Empirics prove threats of decreased SC are the best explanation for increased burden sharing
Blankenship ’21 [Brian Blankenship; Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington, in May 2012; 12-30-2021; "The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of US Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2021.2018624; Accessed 7-10-2022; AW]
My hypotheses’ predictions fare better than those of alternative explanations. First, whereas a pure internal balancing explanation would have predicted all indicators of shared threat to be positively associated with allied military spending, my theory suggests that shared external threat has cross-cutting effects: higher allied perception of threat increases the chances of successful burden-sharing pressure by making allies more vulnerable to threats of abandonment, whereas higher patron perception of threat has the opposite effect by making allies more valuable and thus undercutting the credibility of the patron’s abandonment threats. Shared threat is only likely to produce greater burden sharing to the extent that the former effect outweighs the latter. Thus, I predicted that land contiguity should have a positive effect on allied military spending, but that the effects of other indicators of shared threat are theoretically indeterminate and likely null (see Table 4). The evidence provides some support for the internal balancing proposition but on balance more strongly supports my expectations. Consistent with both explanations, land contiguity with shared adversaries predicts higher allied military spending. However, whereas shared adversary capabilities are positively associated with allied military spending, which is consistent with internal balancing, the rest of the indicators of shared threat have no clear effect, which is more consistent with my theory. The effect of shared adversary hostile behavior is negative and does not reach statistical significance at conventional levels, whereas allies contiguous to shared adversaries by sea spend no more than allies not contiguous to a shared adversary. Allied proximity to shared adversaries in general has no significant effect; only contiguity to land does (per H1b). This is consistent with my expectation that allies’ proximity to shared adversaries can actually undercut the United States’ ability to pressure them to spend more on defense by making them more strategically valuable to it, but is not consistent with a purely threat-based, internal balancing explanation. Moreover, it is consistent with arguments about the “stopping power of water”; separation from shared adversaries by water insulates allies from attack and thus from the patron’s threats of abandonment.94 Additionally, there is no evidence that democracies spend substantially less on defense than nondemocracies, while GDP does not have the positive effect on defense burdens that Olson and Zeckhauser’s economic theory of asymmetric alliances would predict. Finally, there is no evidence that the size of US troop presence reduces allied military spending. Taken together, these results suggest that the ex ante possibility of US abandonment is a better predictor of allied burden sharing than alternative explanations. Robustness Checks Next, in Table A4 in the online appendix, I test the findings’ robustness by using both broader and narrower codings of my main independent variables—proximity to maritime chokepoints and shared US adversaries. First, I use alternative proxies for allies’ vulnerability to threat and their geostrategic value that include fewer allies in the coding. For chokepoints, in some models, I exclude those near China and Russia in the post–Cold War years, as neither had the power-projection capabilities of a peer competitor such as the Soviet Union, and China’s capability for power projection by sea significantly grew only in the later years of the sample. In another model, I expand the coding to include as a key maritime chokepoint the Strait of Hormuz, as Iran may have had the ability to at least disrupt access through the Strait—though its ability to substantially project conventional power outside the region was quite limited.95 For shared adversaries, in some models I shrink the coding to include as shared Cold War adversaries only those countries that had a defense pact with the Soviet Union; this excludes countries such as China after the 1970s, and Albania after the late 1960s. In other models, I expand the coding to include during the post–Cold War period Libya, Serbia, and Syria, as the United States periodically considered them “rogue states.”96 The results are consistent with the original findings: allies contiguous by land to shared adversaries spend more on defense, whereas those contiguous to maritime chokepoints spend less. Exploring Causal Mechanisms: Fear of Abandonment versus Internal Balancing One challenge in evaluating my theory is that the predictions of H1a and H1b (the presence of and land contiguity with shared adversaries) are identical to those one might make purely on the basis of allies’ perceptions of external threat. To distinguish my findings from this alternative explanation, my approach is twofold. First, I use an alternative dependent variable: allies’ host-nation support (HNS) for US military presence in their countries. Because HNS is compensation to the United States, it is both likely to be the result of American pressure and unlikely to be an internal balancing response. I use US Department of Defense data on