Multipolarity is inevitable – nothing will stop the relative decline of US leadership and the rise of other powers; this is only something to fear if the US tries to maintain its status as the unipolar leader because it necessitates a confrontation with those rising powers
Mearsheimer 2018 - R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago John, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, Yale University Press, p. 227-229
If the United States had not been deeply involved in the developing world, might the Soviet Union have invaded a host of minor powers and turned them into puppet states? Perhaps the Soviets might have attacked a few smaller countries, but the result would not have been a steady string of communist victories. On the contrary, the Soviets would have ended up in one quagmire after another. Just look at what happened when the Soviet military moved into Afghanistan in 1979. They were stuck for ten years and ultimately suffered a humiliating defeat. U.S. interests would have been well served if the Soviets had had more Afghanistans, just as Moscow would have been well served if the United States had had more Vietnams. Baiting and bleeding the other side was a smart strategy for both superpowers.
Yet it is still difficult for American policymakers to think along these lines. Most of them fail to appreciate the power of nationalism and instead overestimate universal ideologies like communism and liberalism. Nevertheless, the historical record shows that the best strategy for a great power dealing with minor powers is to avoid getting involved in their domestic politics-and certainly not to invade and occupy them unless it is absolutely necessary. Aggressive intervention is what great powers should try to draw their rivals into doing. U.S. policymakers should keep this lesson in mind if the Sino-American security competition continues to heat up. A proper understanding of the relationship between liberalism, nationalism, and realism suggests that even the mightiest powers on the planetincluding the United States-should pursue a foreign policy of restraint. Any country that fails to understand that basic message and tries instead to shape the world in its own image is likely to face unending trouble.
Where Is the United States Headed?
The American foreign policy establishment would surely resist any move to abandon the pursuit ofliberal hegemony and adopt a foreign policy based on realism. Both the Democratic and Republican parties are deeply wedded to promoting liberalism abroad, even though that policy has been a failure at almost every turn.18 Although the American public tends to favor restraint, the governing elites pay little attention to public opinion-until they have to-when formulating foreign policy.
Nevertheless, there is good reason to think this situation is about to change, for reasons beyond the control of the foreign policy establishment. It appears that the structure of the international system is moving toward multipolarity, because of China's striking rise and the resurrection of Russian power. This development is likely to bring realism back to the fore in Washington, since it is impossible to pursue liberal hegemony when there are other great powers in the international system. American policymakers have not had to concern themselves with the global balance of power since the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, but the unipolar system seems to have been short-lived, which means that the United States will once again have to worry about other great powers. Indeed, the Trump administration has made it clear, to quote Secretary of Defense James Mattis, that "great power competition between nations is a reality once again," and "great power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of U.S. national security strategy. "19
In a world of three great powers, especially when one of them has China's potential military might, there is sure to be security competition and maybe even war. 20 The United States will have little choice but to adopt a realist foreign policy, simply because it must prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon in Asia. That task will not be easy if China continues to grow economically and militarily. Still, liberalism will most likely continue to influence U.S. policy abroad in small ways, as the impulse to spread democracy is by now hardwired into the foreign policy establishment's DNA. Although great-power competition will prevent Washington from fully embracing liberal hegemony, the temptation to pursue liberal policies abroad will be ever present.
In addition to this lingering tendency to adopt liberal strategies on the margins of a largely realist foreign policy, there is also the danger that U.S. policymakers will not fully grasp that nationalism limits their ability to intervene in other countries just as much as it limits their adversaries' ability to conquer other states. They failed to understand the effects of nationalism both during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War world, and there is no assurance they will get it in the future. Even with the return of realism and the demise ofliberal hegemony, it will still be imperative to sound the tocsins about the dangers of a liberal foreign policy and the importance of understanding how nationalism limits great powers' ability to act.