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Threats of abandonment by the United States increase burden-sharing—credible threats enable successful burden-sharing.

Blankenship ’21 [Brian Blankenship; Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington, in May 2012; 12-30-2021; "The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of US Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2021.2018624; Accessed 7-4-2022; AW]

This article presented a theory of burden sharing in asymmetric alliances. I argued that allies are more likely to burden share when their patron can more credibly threaten to abandon them and when the consequences of abandonment would be more acute for them. Specifically, allies are less likely to burden share when they are more strategically valuable to their patron and more likely when they have a higher perception of threat, which renders them in greater need of protection. I tested these expectations using data on US allies’ military expenditures between 1950 and 2010 and found that US allies vulnerable to attack spend more on defense, whereas strategically valuable allies near key maritime chokepoints spend less. My findings suggest numerous avenues for future research. For one, although this study focuses primarily on the effects of fears of abandonment as a source of variation in burden sharing, further research could investigate the effectiveness of other instruments. These include but are not limited to economic coercion, inducements, and “naming and shaming” undercontributing states. A related line of research could focus on allies’ willingness to contribute to collective goods for reasons unrelated to bargaining or the contributions of other allies, such as normative considerations and values.118 Additionally, more research could be done on when patrons actually want their allies to assume more responsibility for their own defense, as well as on explaining change over time since my independent variables are relatively static year to year. Finally, my findings have implications for debates over US grand strategy. Alliances are central in the debate between those favoring a grand strategy of “restraint,” who advocate reducing US alliance commitments to encourage burden sharing, and those favoring “deep engagement,” who argue that reducing support for allies is likely to lead them to become less cooperative with US preferences and inflame regional security dilemmas.119 This article suggests that US officials may need to lean into allies’ fears of abandonment if they hope to encourage allied burden sharing. However, the United States is not helpless in shaping allies’ burden sharing even when it goes to some length to reassure them by, for example, stationing troops in their territory. Many of the same conditions that make assurances of protection more necessary—doubts about US credibility, concerns about external threat—are also favorable for burden sharing. In these conditions, US policymakers may be able to effectively combine assurances of protection with threats of abandonment, whether tacit or explicit. Thus, the trade-off between reassuring allies and encouraging burden sharing is not absolute.

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