The credibility of the threat matters—the perm’s diminished credibility means there won’t be burden-sharing
Blankenship 20 (Brian,Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, PhD political science at Columba, MPhil & MA political science at Columbia. February 2020, The Price of Protection: Understanding Coercive Alliance Burden-Sharing http://www.bblankenship.com/uploads/6/6/2/1/66215933/blankenship_priceofprotection.pdf)
How, then, do we explain variation in the success or failure of coercive alliance burdensharing? Since the pioneering work of scholars like Olson and Zeckhauser in the 1960s, the dominant research program on burden-sharing has treated security in alliances as a public good.8 The primary claim advanced by this literature is that the larger members of an alliance will tend to over-contribute to the costs of the alliance, since its success by-and-large depends on their efforts. Smaller members, by contrast, will under-contribute, or “free-ride.” 9 This argument has generated considerable insights into the distribution of burdens in U.S. alliances – particularly in NATO – both during and after the Cold War.10 However, there is much variation that it has difficulty accounting for. It cannot explain why France withdrew from NATO’s military command in 1966, despite being among NATO’s largest members; why Germany since the end of the Cold War has been among NATO’s lowest spenders on defense as a percentage of its GDP; or why, by contrast, smaller NATO members in the 2010s – namely Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – have punched above their weight. Likewise, the economic theory of alliances cannot account for the rise in allied burden-sharing in 1970s and its subsequent fall in much of 1980s.11
In this article, I present a theory which focuses explicitly on a great power’s (or “patron’s”) ability to influence burden-sharing contributions of its junior allies (“allies,” or “protégés”). In particular, the theory explains the conditions under which a patron’s burden-sharing pressure is more or less likely to be effective. I argue that a patron’s burden-sharing leverage is greatest when its threat to abandon the alliance is both credible and salient to its partners. Specifically, a patron can most credibly threaten to abandon allies when it faces constraints on the resources it can devote to its foreign commitments, and when allies are of limited strategic value. The consequences of abandonment, in turn, are most severe for allies that are highly vulnerable to attack.
In order to test the theory, I conduct statistical tests on U.S. alliances from 1950-2012, using data on allied military spending. Three key findings emerge from the results. First, I find that allies are more likely to increase their military spending when the United States faces resource constraints and pressure to retrench in the aftermath of costly foreign wars. Second, allies which are geographically vulnerable spend more on defense than allies with a large margin of security. Third, allies in geostrategically valuable locations near maritime chokepoints spend less on defense. I further illustrate the theory’s causal mechanisms using short case studies on U.S. burden-sharing pressure toward South Korea and the United Kigndom during the 1960s and 1970s.
This article makes a number of contributions. For one, I directly draw attention to the bargaining process that shapes alliance burden-sharing. With few exceptions, the literature on freeriding and burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances has not emphasized the conditions under which great power patrons pressure their allies to pick up the burden. Instead, the literature has almost exclusively focused on three questions: first, whether smaller allies free-ride more than larger allies12; second, whether alliance benefits such as deterrence and defense are truly “public” goods13; and third, how factors outside the context of the alliance itself may influence allies’ defense efforts.14 Studies generally adopt at most a tacit bargaining framework in which allies’ military expenditures are assumed to be responsive to changes in the military expenditures of the largest member.15 This article, by contrast, explicitly focuses on why and when patrons have bargaining leverage for extracting burden-sharing.
Second and more generally, the theory has implications for understanding how great powers – and especially hegemonic powers – manage their partnerships, deter adversaries, and maintain influence in the international system. Classic works in the international relations literature argue that free-riding is inherent in great powers’ alliances with weaker partners, and that the costs of maintaining these asymmetric partnerships can even contribute to overextension and long-term economic decline.16 Moreover, a lack of allied burden-sharing may make it more difficult for hegemonic states to compete with rising powers, and for great powers to deter their rivals more generally.17 Understanding how great powers encourage burden-sharing in their alliances thus has implications for understanding their ability to avoid “imperial overstretch” and navigate power transitions.18