Burden sharing solves security cooperation over cybersecurity, tech, and hybrid war
Melissa Dalton 20, directs the Cooperative Defense Project and is deputy director and a senior fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C; Hijab Shah, associate fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS, May 2020, “Partners, not Proxies: Capacity Building in Hybrid Warfare
Partners will be vital to the allies’ ability to compete effectively in hybrid warfare environments. Pursuing partnerships through a principled approach provides the allies with an asymmetric advantage in contrast to rivals that resort to autocratic, deceptive, and extra-legal tactics. Allies’ laws, principles, and values are strategic advantages in hybrid warfare. Investing in partners rather than casting them as proxies will increase allied strategic action and operational effectiveness. The allies should select, design, and pursue security partnerships based on the following guidelines:
Be the Partner of Choice: The allies should be the partners of choice. They should be reliable, committing up front to common outcomes and objectives defined with the partner, with clear communication as to expectations, red lines, duration of the partnership, and steps that will be taken if the partner makes choices that depart from a principled approach (e.g., undermining legitimate civilian authorities, human rights violations, or extra-legal actions). They should provide quality training, advising, and equipment to enable interoperability with the allies and other partners and sustainment to provide actual military capability. They should be transparent with the partner, civilian authorities, and public about the purpose of and expectations for the partnership. • Select Partners to Increase “Portfolio Strength”: The allies are fortunate to have a strong network of partners. In seeking new or strengthened partnerships in hybrid warfare environments, the allies should be more selective of partners, seeking fewer, higher-quality partners to fortify collective strengths important for competition in hybrid warfare environments, such as good governance and transparency. Partners should be selected for these attributes and incentivized to make choices that reinforce them. Recognizing that some partnerships will be transactional, the allies should calculate risk thresholds and diminishing returns at the outset and be upfront with the partner to avoid unmet expectations that may do more damage to allied and partner interests than the value of the transactional relationship. If a high-quality partner cannot be found, then allies should determine whether to intervene militarily at all.
Identify Sources of Partner Legitimacy: Partner capacity to perform security missions and political will to complete them are essential ingredients for successful security partnerships. Partner legitimacy is paramount in hybrid warfare environments in terms of how the civilian authorities and population view local security forces and, relatedly, the partner’s relative control of territory. As competitors seek to discredit, corrupt, and alienate security actors that do not accord with their interests, partner legitimacy will be an important source of resiliency. Defining thresholds and criteria for determining legitimacy in particular country contexts will be important for the allies to decide where best to place their engagement and investment. Working with the partner in parallel to identify ways to regulate corrupt actors within the partner’s governance system will also be important to strengthening legitimacy.
Plan and Execute Capacity Building Jointly: Allies should work directly with partners to identify outcomes, objectives, milestones, and conditions for capacity building. This serves to strengthen the basis of the partnership, distinguishes it from a proxy relationship, clarifies intent and expectations, and gives the partner ownership of the consequences of working with the allies—and vice versa. Ideally, the security partnership can be codified in a bilateral compact spelling out these terms. It also serves as the basis for the allies to address partner transgressions and to offramp the relationship if the partner deviates from the joint plan. Capacity-building plans should be made as transparent as possible to sustain political support through transitions in government in allied and partner countries and to hold them accountable to strategic, fiscal, and principle-based goals.
Engage the Partner at the Right Level When Political Choice is Involved: Even in transactional relationships, the allies may have to ask the partner to operate in new territorial areas, build relationships with new or difficult local actors, or refrain from taking actions in order to achieve common goals. These decisions may transcend the operational authority of the partner, particularly in contested environments where the partner’s sources of legitimacy are threatened. The allies should seek to engage the partner at the right level where political decisions can be made, such as when the partner may have to assume short-term risk to accomplish shared objectives. Such engagement will necessarily involve not only allies’ military commanders but, more importantly, its diplomats. It will require close coordination among allied civilian-military leadership, identification of incentives to persuade the partner, and a credible explanation of what withdrawing allied support will mean if the partner says no or deviates from agreed upon next steps.
Integrate Security Partnerships into a Campaign Approach: Security partnerships should be nested within an adaptable campaign approach to compete with rivals in support of civilian capabilities. Partnerships should not be planned or executed in siloed security or operational communities but rather fully integrated to achieve political outcomes and objectives and tailored for specific hybrid warfare environments. This includes designing and implementing military and intelligence information operations in support of civilian public diplomacy and strategic communications to counter disinformation and misinformation from rivals. Information should be elevated as a “good” to subvert rivals’ agenda by encouraging open and transparent societies and strengthening the role of and communication with civil society. Necessarily, a campaign approach will need to adapt over time to changes in the environment, allies’ priorities, and rivals’ tactics and behavior. Allies accordingly should take a long-term view to the return on political investment in security partners.
In addition, the allies should take several concrete steps to be more strategic and effective in working together while capacity building in hybrid warfare environments:
Clarify Definitions, Interests, and Comparative Advantages: The allies are not on the same page in defining what constitutes hybrid warfare or capacity building, complicating efforts to work together, deconflict, and avoid duplication or the undermining of each other’s activities. At a minimum, the allies must decide where hybrid warfare poses risks to individual state interests and where they can work most usefully together to reduce their vulnerabilities. This should also include a shared calculation of where each ally can bring its relative comparative advantage in planning, resourcing, partner engagement, and deployment of specific capacity-building tools in support of a civilianled integrated approach to countering rivals. The allies will have to exercise humility to be transparent with each other about where they have shortcomings and where other allies may be better suited for a mission, capability, or task.
Identify How Burden-sharing Creates Opportunities: Burden sharing enables allies to optimize for their comparative advantages based on political, economic, cultural, operational, and informational capabilities. It not only makes fiscal and strategic sense, but it also can open opportunities for future combined approaches to planning, resourcing, and execution. For example, pooled donor funds used for northeast Syria stabilization enabled coalition civil-military operations to proceed even as direct U.S. political and fiscal support waned. This model could be replicated in terms of its bureaucratic and financial structures for other contexts.
Create Dynamic Campaign Approaches: Hybrid warfare environments will move swiftly past static coalition plans, as competitors routinely test the boundaries and thresholds of what the allies will abide, including coercion of partner institutions, disinformation and misinformation operations, and cyber intrusions. The allies must create dynamic campaigns with an adaptable mandate for partners that can flex to the evolving threats from competitors while bound by the guidelines discussed above. Combined allied planning for campaign design and monitoring and evaluation of its implementation will be important to calibrate priorities and investments over time.
Invest in “Frontline” Allies to Build Their Capacitybuilding Competencies: Allies with first-hand experience countering hybrid warfare threats domestically may be well suited to lead capacity building with security partners in other hybrid warfare environments. Investing in those allies and giving them a leading role with partners thus can leverage proven strategies and tools. For example, Canada’s cooperation with Latvia and Lithuania has strengthened the Baltic allies’ ability to provide capacity building in Ukraine, thereby also reinforcing NATO’s collective strength and competencies, which can be applied in other theaters.