The AFF’s participation in the space race is based in a fear of weakness, softness, and lack – sustains the devaluement of the feminine other to assert global power
Griffin, 2009 (Penny, PhD and professor in the dept of politics and IR, Univ New South Wales, “The spaces between us: the gendered politics of outer space,” in Securing Outer Space, Routledge, p. 63-64, spp)
As critics increasingly condemned Eisenhower’s apparently passive and unconcerned leadership for being ‘old-fashioned’ and ‘out of touch’ (McDougall 1985:7), a particular political discourse began to emerge in the US, founded on a certain type of sexual metaphor and the assertion of virile, heterosexual masculinity, led by Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. These were both men heavily indoctrinated into the myths and ethos of patriotic frontier masculinity, and who placed at the heart of their politics the virtue of capturing the New Frontier. This reshaping of masculinity, alluding to the ‘pioneer’ adventurers of the old ‘Wild West’ but heavily predicated on mastering the technologies of space exploration, rejected the apparent discoordination of the private sector and the stagnancy of consumerism that, many believed, had caused complacency and heaped embarrassment on the US. Just as the American West had signaled freedom and a virile optimism to expansive, US frontier masculinity (see Hooper 2001: 68-69), so the conquest and colonization of space provided a suitably challenge-filled outlet to revive the frustrated masculinity of late 1950s America. In all this, US political discourse was fueled by a fear of emasculation through Soviet achievement and a national paranoia that the US might be perceived, by others and itself, as in any sense weak, complacent, showing any kind of ‘missile gap’, or aspect of ‘lack’. Eisenhower’s more careful and restrained approach was quickly replaced with Kennedy’s cult of masculine prowess, a career premised, as Dean articulates, on an ‘ideology of masculinity’ constructed around culturally resonant images of the ‘stoic warrior-intellectual’ (Dean 2001: 169). The late 1950s was period of massive US self-doubt, propelled by what Michaud refers to as ‘a surge of discourses on emasculation and feminized conformity’ (2005: 4). Kennedy’s assertion (written in The Nation, before he announced he was to run for his party’s nomination to presidential candidate), that the US had ‘gone soft” physically, mentally, spiritually soft’; that the US was ‘in danger of losing our will to fight, to sacrifice, to endure’’ and that the ‘slow corrosion of luxury is beginning to show’, found great sway across America, an assertion, as Dean illustrates, of manly strength against feminized weakness, youth against age, stoic austerity against debilitating luxury (2001: 170). Kennedy’s immediate focus on the ‘space gap’ signaled the announcement of a more militaristically virile engagement. Space exploration thus became a central policy tenet of the Kennedy government, with the operation to get a US astronaut on the Moon a means of reasserting US authority and avenging any doubts as to the administration’s ability to perform. While the USSR operated a single military space programme, tending to classify many of the (at least earlier) processes of its development of space technology, the US elected a different approach, one that intentionally and actively separated the public and private of space colonization through the creation of so-called ‘civilian’ programmes (ostensibly, more open to the public) run by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), such as the Apollo 11 mission to the Moon, and the more secretive ‘military’ space agencies run by the Department of Defense (DoD) (operating both ‘classified’ and ‘unclassified’ operations).