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NATO has shown willingness to increase burden sharing but continued US pressure is key to actualize spending increases

WSJ 22 [The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board; oversees the Journal's editorial page, dictating the tone and direction of the newspaper's opinion section; 3/21/22; “The Rearming of Europe”; https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rearming-of-europe-nato-summit-defense-spending-joe-biden-france-germany-italy-11647900481]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has finally motivated European leaders to say they’ll spend more on defense, but promises are the easy part. One task for President Biden at this week’s NATO summit will be pushing the Europeans to be specific about how much they’ll spend and what they’ll buy. European Union heads of state or government said in a March 11 declaration that “we must resolutely invest more and better in defence capabilities.” After a two-day meeting, the leaders vowed to “increase substantially defence expenditures” and “invest further in the capabilities necessary to conduct the full range of missions.” European NATO allies and Canada increased defense spending overall for six years through 2020, but many still don’t hit NATO’s commitment to contribute 2% of gross domestic product to defense. This target should be a floor, not a ceiling, given the Russian threat. Germany, Europe’s biggest economy and its most notorious defense free rider, has led the charge to change. Berlin hadn’t spent more than 2% of GDP on defense since the end of the Cold War, but Chancellor Olaf Scholz said last month his country will meet its commitment from now on. And it’s starting with a €100 billion down payment. Smaller countries are stepping up too. Poland, which already meets the NATO target, recently passed a law increasing defense spending to at least 3% of GDP in 2023. Frontline nations Romania, Latvia and Lithuania have publicly set clear goals or passed legislation to boost military budgets. Yet too much of Europe has only vaguely promised to do more. French President Emmanuel Macron said this month that Paris would increase spending because of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, but without precise numbers. Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi said the war is “an incentive to invest more in defense than we have ever done before” but it’s unclear how far Rome will go. Spain, which barely spends above 1% of GDP on its military, has vowed to hit 2% but hasn’t said when. Countries have different political pressures and processes, and some may be quietly studying what’s feasible. But Mr. Biden can encourage his European counterparts to step up like Mr. Scholz and set the terms of debate in their own countries. Germany showed it’s possible to hit NATO’s modest spending goals immediately, and there’s no reason for others to phase in spending over long stretches. It’s also important to ensure inflation doesn’t wipe out the gains. The U.K. approved spending increases in 2020 and 2021, but with rising prices the budget in real terms could decline in 2023 and 2024. It’s also easy to spend money on items labeled “defense” that don’t really enhance a country’s security. As a defensive alliance, NATO is primarily concerned with defending Europe and perhaps some counterterrorism missions. Ukraine has offered a useful template of how to defend from a Russian attack. Every NATO country should be competent with the basic tools to resist an invasion. That means a ready arsenal of tanks, helicopters, fighter jets and other heavy equipment. As the Ukrainians have shown, antitank and short-range air-defense systems are highly effective. Drones and loitering munitions, even relatively low-tech, are critical to success on the modern battlefield. Europeans can also invest more in the sophisticated coastal- and air-defense systems and long-range precision fires that Ukraine wishes it had now. The danger is that two of Mr. Macron’s fixations—industrial policy and “strategic autonomy”—could collide to make Europe less safe. There should be an emphasis on divesting from Soviet-era equipment, such as MiG jets and air defense systems, and replacing them with European and American systems. As Ukraine is showing, a mix of U.S., European and Turkish platforms can work well together to make life difficult for Russians. But Europeans will have to avoid the temptation to invest in lesser products out of solidarity. Europe doing more for its own defense is good news, but the U.S. has more to do as well. On top of nudging the Europeans in the right direction, major increases to American defense spending are essential and would set the right example.

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