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Current burden-sharing strategies are based in too many skewed factors--- new burden sharing is necessary for fairness and recognition among allies.

Mattelaer, 16 [Alexander Mattelaer, 3-1-2016, Assistant Director of the Institute for European Studies (IES) in Brussels, Belgium. PhD in Political Science from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, ‘Revisiting the Principles of NATO Burden-Sharing’, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2821&context=parameters /alundy]

A thousand different ways exist for evaluating Alliance burden sharing. This has not only to do with methodology, but also with the tendency in all nations to discount the value of the efforts undertaken by others. Engaging in this debate, therefore, requires careful consideration of the available approaches and the broader purpose these serve. This section reviews the metrics currently in use and contrasts these with frequent criticisms and alternatives. It goes on to discuss their historical inspirations, which helps to transform a debate that tends to focus on defense accounting into one on military strategy. Commonly agreed principles of Alliance strategy are of greater importance than numeric details divorced from their historical and geographical context. At present, NATO defense planners evaluate burden-sharing on the basis of eleven metrics that measure financial inputs as well as military outputs. The best known of these are the investment parameters, namely the percentage of GDP spent on defense expenditure and the percentage of overall defense expenditure spent on major equipment and Research & Development, currently set at 2 percent and 20 percent. With respect to military capabilities, NATO planners track the percentages of any ally’s armed forces that are deployable and sustainable on expeditionary US Leadership and NATO Mattelaer 27 operations. They also evaluate the extent to which every ally implements the national capability targets assigned under the NATO defense plan- ning process.5 An additional guideline in this regard is that no ally can be asked to provide more than 50 percent of any individual capabil- ity set during the apportionment of national targets. The underlying idea here is to wean the Alliance off its near-exclusive reliance on a single ally—read the United States—for certain capabilities. A third set of metrics concerns actual contributions: the percentages of deploy- able land forces, airframes, and vessels that are effectively deployed on operations, the extent to which an ally fills assigned staff positions in the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure headquarters, and the contribution made to filling the requirements of the NATO Response Force. Depending on what measurement parameters one prefers to look at, a different picture emerges. The share of GDP spent on defense often makes media headlines, but this metric draws frequent criticism on methodological grounds.6 Most importantly, it does not differentiate between defense spending for national and for Alliance purposes. It is no secret the United States—which scores the highest on this scale— also has significant national responsibilities that lie far beyond the remit of the Alliance, such as its security guarantees to South Korea and Japan. In some European capitals, it is a rhetorical question to ask whether the United States would spend a dollar less on its military if its allies were to spend more. In addition, alternative metrics are occasionally put forward. These would typically skew the balance in a particular direction. Measuring defense spending per square kilometer of national territory would constitute an extreme example of this kind. Last, but not least, there is the discussion on common funding. While small in size relative to overall defense spending, NATO’s common budgets arguably constitute the purest expression of how the bills of the Alliance are split. The cost-sharing arrangement for the civil budget, the military budget, and the NATO security investment program follows an agreed formula based on Gross National Income.7 One important exception to this formula is the United States, which assumes a 22.14 percent share of the total, whereas its economic weight within the Alliance accounts for more than 40 percent of the NATO total. Taking this discount into consideration, the largest proportional share of NATO common funding is thus borne by Germany (14.65 percent), the ally otherwise most notorious for not meeting investment targets. It is easy to get lost in the jungle of data that these metrics generate. They also bear little direct relationship to the changing security environ- ment the Alliance faces and the precise mix of military capabilities that is required for meeting future challenges. In other words, a focus on any particular parameter is akin to putting the cart before the horse. It is therefore well worth remembering that during the first decades of the Alliance’s existence, successive strategic concepts articulated a list of general principles deemed fundamental to the organization of a common defense. As coined by the 1949 Strategic Concept, the list ran as follows (emphasis added)

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