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Security cooperation during peacetime emboldens allies and causes entrapment during conflict scenarios—cooperation signals a willingness to cooperate.

Blankenship and Kuo ’20 [Brian Blankenship and Raymond Kuo; Brian Blankenship is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington, and Raymond Kuo holds a Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; M.S. in international relations, London School of Economics and Political Science; B.A. in college of social studies, Wesleyan University; 3-3-2020; "Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military Exercises Escalate Conflict?"; Sage Journals; https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00220027211023147#:~:text=We%20find%20that%20JMEs%20do,the%20context%20of%20an%20alliance.; Accessed 7-16-2022; AW]

Consequently, JMEs are public and costly forms of interstate security cooperation, and, as seen in Figure 1, their frequency has risen over time. They are “sharp in,” in that their inputs – national military contributions, chain of command, exercise objectives, timing, and other considerations – are clearly defined for all participants at the outset. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 350-50-3 outlines six purposes of mission command training programs, including:6 1. Warfighting exercises, where troops simulate plausible defense scenarios; 2. Command exercises, where officers prepare for integrated command with Joint Staff (across military services) and geographic commands; and 3. Mission readiness exercises, where defined units test their ability to immediately carry out specific missions. The number of troops involved depends on the mission. The smallest are typically command post exercises, where participants focus on the battle readiness of staffs to handle simulated combat situations. Actions on the “battlefield” are simulated (often via computer), and these results are fed to participating officers, who then respond and issue orders, which are again carried out via simulation. Field training 3Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. War Game in West Germany to Be Cut Back,” New York Times, December 14, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/14/world/us-war-game-in-west-germany-to-be-cut-back.html. Arms export data drawn from SIPRI. 4Data drawn from McManus (2017). 5Calculation made using ATOP dataset. (Leeds et al., 2002). 6Mission Command Training Program (2014). 4 Figure 1: Number of Joint Military Exercises by Year, 1974–2010. exercises, by contrast, are “test runs” of often large-scale operations. They can involve thousands of troops, combat vehicles, and military and civilian transportation and logistics support, all overseen by cadres of commanding officers. Regardless of size, joint military exercises are typically self-contained, tightly controlled and coordinated, and last between a few days to a few weeks. In the United States, the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish an exercise’s training objectives, force and equipment requirements, and the chain of command in coordination with all international participants. FM-25-4 recommends 13-14 months of lead time to prepare for an exercise.7 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) are signed to ensure 7Army Field Manual 25-4: How to Conduct Training Exercises (1984: Table 4). 5 all participants understand the JME’s terms, and there is a final meeting to confirm all parameters and restrictions. In addition, the exercise commander has terminal responsibility for all troops and their actions, and so is provided with extensive lists of personnel and equipment (down to the serial number). In total, JMEs are sharply delimited in their structure, purpose, and participants to ensure accountability at all levels. But while JMEs are “sharp in,” they are not “sharp out.” They produce strategic effects exceeding and not managed by their operational bounds and command structure. This can be best understood through the scholarship on “arms and alliances.” According to Morrow (1993), states have two general paths to generate security. The first is “arms,” by which we typically mean the direct acquisition of military power solely under a single state’s authority. The second is “allies,” commitments of military support from one country to another. JMEs appear to advance both paths simultaneously. Training improves warfighting performance, organizational resilience, and logistical efficacy (the “arms” pathway). Critically, this increases the likelihood of conflict escalation and war by prompting leaders to reach for military solutions to foreign policy challenges.8 Along the “allies” pathway, JMEs signal, at minimum, the willingness of the two countries’ military forces to cooperate in specific scenarios. Moreover, as McManus and Nieman (2019) elaborate, exercises are an integral means for (particularly powerful) states to demonstrate broader alignment and support for a security partner. In 1963, for example, the United States agreed to hold an exercise with and in Saudi Arabia to challenge United Arab Republic intervention in North Yemen and deter any further incursions into nearby Saudi territory (Department of State Office of the Historian, 1995: 290-291, 300). Despite not having an alliance treaty with Riyadh, the JME implied that the United States would at minimum bolster Saudi defenses through training and material support, if not direct intervention. By signaling support through both the arms and allies paths, exercises are doubly effective at deterring adversaries. But too much support, as Snyder (1997) discusses, can lead partners to escalate conflict through adverse behavior – activities that one partner does not want to encourage in another partner, because such an action has negative repercussions for the first state’s security. Chief among these potential risks is entrapment, in which a state, emboldened by and seeking to stretch a partner’s support, escalates conflict for its own individual advantage while dragging its partner into the conflict through reputational, strategic, and/or 8 See, for example, Stares (1975); Craft (1999); Kinsella and Tillema (1995); and Krause (2004). 6 audience cost mechanisms. Later authors contend that entrapment is rare because states can use ambiguity, conditionality, “backing up” from their commitment, and outright reneging to avoid being entangled in their partners’ conflicts (Kim, 2011; Benson, 2012; Beckley, 2015). However, even if states are able to avoid having to support their partners in wartime, their signals of support in peacetime may nevertheless embolden partners to act aggressively (Snyder, 1997; Cesa, 2010; Edelstein and Shifrinson, 2018).

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