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Conditioning solves and states say yes—reputational costs and threat perceptions

Joel R. Hillison 14, professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College and an Adjunct Professor at Gettysburg College, November 2014, “Stepping Up: Burden Sharing by NATO's Newest Members,” https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2306.pdf, RH

The collective action literature suggests that freeriding behavior is likely to increase as organizations increase their membership. Article 10 of the NATO treaty provides modalities for new members to join the Alliance.11 During the Cold War, NATO expanded from 12 original members to 16 members over a 40 plus-year period. After the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO expanded from 16 members in 1998 to 28 members by 2009. While all members face incentives to free-ride, these incentives increase as the size of the organization increases. In the absence of a commonly identified threat, the rational incentives to free-ride are even more pronounced.

A salient characteristic of NATO enlargement is that all of the new members are smaller than either the United States or the Big Four European members, (Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Italy). The logic of collective action suggests that larger, more powerful states bear a greater proportion of the costs in producing a public good.12 Therefore, the new members would be expected to free-ride in relative contributions to the Alliance. However, free-riding by smaller states has not been the case. Something other than collective action theory is required to explain this phenomenon. As expected, the capability and willingness to share burdens varies from the largest European NATO members (in terms of population and geography) to the smallest. Likewise, burden sharing, as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP), varies based on the level of national economic output. However, the sharing of risks, as measured by military commitments to NATO operations, less closely follows the collective action model. When national interests more closely aligned with Alliance-wide goals, NATO members were more willing to increase their contributions.

This analysis of burden sharing behavior also revealed that new NATO members demonstrate a greater willingness to bear the burdens of the Alliance than older members, all things being equal. Consequently, free-riding behavior increased with the length of membership in NATO. When states’ reputations were on the line, they were more willing to share the burdens of the Alliance.13 In addition, though many of these new members still view Russia as a potential threat and thus favor a greater focus on territorial defense, their level of military spending was not correlated to Russian military spending. These same nations also contributed their best equipped and most combat ready units to NATO missions in such places as Afghanistan.

These phenomena can be attributed to two explanations. First, new members are concerned with establishing a good reputation, not only within the Alliance, but also with the leader of the Alliance, the United States. By providing troops to NATO missions, new members demonstrate their ability to make credible commitments. By demonstrating their loyalty to the United States and the NATO Alliance, they hope to compensate for their historic fear of abandonment. The other explanation is that NATO has invested a great deal of effort into socializing new members and partners on Alliance norms of burden sharing. Thus, it is not surprising that new members explain troop contributions in terms of appropriate behavior for Alliance members, rather than in terms of rational, self-interest.

Finally, this book examines burden sharing behavior in the aftermath of NATO enlargement. The logic of collective action suggests that free-riding behavior should have increased due to the increase in the number of members. However, the actual record is mixed. Even though NATO expanded its scope and membership significantly, all NATO members are contributing, to some extent, to the various on-going Alliance missions. In explaining this result, this work provides a contribution to the extensive literature on burden sharing.

Another plausible rational explanation of burden sharing behavior by new member states is that their calculations are conditioned by their history. Most of the new member states of NATO were previously occupied by Soviet troops following World War II. These former Warsaw Pact countries consequently fear that Russia might try to reassert itself in their affairs. These states also have an historic and deep seated fear of abandonment by the West. Certainly, there is a historic legacy in states such as the Czech Republic, whose sovereignty was sacrificed to appeasement policies prior to World War II; and Poland, which was left alone to face the onslaught of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, despite existing security assurances from France and the United Kingdom (UK). States such as Hungary and the Czech Republic also suffered military interventions by the Soviet Union in 1956 and 1968, respectively. With their unique history, this explanation is less applicable to Albania and Croatia, since these states were outside of the Warsaw Pact. Given this history, new member states would feel threatened by a weakened NATO or a reduced U.S. presence in NATO. Thus, there is some merit to the rationalist argument that these states retain a fear of abandonment and act accordingly.28 Glenn Snyder’s work on security dilemmas in alliances demonstrated that states’ interests might converge over a fear of abandonment.29 Therefore, new NATO members might support out of area Alliance operations, even in the absence of intrinsic national interests. In any case, the fear of abandonment, combined with a pursuit of credibility and side payments, all represent plausible explanations for norm complying behavior. However, as Alastair Johnston points out, “the presence of strategic behavior does not undermine the possibility of persuasion,” nor does it rule out the impact of socialization.30

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