Equal burden sharing is key to US interests--- including presence in Asia.
Monie, 21 [Connor Monie, PhD student in political science at the Schar School of Policy and Government, 4-14-2021, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, ‘Perennial Friction: NATO and Burden Sharing Concerns’, https://csps.gmu.edu/2021/04/14/perennial-friction-nato-and-burden-sharing-concerns/ /alundy]
President Biden comes into office with a similar gripe against wealthy European allies. Defense spending has increased in recent years, yet many European governments remain unwilling to allocate the amount of resource sought by their American counterpart. Geopolitical trends will only serve to intensify US entreaties for greater equality in defense burdens: the focus on Beijing as Washington’s primary adversary will continue to put budgetary pressures on US military commitments in Europe. President Biden will be forced to walk a tightrope between his stated goal of revitalizing the transatlantic community and the tradeoffs associated with a focus on the Indo-Pacific.
President Biden and his team face the same perennial problem vis-à-vis NATO that their predecessors faced: stronger allies tend to absorb disproportionate costs in providing security for all members and chafe at that imbalance. argue that free-riding is less harmful than it is often described to be and that the rhetoric often distorts reality. contend that standard metrics of burden sharing measure the wrong things, resulting in biased estimates of national defense contributions. Still others posit that smaller allies rationally pay a smaller share of alliance costs, whether because or because they are . Whatever the case may be, the US interest in inducing Europeans to spend more on defense — and their disinclination to do so — will persevere throughout President Biden’s time in office.
Pleasing rhetoric notwithstanding, President Biden is likely to continue in the tradition of post-Second World War presidents by prodding the Europeans to expand their contributions to NATO. This tradition traces its roots through decades of American foreign policy all the way back to NATO’s inception. Moreover, current trends in US interests are likely to exacerbate the Biden team’s preference for greater European self-sufficiency in the defense sphere. Though the style of the new administration will certainly be a departure from President Trump’s antagonistic approach, this feature of US relations toward the NATO alliance will endure. The task of President Biden is to simultaneously placate European fears of US disengagement in light of its emphasis on the Indo-Pacific while appearing credible enough in its demands for European contributions that the Europeans take notice. This will be a difficult endeavor, but also a necessary one if the US is to synchronize its disparate commitments, interests, and regional force postures.