Their impacts are fear-mongering, no risk of decline
Fettweis 2018 - Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University Christopher J, Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy, Columbia University Press, p. 168-170
A few things can be said with certainty, however. First, the main engine of U.S. decline-the rise of challengers-has not occurred. Whether because of high costs, the essential benevolence of U.S. unipolarity, or some other factor, the world has not witnessed widespread balancing behavior over the last twenty-five years. States have generally tolerated unprecedented disparities in material power without much reaction at all. No new coalitions have formed to counter U.S. capabilities, which would be symptomatic of "external balancing," and few states are building up their militaries, or "internally" balancing the United States.24 The only major exception to this rule is China, but its commitment to balance is less clear than is sometimes portrayed. Beijing has consistently chosen to devote a very small percentage of its GDP toward defense-at or near 2 percent-a rate that is not growing.25 Increasing Chinese defense expenditures are a reflection of its growing economy, in other words, but not necessarily an increased imperative to balance the United States. Although the real level of Chinese spending is hotly debated, the Peoples' Republic could certainly devote more to its defense if it felt the need.
Second, perceptions of decline thrive during periods of uncertainty, especially those following foreign-policy disasters. It is no coincidence that Paul Kennedy wrote Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the United States in the 1970s or that Otto Spengler wrote about the decline of the West from the perspective of Germany in the early 192os.26 The mixed bag of negative emotions that follow foreign-policy catastrophe-anger, guilt, shame, doubt, insecurity-contributes to an overall sense of pessimism about the future and about foreign policy in general. Disasters always seem to portend even greater ones to come. Status is fueled by perception as much as reality, and when pessimism reigns, decline seems imminent.
Third, the United States is structurally and culturally predisposed to suffer from status insecurity. While all states worry to some degree about their relative power, those at the top tend to worry even more. Psychologists have long known that people are motivated more strongly by the specter of loss than the potential for gain, and no state has more to lose than the unipole.27 People are naturally insecure about what they value most, and the hypercompetitive United States values its status.28 As a result, it is predisposed to worry about losing that status and thereby puts more stock in the arguments of declinists than might otherwise be warranted. Michael Cox has observed that "the United States is a very special kind of polity preoccupied by status and consumed by inner doubt."29 That specialness leads us to fear more than necessary and to obsess over our ranking.
Fourth, proponents of decline tend to confuse concepts. One can argue that unipolarity is coming to an end or that the United States is in hegemonic decline, but the two are not the same. For the former to be true, the power of the United States would have to be waning in relation to potential challengers. For the latter, the influence of the United States would have to be declining. It is the unipolarity-versus-hegemony distinction once again, and, as usual, the two are not kept separate in much of the writing about systemic durability. Previous iterations of declinism consistently conflated the aggregate power of the United States with its ability to bring about its preferred outcomes. The former is much easier to measure, and definitive statements can be made as a result. Today, the only empirical dimension along which the U.S. advantage may be slipping is in aggregate economic power, which is always expressed in terms of gross domestic product. One measurethe growth in China's GDP-has provided the lion's share of the ammunition for those predicting the end of unipolarity. In nearly all other measures of raw and symbolic power, unipolarity shows little sign of waning.