allies’ HNS between 1995 and 2002.97 The findings (shown in Tables A5–A6 in the online appendix) suggest that countries that share a US adversary and border it by land provide more HNS. Second, I present qualitative evidence from West Germany and Japan during the 1960s and early 1970s. I selected these cases to concentrate on variation in the threat environment by holding other factors as constant as possible; both countries were large, democratic, close to strategic chokepoints, hosted the most US troops of any allies, and had post–World War II legacies that contributed to US fears about a return to militarism. However, West Germany bordered the Communist bloc by land, whereas Japan was separated by water. I chose the period because it was one of intense burden-sharing interest: the economies of US allies had recovered, and meanwhile US dominance was eroding, its resources constrained by the Vietnam War, and US officials faced congressional pressure for greater burden sharing.98 In these cases, I look for evidence that West Germany feared abandonment more than Japan, that this fear motivated its defense efforts, and that it responded more to US burden-sharing pressure. West Germany Like their predecessors, President John F. Kennedy and his successor Lyndon Johnson favored a strong West German contribution to NATO, and throughout the 1960s the FRG spent upward of 1 percent more of GDP on defense than the rest of European NATO, on average (see Figure 4). Kennedy and Johnson put particular emphasis on the FRG’s purchase of US arms and military equipment, which was dual-purpose: (1) bolstering West German military capability while also making it more dependent on US arms; and (2) reducing the US balance of payments deficit, which produced a large supply of foreign-held US dollars and put pressure on American gold stocks due to the dollar’s convertibility to gold at $35/ounce.99 US and West German policymakers negotiated a series of biannual “offset” agreements wherein the FRG would purchase around $1 billion in US military equipment. Figure 4. West German military spending, 1961–75. Display full size Kennedy and Johnson frequently threatened to withdraw US forces from West Germany to pressure it into greater cost sharing. West German officials repeatedly indicated that they faced budgetary pressure that would constrain the FRG’s military budget and its offset purchases. However, US officials made it clear to them that the continued presence of US forces would be contingent on the size of the FRG defense budget and its offset purchases.100 In late 1962, for example, Kennedy warned Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of “disastrous consequences” if the FRG did not upwardly revise its budget and follow through on its purchases.101 Likewise, the following year Kennedy and his advisers pursued a sustained pressure campaign that included threats of withdrawal in response to lower-than-expected FRG defense spending plans.102 Johnson continued wielding the threat of withdrawal when he took office following Kennedy’s assassination, culminating in 1966 when his insistence on a larger FRG defense budget with the agreed-upon offset purchases, combined with recession and budget deficits in the FRG, contributed to the collapse of West German chancellor Ludwig Erhard’s government and his removal as chancellor.103 Johnson’s successor Richard Nixon was, if anything, even more committed to seeking greater West German burden-sharing contributions. During Nixon’s presidency, FRG military spending rose sharply, from 3% of GDP in 1970 to 4.6% of GDP in 1975. Like his predecessors, Nixon leaned on the threat of troop withdrawals. He instructed NATO officials in 1970 that US contributions to NATO would be partly dependent on their own contributions, and he and other US officials made similar warnings to FRG chancellor Willy Brandt directly. The following year, all NATO capitals were informed that their burden-sharing contributions would influence US force levels in Europe. This pressure yielded commitments from the FRG and other NATO members to increase their defense spending and improve their forces.104 The evidence suggests that FRG policymakers took the US threat of abandonment seriously and tailored their defense contributions to assuage American pressure. One US official noted in 1969 that the Europeans saw “their defense requirements primarily in terms of what they need to provide to keep the Americans committed,” and in 1970 the West Germans requested “an indication … of the minimum European defense contribution” necessary “to constrain [US] budgetary and congressional pressures.”105 Indeed, dating to the 1950s, Chancellor Adenauer and his successors pursued burden sharing not only to hedge against the possibility of abandonment but also to explicitly curry favor with the United States.106 Because of their country’s vulnerability, FRG officials found it difficult to turn down US burden-sharing requests, and US policymakers exploited this.107 Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, cautioned the German ambassador in January 1963 that geography made it very dangerous for the FRG to risk defying the United States, while in 1968 National Security Adviser Walt Rostow stressed the “simple fact” of German vulnerability to coerce the FRG into signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.108 A State Department report similarly pointed to the FRG’s position as “an exposed country, with a contiguous border with the Soviet bloc.”109