NATO countries want AI – econ and military benefits
Edward Christie et al, 6-10-2022, non-resident Senior Fellow with PSSI's E&F Threat Program An economist by training, he has held roles in research, industry, and the government sector. He served as a NATO official from 2014 to 2020, including as Defence Economist and Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit;"NATO and Artificial Intelligence," Routledge Companion to Artificial Intelligence and National Security Policy, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4133397// pg. 4-5 EZAY
3. Military AI and its strategic implications for NATO . AI is a general purpose technology, that is, “a single generic technology, recognizable as such over its whole lifetime, that initially has much scope for improvement and eventually comes to be widely used, to have many uses, and to have many [positive economic] spillover effects”, see Lipsey, Carlaw, and Bekar (2005, p.98). Like previous general purpose technologies (such as the steam engine or aviation or computers), AI holds great promise for enhancing both economic productivity and military capabilities. As with computing and information and telecommunications technology (ICT) more broadly, the current development of AI is dominated by the civilian corporate sector. This inverts the traditional relationship between state institutions and the civilian corporate sector: technologies that have comparatively narrow uses or that are quite immature are typically dependent on extended periods of state support before they may be spun off into commercial applications. GPS is a typical example of a successful traditional transfer from the military to the civilian sector (Schroeer, 2018). With ICT, and with the current wave of AI, the technology is of general purpose and at a high level of maturity. This allows for mass production and diffusion to the civilian sector, indeed internationally, leading to a strong dominance of civilian private revenues over state and military revenues in the total sales volumes of leading producers of these technologies, and ultimately to a dominance of the latter in R&D and innovation. As a result, the state sector, including defence institutions, are dependent on and have to follow the technology frontier that emerges from the civilian corporate sector to a far greater degree than is the case with narrower purpose or less mature technologies (Christie, Buts & Du Bois, 2021). In many respects, the drive to adopt AI can be seen as an opportunity to improve and enhance capabilities in ways that mirror developments in the civilian economy (Fischer, 2021; Sayler, 2019). AI-enhanced software applications already enrich people’s lives in direct ways, from auto-completion of emails to helpful recommendations on social media platforms. In the corporate world, a large range of back-office applications and business function support applications are already quite well developed. Predictive analytics for business functions such as maintenance, inventory management, and logistics are common – as is the ability to sift through and analyse vast volumes of data of all kinds, including audio, image, and video data. For defence institutions, failing to “adapt to adopt” such obviously efficiency-enhancing opportunities would be difficult to justify in any international security landscape. In addition, the rise of AI is occurring in a context of revived great power competition. From a global perspective, China has already overtaken the United States on certain metrics of economic and industrial power (O’Rourke, 2021), and it is rational to expect that power to translate increasingly into potential military power and foreign policy influence (Kania, 2017). From the perspective of European security, Russia is back on the world stage, with large, modernised and capable armed forces. Both powers have clearly signaled that they understand the potential of AI and both are taking active steps to adopt AI for multiple uses, including defence and security (Schmidt et al., 2021; Soare, 2021). Due to its digital nature, AI diffuses extremely rapidly across sectors of activity as well as across borders. In practice, it is difficult to see how any great power in the international system could prevent other nations, or indeed non-state actors, from adopting AI for a wide range of purposes, including potentially hostile purposes. This poses serious challenges for traditional security policy efforts in areas such as non-proliferation and export controls. From a strategic perspective, it is also clear that every major power faces a strong incentive to adopt AI rapidly for all purposes, including for defence and security purposes. This general dynamic is a race of a particular kind – not an arms race, since AI is not a type of armament – but rather a technology race, or a “technological adoption race”, as expressed by NATO’s Head of Innovation (Murray, 2020).