The cp exerts alliance discipline by establishing a reputation of conditional reliability.
Porter 19, Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London and a Fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. (Patrick Porter (2019) “Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition”, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1590079)
To make alliances work for its interests, the United States should restore what used to be part of its repertoire as a great power —the imposition of conditions on its protection, and the credible threat of abandonment. In other words, contrary to the standard orthodoxy often invoked by Trump’s critics, a critical ingredient in an effective patron-client relationship is the cultivation of a reputation for limited reliability, if not unreliability. Thus, the United States should make clear that it is willing to walk away and that its alliance commitments are conditional on its ally’s prudent behavior. In a world of worsening rivalries, the U.S. ability to control escalation and limit inadvertent spirals depends partly on its capacity to restrain third parties and keep its initiative. To make this threat credible, it may require the United States occasionally to terminate an alliance relationship.
There are fine lines to be walked here. The United States has alliances for the most basic purpose of augmenting its power, its reach and the totality of its presence. From this perspective, it is in Washington’s interests to have militarily proficient friends. But its alliances have other rationales that cut against that simple desire. Another central historical purpose of American alliances in the postwar period is to contain its allies. By providing security, Washington in theory removes incentives for its allies to rearm and reassert themselves as challengers. This imperative, to depress allies’ defense expenditure, requires in turn that Washington must establish a reputation for being a reliable security provider. Failure to maintain that baseline of confidence could lead the client to pursue belligerent self-help, or even other allies in lieu of the United States. Yet, establishing a reputation for reliable security provision can and does have a perverse result—it creates a moral hazard. Allies’ confidence in American backing can embolden them to behave recklessly in ways that Washington dislikes. Conversely, the dependency Washington forms on the alliance, as an indispensable platform for its power projection, creates reverse leverage, making Washington reluctant to attempt to impose itself with threats of abandonment or even public criticism.33
Some allied states have tested the possibilities of this relationship with a spirit of adventure, tolerating or encouraging militant Islamist activity, suppressing peaceful protests, committing human rights violations, locking up citizens of allied countries in humiliating and brazen fashion, and threatening or carrying out military campaigns against Washington’s wishes with strategically corrosive results, such as the present onslaught in Yemen. Even the most outspoken supporters of the U.S.-Israel alliance will admit that U.S. guarantees have not restrained Tel Aviv from settlement expansion. As Asia becomes more competitive, a rearming Japan could also start to test alliance boundaries, either because of lost faith in American security guarantees or because it takes them for granted. In Eastern Europe, the cast-iron guarantee built into NATO could lead states to miscalculate and behave recklessly against Russian minorities in their own territory, quickly fomenting a cross-border crisis.
There is a difficult balancing act to be struck here, if the United States chooses to maintain allies to increase its material strength while containing those same allies. The threat of abandonment, or withdrawal of patronage, was once a greater part of U.S. diplomatic repertoire behind the scenes.34 The United States explicitly threatened West Germany, South Korea and Taiwan in order to prevent nuclear proliferation, for instance. It seems to have receded to an extent, after the Cold War, when the sense weakened of the need to keep allies in line coercively. Trump’s public humiliation of and threats to allies, usually followed swiftly by increased U.S. commitment, are probably too hollow and less effective in the long run than the quiet threats made by past administrations.
Certainly, the United States has an interest in preventing allies being complacent about American guarantees, or worse, of the United States being so anxious about losing access and influence that it dare not exercise it. One of the superpower’s greatest advantages is its ability to leave. This is a possibility it should deftly exploit. Against traditional orthodoxies about “global leadership,” the overall U.S. position would benefit from the possibility that Washington might not have an ally’s “back” if it behaves recklessly against the superpower’s stated preferences, or if it hedges too much in favor of rivals. In other words, U.S. alliances are likely to serve U.S. interests better if it ceases fetishizing them.