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Counterplan solves nuclear prolif.

Suzana Anghel et. al 20. PhD in political science from the European University Institute, MA in European Political Studies from the College of Europe, Assistant Professor of Political Science Department of International Affairs at Vesalius College. “On the path to 'strategic autonomy':The EU in an evolving geopolitical environment.” European Parliamentary Research Service. Sep 20. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/652096/EPRS_STU(2020)652096_EN.pdf

4.4.3. Addressing the future of non-proliferation and nuclear deterrence

The world has entered a 'new nuclear age' 127 that is very different from the Cold War, both in terms of characteristics and challenges. Two nuclear superpowers, Russia and the USA, still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons (see Figure 10). The greatest challenge still lies in saving the bilateral agreements between them that have led to a very significant reduction in nuclear weapons over the past 30 years. However, the number of nuclear-armed states that determine whether and when nuclear weapons will be used has grown to include China, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea, and may soon comprise Iran. Pakistan and North Korea rank high on the list of fragile states (25th and 30th respectively). In this overall climate, where multilateral arms control has effectively been declared '(almost) dead', 128 Europe is at particular risk that any renewed arms race between Russia and the USA will play out on European soil. Moreover, even though the probability is considered low, there is a persistent risk that a non-state actor may steal and detonate a nuclear weapon or seek to manufacture an improvised nuclear device. 129

Figure 10 – Nuclear weapons worldwide Source: SIPRI, 2019. [Figure excluded]

The recent demise of the INF Treaty, 130 a bilateral arms control agreement between Russia and the USA, may lead to the redeployment of intermediate-range missiles and put Europe once more in the line of fire of strategic nuclear weapons, for the first time since 1991. The EU called on both parties to save the agreement, but these efforts failed. The last remaining bilateral strategic nuclear arms control agreement between the USA and Russia, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), will expire in 2021, unless both parties agree to extend it as part of negotiations that started in June 2020. New START has been critical to continuing the trend of gradual reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the USA and Russia that started in the 1990s. Its demise could trigger a renewed nuclear arms race between Russia and the USA. At the same time, all nuclear weaponpossessing states continue to modernise their nuclear arsenals. The USA and Russia are investing large sumsin the overhaul of their nuclear weapons systems131 and are working on introducing 'low yield nuclear weapons' with a lower threshold for use. To make matters worse, the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime, is under threat, including from tension between supporters and opponents of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Ban Treaty).

Based on the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems and the New Lines for Action, the guiding principle of the EU in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues to be effective multilateralism. This includes safeguarding the centrality and the promotion of the universality of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, through diplomatic action and financial assistance to third countries and international organisations. EU Member States are signatories to the international treaty regime of non-proliferation conventions concerning nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In addition, the EU actively promotes the universalisation of these conventions. However, the EU's effectiveness in maintaining and shaping the future of the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture has been weakened due to internal divisions over the role of nuclear weapons. France is fully committed to step-by-step nuclear disarmament but considers nuclear weapons to be an essential part of its security strategies for now. A further 20 EU Member States are NATO members and covered by NATO's commitment to nuclear deterrence. These include four hosts to US tactical nuclear weapons (Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) and 16 that are covered by NATO's 'extended nuclear deterrence pledges', including all the central and eastern European Member States. In contrast, Austria, which is not a NATO member, was one of the key drivers behind the Humanitarian Initiative, which led to the adoption of the Ban Treaty. Among EU Member States, only Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Sweden voted in favour of the Ban Treaty, only Austria and Ireland signed it, and only Austria has ratified it. Consequently, there is no agreed EU position on the Ban Treaty, reflecting long-standing division on nuclear disarmament. The EU will have to overcome internal divisions over the role of nuclear weapons if it wants to regain the ability to speak with one voice in international non-proliferation and disarmament fora, give new impetus to the mission of the EU Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation, and be able to act autonomously in an international environment characterised by an increased assertiveness from both global and regional powers.

The EU has been part of several global initiatives at the political level. This includes the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which establishes legally binding obligations on all UN Member States to have and enforce appropriate and effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It also includes the setting up of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the creation of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors' Group and Global Partnership, and the convening of the Nuclear Security Summit. To strengthen regional cooperation against proliferation of WMD, the EU launched the EU Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative in 2010. The EU also pursues close cooperation with individual countries to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. An increasing number of the EU's bilateral relationships include a non-proliferation component. The EU has also contributed to promoting the highest standards and practices in nuclear safety applied in the EU in third countries, and continues to promote alignment with EU policies and priorities in the field of nuclear safety in non-EU countries. These efforts have certainly contributed to reducing the risk of non-state actors acquiring nuclear devices or the nuclear materials needed to manufacture them. However, the EU will not be able to prevent nuclear-armed states from sharing their nuclear technology and material with friendly states, as the USA did with India and Iran, China did with Pakistan, the former Soviet Union and China did with North Korea, and France with Israel. Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have expressed an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclearpower competition among the USA, Russia and China may make it easier for both countries to procure the necessary technology.

To prevent the proliferation of WMD, the EU also controls the export of dual-use goods. Certain goods and technologies have legitimate civilian applications but can also be used for military purposes; 'dual-use' goods are subject to EU's export control regime. EU export controls reflect commitments agreed upon in key multilateral export control regimes such as the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The regime is now being revised, 132 mainly to take account of significant technological developments and to create a more level playing field among EU Member States. The EU is currently considering expanding the definition of dual-use items to include 'cyber-surveillance technologies' – which have been used in connection with serious human rights violations – and to create a new EU autonomous list of cyber-surveillance technology subject to export control that would be more restrictive than existing multilateral export control regimes.

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