Burden sharing allows the US to focus on China
Felde ’22 (Rainer Meyer zum Felde, Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University, 6/12/22, “Russia-China Relations”, 261-262, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3.pdf) //sethlee
Europeans need to accept transatlantic burden shifting in order to “keep the Americans in”. While significantly fewer US forces and capabilities will be available for fighting and winning a regional war in Europe, some European NATO allies, including Germany as a key member, have long hesitated to fully implement their current commitments and were not even considering further upgrades in response to the deteriorating geopolitical situation (Meyer zum Felde, 2020b). US representatives have been clear in recent years that the US military is no longer able to fight and win two major wars simultaneously in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and that the primary US focus is shifting toward China (Russia is perceived as the near-term, but China as the long-term and more difficult, bigger challenge; see Colby, 2021b). It follows that Europeans need to take on much more of the burden of deterring and defending NATO member states in Europe against Russia. Against this background, the NATO capstone documents for NATO defense planning agreed at Wales, Warsaw and Brussels have all been designed toward a fairer transatlantic burden-sharing and more European forces, capabilities and contributions. However, in terms of implementation, European member states—first and foremost Germany—have taken a steady but rather slow approach in their turnarounds and implementation efforts. What remains required in Europe vis-à-vis Russia is significant US military presence and power, particularly in critical capability areas—extended nuclear deterrence, critical enablers and force multipliers, air power, naval power, cyber. In return, Europeans need to accept the US request for burden shifting and take more responsibility for filling the gaps in NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. This applies particularly to Germany, despite its obvious unwillingness to keep its pledges and again play its role as the conventional backbone for collective defense in Europe. Whether or not Europe will be able to maintain its security depends first and foremost on the USA, and next on Germany. Both need to take their responsibilities seriously, and consequently accept that in military burden sharing and shifting, they have to take their fair share according to their political and economic weight. Above all, it is essential for Europe’s security that both give the Russian leadership no reason to change its risk calculus.