they argue that as it approaches its credit limit, the US should cut military spending and act preemptively to forestall steeper decline and even bankruptcy. Some retrenchment supporters also fear that negative feedback between military overstretch and economic decline will eventually put America’s coercive hegemony at risk because economic might is the wellspring of military might (Calleo, 1982; Chace, 1981; Kennedy, 1987a, 1987b; MacDonald and Parent, 2011). In short, retrenchment proponents agree that reducing military spending is an economic necessity, although they disagree about the extent to which the US should reduce its spending and overseas presence as well as the desirability of sustaining military primacy.
This argument is noteworthy not only because of its centrality to the retrenchment argument, but also because academic defenders of deep engagement have as yet no direct response. Scholars and policymakers who oppose retrenchment maintain that American military dominance has produced significant economic benefits and warn that reductions in military spending will reduce these benefits (Brooks, et al., 2013; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2016; Gottlieb, 2012; Kagan, 2012; Sestanovich, 2014). Three main arguments point to such benefits. First, according to a research program closely connected with the work of Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner, military power underwrites an open economic order. In a series of books, Gilpin and Krasner explain the logic and evidence for hegemonic orders that rest in part on an outsized global military role (Gilpin, 1975; Gilpin, 1981, 1987, 2001; Krasner, 1978). A dominant military power that equates its own interest with expanding economic globalization benefits from providing a stable political context that makes economic exchange more secure and predictable (Brooks, et al., 2013; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2016; Norrlof, 2008, 2010).
Second, military primacy generates other direct benefits, such as official support for the hegemon’s currency; sustained capital inflows during times of distress; protection of residents’ foreign investments; and economic contributions to the hegemon’s military activities, including economic transfers through basing fees (Beckley, 2011; Helleiner, 2008; James, 2009; McNamara, 2008, Norrlof, 2008, 2010; Posen, 2008).
Third, the preeminent military power leverages security to extract economic favors from allies in exchange for protection. As a background condition, security allows the hegemonic power to win concessions in economic and trade negotiations (Ikenberry, 2011; Mastanduno, 2009; Norrlof, 2010). Economic agreements flow from the barrel of a gun.