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Public opinion is malleable and shaped by threat perception, domestic preferences for social spending is overstated, and overriding national elites is the key variable.

Schilde et al. 19, *Kaija E. Schilde is an Associate Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. She is the author of The Political Economy of European Security (Cambridge University Press 2017). *Stephanie B. Anderson, Professor of Political Science, Ph.D. University of Cambridge (UK), M.Sc., The London School of Economics, and B.S.F.S. at Georgetown University. Her research focus is on the European Union (EU) as an International Actor, International Relations and Security Issues. *Andrew D. Garner is an Associate Professor at the University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, USA, whose research focuses on the effect of Political, Social, and Media Environments on public opinion and voting behavior. (Kaija E. Schilde, Stephanie B. Anderson & Andrew D. Garner (2019) A more martial Europe? Public opinion, permissive consensus, and EU defence policy, European Security,28:2, 153-172, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2019.1617275)

Indeed, there may be an intuitive logic to EU defence–particularly with regard to pooling and sharing defence burdens–that resonates amongst the public with little persuasion. In recent history, Europe might well have been turning inward, losing its foreign policy influence, and diminishing its role in security and defence. However, these developments cannot be understood as driven by popular opinion. A better explanation for stagnation in defence integration might be that national elites, such as defence bureaucrats and or protected national industries, benefit from the status quo.

An additional implication emerges: it is possible that Europeans may be more supportive of the use of force at the European than the national level. Negative preferences on the use of force and interventions may be capturing low levels of support for national military interventions. Conventional wisdom assumes that individuals support national defence over collective defence, stretching negative opinion results on intervention to the logic of defence cooperation. While their states spend less on defence than the US, it appears that most Europeans are not content with the status quo, nor have they become used to spending less on the military as a matter of principle. Europeans are not so exceptional when it comes to defence preferences. Also, the idea that Europeans inherently prefer butter to guns–allowing the US to subsidise their security with no concerns–appears shaky at best.

This study has clarified the nature of individual support for EU defence, but it has not yet identified the conditions under which individuals support integration. In order to identify more granular determinants of individual support for EU defence, we propose sub-sequent experimental surveys on the topic. We suggest two additional mechanisms at work for future research that are mutually constitutive. The first is that there may be a latent European identification amongst the European public supportive of EU defence. It may not be well-captured by extant public opinion polls, because those questions have historically framed European identity as either layered with national identity or contrasted with it (i.e. are you European, national, or both?).

The second is that this proto-European identity may be activated and driven by threats from outside of Europe. There are certain kinds of threats–of many origins but from outside of Europe–that may provoke a default support for a common European security and defence policy. Perceived threats may take different forms, from competition with the US, reactions to immigrants, instability outside Europe, or Russian geopolitical developments. If true, this could help explain why support for EU defence is so consistent and robust: it may be driven by a succession of threats–from different sources at different points in time–that create logical preferences prioritising European security responses and solutions. We propose testing these additional hypotheses of identity and external threats in future research designs.

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