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Interest asymmetry means only a resolved Europe signals NATO has a stake in Baltic defense.

Gopalan 18, a professor of law and pro vice chancellor for academic innovation at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia. He previously was co-chairman or vice chairman of American Bar Association committees on aerospace/defense and international transactions, a member of the ABA’s immigration commission, and dean of three law schools in Ireland and Australia. He has taught law in four countries and served as a visiting scholar at universities in France and Germany. (Sandeep, July 11th, 2018, “A new security alliance might be better than NATO free-riders”, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/395875-a-new-security-alliance-might-be-better-than-nato-free-riders)

The provision with bite is article 5 — that is, members agree “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,” and in response, NATO will assist by taking “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” Yet, even this provision is not that strong. It doesn’t commit members to take military action in all cases of armed attack against a member. For example, Germany is not obligated to attack Russia if the latter invades Estonia. Collective self-defense is subject to pragmatic considerations of expediency and self-interest.

In other words, while NATO might provide limited deterrence against Russian adventurism, this is largely predicated on adversely impacting U.S. self-interest. Put differently, Russia is not so naïve as to be deterred by the prospect of a military response from Europeans when U.S. interests are not affected. Russia knows that the Germans and French are unlikely to sacrifice their troops or commercial interests and go to war if Russia acts aggressively against, say, Poland. Therefore, if deterrence is the goal, America must decide what price it is willing to pay to save Poland — and who should foot that bill.

At present, European states are gambling on the U.S. paying, even though they have more to lose than the United States from Russian aggression. It may be time for Trump to call that bluff and make them pay up if they really care about security. If they don’t, the United States might be better off creating a new alliance of willing states that are prepared to contribute to collective security against modern threats including cyber attacks and other forms of warfare. That might guarantee better protection for Poland and Estonia than do their free-riding neighbors.

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