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Deep engagement causes free riding—conditions solve

Alley, Joshua Keegan, 8-1-2020[Postdoctoral Research Associate (Politics) UVirginia Ph.D. Political Science (Department of Political Science) Texas AM B.A. International Affairs/Political Science Gettysburg college) “Alliance Participation and Military Spending. “Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University. Available electronically from https://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/189551.] //EZAY

5.1 What Did I Do? This dissertation addressed the question of alliance participation and military spending. First, I reassessed an alternative to my bargaining-focused argument— the public goods model of alliances. After noting that existing empirical tests of the public goods logic suffer from model specification and generalizability problems, I offered an improved empirical test. My examination of the association between economic weight in alliances and percentage changes in military spending found little evidence that small states decrease military spending and large states increase military spending due to alliance participation. In the second chapter, I showed that deep alliance treaties often decrease non-major power military spending, but participation in shallow alliances is more likely to increase non-major power military spending. Last, I explored the sources of alliance treaty depth. I argued that states use treaty depth to assuage allied concerns about treaty reliability in a way that minimizes the domestic audience costs of international commitment. Because democracies have higher audience costs from military support, they use treaty depth to increase alliance credibility. I then showed that democracies are more likely to form deep alliances using a statistical analysis and illustrative case study of NATO. 5.2 What Did We Learn? We learned four things from this dissertation project. First, we learned that alliance participation can increase or decrease military spending. Second, we learned that a crucial prediction of free-riding in alliances based on economic size has limited empirical support. Third, we learned that the impact of alliance participation on military spending depends on the relative bargaining leverage of alliance members difference alliance members state capability and alliance treaty design. Therefore, claims that alliance participation only increases or only decreases military spending are incomplete, because each applies in a specific set of circumstances. Last, we learned that deep treaties follow from attempts to establish a credible commitment of military support between alliance partners while managing the risk of entrapment. All told, my findings suggest that bargaining between alliance members and the credibility of commitment shape the connection between alliance participation and military spending. States’ leverage over allied military spending depends on how they design alliances in response to abandonment and entrapment concerns. Put differently, efforts to ensure credible commitment through alliance treaty design affect alliance members’ military spending. 5.3 Why Does it Matter? My argument and findings contribute to scholarship on alliance politics and international relations. I first address two implications for alliance politics scholarship. After that, I turn to two implications for research on international institutions and international relations more generally. In alliance politics, the conventional wisdom about non-major powers, alliances, and military spending should be revised. While conventional wisdom expects regular non-major power free-riding, I find that alliance participation often increases or has little effect on non-major power military spending. Some alliances do reduce non-major power military spending, but these alliances are unusually deep and capable. The findings about when non-major powers can reduce military spending in alliances should also inform debates about US alliances. If the United States wants allies to spend more on defense, it may need to change the nature of its alliance commitments. By increasing the credibility of US commitments, deep US alliances may undermine attempts to encourage higher allied defense spending. The United States formed deep alliances to reassure allied states, but reassurance may be incompatible with demanding more investment in military capability. Therefore, reconciling competing views of alliances in US grand strategy will be difficult. If the United States wants allies to spend more on defense, less emphasis on credible commitments may be necessary. If allies have low defense spending, deep alliances like NATO rarely encourage increases. This means that deep engagement to reassure partners may lead allies to maintain low defense spending, which is a common criticism of US alliances in the restraint school. In addition to alliance politics, this dissertation makes two contributions to international relations scholarship. First, the results provide new evidence about how states use different policy tools as complements and substitutes. Arms and alliances are a classic example of substitutes, but I find that they are complements for non-major powers in shallow alliances and substitutes in deep alliances. Therefore, even if policies provide the same good, substitution is unusual. It may be hard to find empirical evidence of substitution in foreign policy (Starr, 2000) because substitution is rare and highly conditional. Second, the argument and findings in Chapter 3 reinforce the importance of accounting for differences in institutional design. Studies of trade e.g. (Allee and Scalera, 2012; Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 2007), bilateral investment treaties (Blake, 2013; Simmons, 2014) and the rational design of institutions literature (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001) all acknowledge this point. Translating theories of institutional heterogeneity into research design is challenging, however. Many studies of international institutions rely on state-level aggregate measures. When scholars are interested in inferring how institutional characteristics modify the consequences of participation, they could employ variants of the multilevel model in Chapter 3. If scholars are only interested in estimating the specific effects of individual institutions, and states are not neatly nested within institutions, the model in Chapter 2 could facilitate inferences.

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